This commit adds support for encrypted KES
client private keys.
Now, it is possible to encrypt the KES client
private key (`MINIO_KMS_KES_KEY_FILE`) with
a password.
For example, KES CLI already supports the
creation of encrypted private keys:
```
kes identity new --encrypt --key client.key --cert client.crt MinIO
```
To decrypt an encrypted private key, the password
needs to be provided:
```
MINIO_KMS_KES_KEY_PASSWORD=<password>
```
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <hi@aead.dev>
This commit optimises the ETag decryption when
listing objects.
When MinIO lists objects, it has to decrypt the
ETags of single-part SSE-S3 objects.
It does not need to decrypt ETags of
- plaintext objects => Their ETag is not encrypted
- SSE-C objects => Their ETag is not the content MD5
- SSE-KMS objects => Their ETag is not the content MD5
- multipart objects => Their ETag is not encrypted
Hence, MinIO only needs to make a call to the KMS
when it needs to decrypt a single-part SSE-S3 object.
It can resolve the ETags off all other object types
locally.
This commit implements the above semantics by
processing an object listing in batches.
If the batch contains no single-part SSE-S3 object,
then no KMS calls will be made.
If the batch contains at least one single-part
SSE-S3 object we have to make at least one KMS call.
No we first filter all single-part SSE-S3 objects
such that we only request the decryption keys for
these objects.
Once we know which objects resp. ETags require a
decryption key, MinIO either uses the KES bulk
decryption API (if supported) or decrypts each
ETag serially.
This commit is a significant improvement compared
to the previous listing code. Before, a single
non-SSE-S3 object caused MinIO to fall-back to
a serial ETag decryption.
For example, if a batch consisted of 249 SSE-S3
objects and one single SSE-KMS object, MinIO would
send 249 requests to the KMS.
Now, MinIO will send a single request for exactly
those 249 objects and skip the one SSE-KMS object
since it can handle its ETag locally.
Further, MinIO would request decryption keys
for SSE-S3 multipart objects in the past - even
though multipart ETags are not encrypted.
So, if a bucket contained only multipart SSE-S3
objects, MinIO would make totally unnecessary
requests to the KMS.
Now, MinIO simply skips these multipart objects
since it can handle the ETags locally.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <hi@aead.dev>
In bulk ETag decryption, do not rely on the etag to check if it is
encrypted or not to decide if we should set the actual object size in
ObjectInfo. The reason is that multipart objects ETags are not
encrypted.
Always get the actual object size in that case.
This commit fixes a subtle bug in the ETag
`IsEncrypted` implementation.
An encrypted ETag may contain random bytes,
i.e. some randomness used for encryption.
This random value can contain a '-' byte
simple due to being randomly generated.
Before, the `IsEncrypted` implementation
incorrectly assumed that an encrypted ETag
cannot contain a '-' since it would be a
multipart ETag. Multipart ETags have a
16 byte value followed by a '-' and the part number.
For example:
```
059ba80b807c3c776fb3bcf3f33e11ae-2
```
However, the following encrypted ETag
```
20000f00db2d90a7b40782d4cff2b41a7799fc1e7ead25972db65150118dfbe2ba76a3c002da28f85c840cd2001a28a9
```
also contains a '-' byte but is not a multipart ETag.
This commit fixes the `IsEncrypted` implementation
simply by checking whether the ETag is at least 32
bytes long. A valid multipart ETag is never 32 bytes
long since a part number must be <= 10000.
However, an encrypted ETag must be at least 32 bytes
long. It contains the encrypted ETag bytes (16 bytes)
and the authentication tag added by the AEAD cipher (again
16 bytes).
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <hi@aead.dev>
This commit adds support for bulk ETag
decryption for SSE-S3 encrypted objects.
If KES supports a bulk decryption API, then
MinIO will check whether its policy grants
access to this API. If so, MinIO will use
a bulk API call instead of sending encrypted
ETags serially to KES.
Note that MinIO will not use the KES bulk API
if its client certificate is an admin identity.
MinIO will process object listings in batches.
A batch has a configurable size that can be set
via `MINIO_KMS_KES_BULK_API_BATCH_SIZE=N`.
It defaults to `500`.
This env. variable is experimental and may be
renamed / removed in the future.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <hi@aead.dev>
ListObjects, ListObjectsV2 calls are being heavily taxed when
there are many versions on objects left over from a previous
release or ILM was never setup to clean them up. Instead
of being absolutely correct at resolving the exact latest
version of an object, we simply rely on the top most 1
version and resolve the rest.
Once we have obtained the top most "1" version for
ListObject, ListObjectsV2 call we break out.
In riscv64, the `syscall.Uname` function will return a uint8 slice.
func main() {
var buf syscall.Utsname
fmt.Printf("Buffer Type: %T\n", buf.Release)
}
output:
Buffer Type: [65]uint8
This is tested in the Arch Linux RISC-V 64 QEMU environment.
Signed-off-by: Avimitin <avimitin@gmail.com>
For ListObjects and ListObjectsV2 perform lifecycle checks on
all objects before returning. This will filter out objects that are
pending lifecycle expiration.
Bonus: Cheaper server pool conflict resolution by not converting to FileInfo.
When reloading a dynamic config allow the request pool to scale both ways.
Existing requests hold on to the previous pool, so they will pop the elements from that.
currently an on-going decommission, during a server
restart might block the startup sequence for relatively
longer periods, instead start the decommission in
background lazily.
This commit fixes two bugs in the `PutObjectPartHandler`.
First, `PutObjectPart` should return SSE-KMS headers
when the object is encrypted using SSE-KMS.
Before, this was not the case.
Second, the ETag should always be a 16 byte hex string,
perhaps followed by a `-X` (where `X` is the number of parts).
However, `PutObjectPart` used to return the encrypted ETag
in case of SSE-KMS. This leaks MinIO internal etag details
through the S3 API.
The combination of both bugs causes clients that use SSE-KMS
to fail when trying to validate the ETag. Since `PutObjectPart`
did not send the SSE-KMS response headers, the response looked
like a plaintext `PutObjectPart` response. Hence, the client
tries to verify that the ETag is the content-md5 of the part.
This could never be the case, since MinIO used to return the
encrypted ETag.
Therefore, clients behaving as specified by the S3 protocol
tried to verify the ETag in a situation they should not.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <hi@aead.dev>
Fix `panic: "POST /minio/peer/v21/signalservice?signal=2": sync: WaitGroup is reused before previous Wait has returned`
Log entries already on the channel would cause `logEntry` to increment the
waitgroup when sending messages, after Cancel has been called.
Instead of tracking every single message, just check the send goroutine. Faster
and safe, since it will not decrement until the channel is closed.
Regression from #14289
When more than 2 disks are unavailable for listing, the same disk will be used for fallback.
This makes quorum calculations incorrect since the same disk will have multiple entries.
This PR keeps track of which fallback disks have been handed out and only every returns a disk once.
avoids creating new transport for each `isServerResolvable`
request, instead re-use the available global transport and do
not try to forcibly close connections to avoid TIME_WAIT
build upon large clusters.
Never use httpClient.CloseIdleConnections() since that can have
a drastic effect on existing connections on the transport pool.
Remove it everywhere.
- GetObject() with vid should return 405
- GetObject() without vid should return 404
- ListObjects() should ignore this object if this is the "latest" version of the object
- ListObjectVersions() should list this object as "DELETE marker"
- Remove data parts before sync'ing the version pending purge