mirror of
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666af127d5
And I learnt that gcrypt doesn't follow the negative-on-error pattern
1364 lines
35 KiB
C
1364 lines
35 KiB
C
/*
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*
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* The Secure Remote Password 6a implementation included here is by
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* - Tom Cocagne
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* <https://github.com/cocagne/csrp>
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*
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*
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* The MIT License (MIT)
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*
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* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
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* this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
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* the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
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* use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies
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* of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do
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* so, subject to the following conditions:
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*
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* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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* copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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* AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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* SOFTWARE.
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*
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <plist/plist.h>
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#include <sodium.h>
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#include "raop_verification.h"
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#define CONFIG_GCRYPT 1
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/* -------------------- GCRYPT AND OPENSSL COMPABILITY --------------------- */
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/* partly borrowed from ffmpeg (rtmpdh.c) */
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#if CONFIG_GCRYPT
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#include <gcrypt.h>
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#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH 64
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#define bnum_new(bn) \
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do { \
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if (!gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED_P)) { \
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if (!gcry_check_version("1.5.4")) \
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abort(); \
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gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0); \
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gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0); \
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} \
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bn = gcry_mpi_new(1); \
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} while (0)
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#define bnum_free(bn) gcry_mpi_release(bn)
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#define bnum_num_bytes(bn) (gcry_mpi_get_nbits(bn) + 7) / 8
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#define bnum_is_zero(bn) (gcry_mpi_cmp_ui(bn, (unsigned long)0) == 0)
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#define bnum_bn2bin(bn, buf, len) gcry_mpi_print(GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, buf, len, NULL, bn)
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#define bnum_bin2bn(bn, buf, len) gcry_mpi_scan(&bn, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, buf, len, NULL)
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#define bnum_hex2bn(bn, buf) gcry_mpi_scan(&bn, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, buf, 0, 0)
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#define bnum_random(bn, num_bits) gcry_mpi_randomize(bn, num_bits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM)
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#define bnum_add(bn, a, b) gcry_mpi_add(bn, a, b)
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#define bnum_sub(bn, a, b) gcry_mpi_sub(bn, a, b)
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#define bnum_mul(bn, a, b) gcry_mpi_mul(bn, a, b)
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typedef gcry_mpi_t bnum;
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static void bnum_modexp(bnum bn, bnum y, bnum q, bnum p)
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{
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gcry_mpi_powm(bn, y, q, p);
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}
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#elif CONFIG_OPENSSL
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/sha.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#define bnum_new(bn) bn = BN_new()
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#define bnum_free(bn) BN_free(bn)
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#define bnum_num_bytes(bn) BN_num_bytes(bn)
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#define bnum_is_zero(bn) BN_is_zero(bn)
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#define bnum_bn2bin(bn, buf, len) BN_bn2bin(bn, buf)
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#define bnum_bin2bn(bn, buf, len) bn = BN_bin2bn(buf, len, 0)
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#define bnum_hex2bn(bn, buf) BN_hex2bn(&bn, buf)
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#define bnum_random(bn, num_bits) BN_rand(bn, num_bits, 0, 0)
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#define bnum_add(bn, a, b) BN_add(bn, a, b)
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#define bnum_sub(bn, a, b) BN_sub(bn, a, b)
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typedef BIGNUM* bnum;
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static void bnum_mul(bnum bn, bnum a, bnum b)
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{
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// No error handling
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BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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BN_mul(bn, a, b, ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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}
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static void bnum_modexp(bnum bn, bnum y, bnum q, bnum p)
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{
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// No error handling
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BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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BN_mod_exp(bn, y, q, p, ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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}
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#endif
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/* ----------------------------- DEFINES ETC ------------------------------- */
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#define USERNAME "12:34:56:78:90:AB"
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#define EPK_LENGTH 32
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#define AUTHTAG_LENGTH 16
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#define AES_SETUP_KEY "Pair-Setup-AES-Key"
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#define AES_SETUP_IV "Pair-Setup-AES-IV"
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#define AES_VERIFY_KEY "Pair-Verify-AES-Key"
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#define AES_VERIFY_IV "Pair-Verify-AES-IV"
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#ifdef CONFIG_OPENSSL
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enum hash_alg
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{
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HASH_SHA1,
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HASH_SHA224,
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HASH_SHA256,
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HASH_SHA384,
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HASH_SHA512,
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};
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#elif CONFIG_GCRYPT
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enum hash_alg
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{
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HASH_SHA1 = GCRY_MD_SHA1,
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HASH_SHA224 = GCRY_MD_SHA224,
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HASH_SHA256 = GCRY_MD_SHA256,
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HASH_SHA384 = GCRY_MD_SHA384,
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HASH_SHA512 = GCRY_MD_SHA512,
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};
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#endif
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struct verification_setup_context
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{
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struct SRPUser *user;
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char pin[4];
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const uint8_t *pkA;
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int pkA_len;
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uint8_t *pkB;
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uint64_t pkB_len;
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const uint8_t *M1;
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int M1_len;
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uint8_t *M2;
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uint64_t M2_len;
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uint8_t *salt;
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uint64_t salt_len;
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uint8_t public_key[crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
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uint8_t private_key[crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES];
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// Hex-formatet concatenation of public + private, 0-terminated
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char auth_key[2 * (crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES + crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES) + 1];
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// We don't actually use the server's epk and authtag for anything
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uint8_t *epk;
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uint64_t epk_len;
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uint8_t *authtag;
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uint64_t authtag_len;
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const char *errmsg;
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};
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struct verification_verify_context
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{
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uint8_t server_eph_public_key[32];
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uint8_t server_public_key[64];
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uint8_t client_public_key[crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
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uint8_t client_private_key[crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES];
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uint8_t client_eph_public_key[32];
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uint8_t client_eph_private_key[32];
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const char *errmsg;
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};
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/* ---------------------------------- SRP ---------------------------------- */
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typedef enum
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{
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SRP_NG_2048,
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SRP_NG_CUSTOM
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} SRP_NGType;
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typedef struct
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{
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bnum N;
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bnum g;
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} NGConstant;
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#if CONFIG_OPENSSL
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typedef union
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{
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SHA_CTX sha;
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SHA256_CTX sha256;
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SHA512_CTX sha512;
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} HashCTX;
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#elif CONFIG_GCRYPT
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typedef gcry_md_hd_t HashCTX;
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#endif
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struct SRPUser
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{
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enum hash_alg alg;
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NGConstant *ng;
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bnum a;
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bnum A;
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bnum S;
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const unsigned char *bytes_A;
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int authenticated;
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const char *username;
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const unsigned char *password;
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int password_len;
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unsigned char M [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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unsigned char H_AMK [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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unsigned char session_key [2 * SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; // See hash_session_key()
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int session_key_len;
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};
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struct NGHex
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{
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const char *n_hex;
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const char *g_hex;
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};
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// We only need 2048 right now, but keep the array in case we want to add others later
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// All constants here were pulled from Appendix A of RFC 5054
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static struct NGHex global_Ng_constants[] =
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{
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{ /* 2048 */
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"AC6BDB41324A9A9BF166DE5E1389582FAF72B6651987EE07FC3192943DB56050A37329CBB4"
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"A099ED8193E0757767A13DD52312AB4B03310DCD7F48A9DA04FD50E8083969EDB767B0CF60"
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"95179A163AB3661A05FBD5FAAAE82918A9962F0B93B855F97993EC975EEAA80D740ADBF4FF"
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"747359D041D5C33EA71D281E446B14773BCA97B43A23FB801676BD207A436C6481F1D2B907"
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"8717461A5B9D32E688F87748544523B524B0D57D5EA77A2775D2ECFA032CFBDBF52FB37861"
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"60279004E57AE6AF874E7303CE53299CCC041C7BC308D82A5698F3A8D0C38271AE35F8E9DB"
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"FBB694B5C803D89F7AE435DE236D525F54759B65E372FCD68EF20FA7111F9E4AFF73",
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"2"
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},
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{0,0} /* null sentinel */
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};
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static NGConstant *
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new_ng(SRP_NGType ng_type, const char *n_hex, const char *g_hex)
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{
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NGConstant *ng = calloc(1, sizeof(NGConstant));
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if ( ng_type != SRP_NG_CUSTOM )
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{
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n_hex = global_Ng_constants[ ng_type ].n_hex;
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g_hex = global_Ng_constants[ ng_type ].g_hex;
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}
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bnum_hex2bn(ng->N, n_hex);
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bnum_hex2bn(ng->g, g_hex);
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return ng;
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}
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static void
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free_ng(NGConstant * ng)
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{
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if (!ng)
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return;
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bnum_free(ng->N);
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bnum_free(ng->g);
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free(ng);
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}
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static int
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hash_init(enum hash_alg alg, HashCTX *c)
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{
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#if CONFIG_OPENSSL
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switch (alg)
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{
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case HASH_SHA1 : return SHA1_Init(&c->sha);
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case HASH_SHA224: return SHA224_Init(&c->sha256);
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case HASH_SHA256: return SHA256_Init(&c->sha256);
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case HASH_SHA384: return SHA384_Init(&c->sha512);
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case HASH_SHA512: return SHA512_Init(&c->sha512);
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default:
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return -1;
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};
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#elif CONFIG_GCRYPT
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gcry_error_t err;
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err = gcry_md_open(c, alg, 0);
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if (err)
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return -1;
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return 0;
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#endif
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}
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static int
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hash_update(enum hash_alg alg, HashCTX *c, const void *data, size_t len)
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{
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#if CONFIG_OPENSSL
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switch (alg)
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{
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case HASH_SHA1 : return SHA1_Update(&c->sha, data, len);
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case HASH_SHA224: return SHA224_Update(&c->sha256, data, len);
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case HASH_SHA256: return SHA256_Update(&c->sha256, data, len);
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case HASH_SHA384: return SHA384_Update(&c->sha512, data, len);
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case HASH_SHA512: return SHA512_Update(&c->sha512, data, len);
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default:
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return -1;
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};
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#elif CONFIG_GCRYPT
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gcry_md_write(*c, data, len);
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return 0;
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#endif
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}
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static int
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hash_final(enum hash_alg alg, HashCTX *c, unsigned char *md)
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{
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#if CONFIG_OPENSSL
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switch (alg)
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{
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case HASH_SHA1 : return SHA1_Final(md, &c->sha);
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case HASH_SHA224: return SHA224_Final(md, &c->sha256);
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case HASH_SHA256: return SHA256_Final(md, &c->sha256);
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case HASH_SHA384: return SHA384_Final(md, &c->sha512);
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case HASH_SHA512: return SHA512_Final(md, &c->sha512);
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default:
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return -1;
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};
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#elif CONFIG_GCRYPT
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unsigned char *buf = gcry_md_read(*c, alg);
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if (!buf)
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return -1;
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memcpy(md, buf, gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(alg));
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gcry_md_close(*c);
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return 0;
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#endif
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}
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static unsigned char *
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hash(enum hash_alg alg, const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
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{
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#if CONFIG_OPENSSL
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switch (alg)
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{
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case HASH_SHA1 : return SHA1(d, n, md);
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case HASH_SHA224: return SHA224(d, n, md);
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case HASH_SHA256: return SHA256(d, n, md);
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case HASH_SHA384: return SHA384(d, n, md);
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case HASH_SHA512: return SHA512(d, n, md);
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default:
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return NULL;
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};
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#elif CONFIG_GCRYPT
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gcry_md_hash_buffer(alg, md, d, n);
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return md;
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#endif
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}
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static int
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hash_length(enum hash_alg alg)
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{
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#if CONFIG_OPENSSL
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switch (alg)
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{
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case HASH_SHA1 : return SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
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case HASH_SHA224: return SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH;
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case HASH_SHA256: return SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
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case HASH_SHA384: return SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
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case HASH_SHA512: return SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
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default:
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return -1;
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};
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#elif CONFIG_GCRYPT
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return gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(alg);
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#endif
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}
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static int
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hash_ab(enum hash_alg alg, unsigned char *md, const unsigned char *m1, int m1_len, const unsigned char *m2, int m2_len)
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{
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HashCTX ctx;
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hash_init(alg, &ctx);
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hash_update(alg, &ctx, m1, m1_len);
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hash_update(alg, &ctx, m2, m2_len);
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return hash_final(alg, &ctx, md);
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}
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static bnum
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H_nn_pad(enum hash_alg alg, const bnum n1, const bnum n2)
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{
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bnum bn;
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unsigned char *bin;
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unsigned char buff[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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int len_n1 = bnum_num_bytes(n1);
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int len_n2 = bnum_num_bytes(n2);
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int nbytes = 2 * len_n1;
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if ((len_n2 < 1) || (len_n2 > len_n1))
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return 0;
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bin = calloc( 1, nbytes );
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bnum_bn2bin(n1, bin, len_n1);
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bnum_bn2bin(n2, bin + nbytes - len_n2, len_n2);
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hash( alg, bin, nbytes, buff );
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free(bin);
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bnum_bin2bn(bn, buff, hash_length(alg));
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return bn;
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}
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static bnum
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H_ns(enum hash_alg alg, const bnum n, const unsigned char *bytes, int len_bytes)
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{
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bnum bn;
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unsigned char buff[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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int len_n = bnum_num_bytes(n);
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int nbytes = len_n + len_bytes;
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unsigned char *bin = malloc(nbytes);
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bnum_bn2bin(n, bin, len_n);
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memcpy( bin + len_n, bytes, len_bytes );
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hash( alg, bin, nbytes, buff );
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free(bin);
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bnum_bin2bn(bn, buff, hash_length(alg));
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return bn;
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}
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static bnum
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calculate_x(enum hash_alg alg, const bnum salt, const char *username, const unsigned char *password, int password_len)
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{
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unsigned char ucp_hash[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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HashCTX ctx;
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hash_init( alg, &ctx );
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hash_update( alg, &ctx, username, strlen(username) );
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hash_update( alg, &ctx, ":", 1 );
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hash_update( alg, &ctx, password, password_len );
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hash_final( alg, &ctx, ucp_hash );
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return H_ns( alg, salt, ucp_hash, hash_length(alg) );
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}
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static void
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update_hash_n(enum hash_alg alg, HashCTX *ctx, const bnum n)
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{
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unsigned long len = bnum_num_bytes(n);
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unsigned char *n_bytes = malloc(len);
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bnum_bn2bin(n, n_bytes, len);
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hash_update(alg, ctx, n_bytes, len);
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free(n_bytes);
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}
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static void
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hash_num(enum hash_alg alg, const bnum n, unsigned char *dest)
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{
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int nbytes = bnum_num_bytes(n);
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unsigned char *bin = malloc(nbytes);
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bnum_bn2bin(n, bin, nbytes);
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hash( alg, bin, nbytes, dest );
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free(bin);
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}
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static int
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hash_session_key(enum hash_alg alg, const bnum n, unsigned char *dest)
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{
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int nbytes = bnum_num_bytes(n);
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unsigned char *bin = malloc(nbytes);
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|
unsigned char fourbytes[4] = { 0 }; // Only God knows the reason for this, and perhaps some poor soul at Apple
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|
|
|
bnum_bn2bin(n, bin, nbytes);
|
|
|
|
hash_ab(alg, dest, bin, nbytes, fourbytes, sizeof(fourbytes));
|
|
|
|
fourbytes[3] = 1; // Again, only ...
|
|
|
|
hash_ab(alg, dest + hash_length(alg), bin, nbytes, fourbytes, sizeof(fourbytes));
|
|
|
|
free(bin);
|
|
|
|
return (2 * hash_length(alg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
calculate_M(enum hash_alg alg, NGConstant *ng, unsigned char *dest, const char *I, const bnum s,
|
|
const bnum A, const bnum B, const unsigned char *K, int K_len)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char H_N[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
|
|
unsigned char H_g[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
|
|
unsigned char H_I[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
|
|
unsigned char H_xor[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
|
|
HashCTX ctx;
|
|
int i = 0;
|
|
int hash_len = hash_length(alg);
|
|
|
|
hash_num( alg, ng->N, H_N );
|
|
hash_num( alg, ng->g, H_g );
|
|
|
|
hash(alg, (const unsigned char *)I, strlen(I), H_I);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < hash_len; i++)
|
|
H_xor[i] = H_N[i] ^ H_g[i];
|
|
|
|
hash_init( alg, &ctx );
|
|
|
|
hash_update( alg, &ctx, H_xor, hash_len );
|
|
hash_update( alg, &ctx, H_I, hash_len );
|
|
update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, s );
|
|
update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, A );
|
|
update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, B );
|
|
hash_update( alg, &ctx, K, K_len );
|
|
|
|
hash_final( alg, &ctx, dest );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
calculate_H_AMK(enum hash_alg alg, unsigned char *dest, const bnum A, const unsigned char * M, const unsigned char * K, int K_len)
|
|
{
|
|
HashCTX ctx;
|
|
|
|
hash_init( alg, &ctx );
|
|
|
|
update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, A );
|
|
hash_update( alg, &ctx, M, hash_length(alg) );
|
|
hash_update( alg, &ctx, K, K_len );
|
|
|
|
hash_final( alg, &ctx, dest );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct SRPUser *
|
|
srp_user_new(enum hash_alg alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char *username,
|
|
const unsigned char *bytes_password, int len_password,
|
|
const char *n_hex, const char *g_hex)
|
|
{
|
|
struct SRPUser *usr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct SRPUser));
|
|
int ulen = strlen(username) + 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!usr)
|
|
goto err_exit;
|
|
|
|
usr->alg = alg;
|
|
usr->ng = new_ng( ng_type, n_hex, g_hex );
|
|
|
|
bnum_new(usr->a);
|
|
bnum_new(usr->A);
|
|
bnum_new(usr->S);
|
|
|
|
if (!usr->ng || !usr->a || !usr->A || !usr->S)
|
|
goto err_exit;
|
|
|
|
usr->username = (const char *) malloc(ulen);
|
|
usr->password = (const unsigned char *) malloc(len_password);
|
|
usr->password_len = len_password;
|
|
|
|
if (!usr->username || !usr->password)
|
|
goto err_exit;
|
|
|
|
memcpy((char *)usr->username, username, ulen);
|
|
memcpy((char *)usr->password, bytes_password, len_password);
|
|
|
|
usr->authenticated = 0;
|
|
usr->bytes_A = 0;
|
|
|
|
return usr;
|
|
|
|
err_exit:
|
|
if (!usr)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
bnum_free(usr->a);
|
|
bnum_free(usr->A);
|
|
bnum_free(usr->S);
|
|
if (usr->username)
|
|
free((void*)usr->username);
|
|
if (usr->password)
|
|
{
|
|
memset((void*)usr->password, 0, usr->password_len);
|
|
free((void*)usr->password);
|
|
}
|
|
free(usr);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
srp_user_delete(struct SRPUser *usr)
|
|
{
|
|
if(!usr)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
bnum_free(usr->a);
|
|
bnum_free(usr->A);
|
|
bnum_free(usr->S);
|
|
|
|
free_ng(usr->ng);
|
|
|
|
memset((void*)usr->password, 0, usr->password_len);
|
|
|
|
free((char *)usr->username);
|
|
free((char *)usr->password);
|
|
|
|
if (usr->bytes_A)
|
|
free( (char *)usr->bytes_A );
|
|
|
|
memset(usr, 0, sizeof(*usr));
|
|
free(usr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
srp_user_is_authenticated(struct SRPUser *usr)
|
|
{
|
|
return usr->authenticated;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned char *
|
|
srp_user_get_session_key(struct SRPUser *usr, int *key_length)
|
|
{
|
|
if (key_length)
|
|
*key_length = usr->session_key_len;
|
|
return usr->session_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Output: username, bytes_A, len_A */
|
|
static void
|
|
srp_user_start_authentication(struct SRPUser *usr, const char **username,
|
|
const unsigned char **bytes_A, int *len_A)
|
|
{
|
|
bnum_random(usr->a, 256);
|
|
bnum_modexp(usr->A, usr->ng->g, usr->a, usr->ng->N);
|
|
|
|
*len_A = bnum_num_bytes(usr->A);
|
|
*bytes_A = malloc(*len_A);
|
|
|
|
if (!*bytes_A)
|
|
{
|
|
*len_A = 0;
|
|
*bytes_A = 0;
|
|
*username = 0;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bnum_bn2bin(usr->A, (unsigned char *) *bytes_A, *len_A);
|
|
|
|
usr->bytes_A = *bytes_A;
|
|
*username = usr->username;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Output: bytes_M. Buffer length is SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH */
|
|
static void
|
|
srp_user_process_challenge(struct SRPUser *usr, const unsigned char *bytes_s, int len_s,
|
|
const unsigned char *bytes_B, int len_B,
|
|
const unsigned char **bytes_M, int *len_M )
|
|
{
|
|
bnum s, B, k, v;
|
|
bnum tmp1, tmp2, tmp3;
|
|
bnum u, x;
|
|
|
|
*len_M = 0;
|
|
*bytes_M = 0;
|
|
|
|
bnum_bin2bn(s, bytes_s, len_s);
|
|
bnum_bin2bn(B, bytes_B, len_B);
|
|
k = H_nn_pad(usr->alg, usr->ng->N, usr->ng->g);
|
|
bnum_new(v);
|
|
bnum_new(tmp1);
|
|
bnum_new(tmp2);
|
|
bnum_new(tmp3);
|
|
|
|
if (!s || !B || !k || !v || !tmp1 || !tmp2 || !tmp3)
|
|
goto cleanup1;
|
|
|
|
u = H_nn_pad(usr->alg, usr->A, B);
|
|
x = calculate_x(usr->alg, s, usr->username, usr->password, usr->password_len);
|
|
if (!u || !x)
|
|
goto cleanup2;
|
|
|
|
// SRP-6a safety check
|
|
if (!bnum_is_zero(B) && !bnum_is_zero(u))
|
|
{
|
|
bnum_modexp(v, usr->ng->g, x, usr->ng->N);
|
|
|
|
// S = (B - k*(g^x)) ^ (a + ux)
|
|
bnum_mul(tmp1, u, x);
|
|
bnum_add(tmp2, usr->a, tmp1); // tmp2 = (a + ux)
|
|
bnum_modexp(tmp1, usr->ng->g, x, usr->ng->N);
|
|
bnum_mul(tmp3, k, tmp1); // tmp3 = k*(g^x)
|
|
bnum_sub(tmp1, B, tmp3); // tmp1 = (B - K*(g^x))
|
|
bnum_modexp(usr->S, tmp1, tmp2, usr->ng->N);
|
|
|
|
usr->session_key_len = hash_session_key(usr->alg, usr->S, usr->session_key);
|
|
|
|
calculate_M(usr->alg, usr->ng, usr->M, usr->username, s, usr->A, B, usr->session_key, usr->session_key_len);
|
|
calculate_H_AMK(usr->alg, usr->H_AMK, usr->A, usr->M, usr->session_key, usr->session_key_len);
|
|
|
|
*bytes_M = usr->M;
|
|
*len_M = hash_length(usr->alg);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
*bytes_M = NULL;
|
|
*len_M = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cleanup2:
|
|
bnum_free(x);
|
|
bnum_free(u);
|
|
cleanup1:
|
|
bnum_free(tmp3);
|
|
bnum_free(tmp2);
|
|
bnum_free(tmp1);
|
|
bnum_free(v);
|
|
bnum_free(k);
|
|
bnum_free(B);
|
|
bnum_free(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
srp_user_verify_session(struct SRPUser *usr, const unsigned char *bytes_HAMK)
|
|
{
|
|
if (memcmp(usr->H_AMK, bytes_HAMK, hash_length(usr->alg)) == 0)
|
|
usr->authenticated = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* -------------------------------- HELPERS -------------------------------- */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
encrypt_gcm(unsigned char *ciphertext, int ciphertext_len, unsigned char *tag, unsigned char *plaintext, int plaintext_len, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, const char **errmsg)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OPENSSL
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
*errmsg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ( !(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) ||
|
|
(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) ||
|
|
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, 16, NULL) != 1) ||
|
|
(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv) != 1) )
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error initialising AES 128 GCM encryption";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertext, &len, plaintext, plaintext_len) != 1)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error GCM encrypting";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len > ciphertext_len)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Bug! Buffer overflow";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ciphertext + len, &len) != 1)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error finalising GCM encryption";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, AUTHTAG_LENGTH, tag) != 1)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error getting authtag";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#elif CONFIG_GCRYPT
|
|
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
|
|
gcry_error_t err;
|
|
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_open(&hd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, 0);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error initialising AES 128 GCM encryption";
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_setkey(hd, key, gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(GCRY_CIPHER_AES128));
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Could not set key for AES 128 GCM";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_setiv(hd, iv, gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(GCRY_CIPHER_AES128));
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Could not set iv for AES 128 GCM";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_encrypt(hd, ciphertext, ciphertext_len, plaintext, plaintext_len);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error GCM encrypting";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_gettag(hd, tag, AUTHTAG_LENGTH);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error getting authtag";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gcry_cipher_close(hd);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
gcry_cipher_close(hd);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
encrypt_ctr(unsigned char *ciphertext, int ciphertext_len,
|
|
unsigned char *plaintext1, int plaintext1_len, unsigned char *plaintext2, int plaintext2_len,
|
|
unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, const char **errmsg)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OPENSSL
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
*errmsg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ( !(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) || (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), NULL, key, iv) != 1) )
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error initialising AES 128 CTR encryption";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertext, &len, plaintext1, plaintext1_len) != 1) ||
|
|
(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertext, &len, plaintext2, plaintext2_len) != 1) )
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error CTR encrypting";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ciphertext + len, &len) != 1)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error finalising encryption";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#elif CONFIG_GCRYPT
|
|
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
|
|
gcry_error_t err;
|
|
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_open(&hd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR, 0);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error initialising AES 128 CTR encryption";
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_setkey(hd, key, gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(GCRY_CIPHER_AES128));
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Could not set key for AES 128 CTR";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_setctr(hd, iv, gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(GCRY_CIPHER_AES128));
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Could not set iv for AES 128 CTR";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_encrypt(hd, ciphertext, ciphertext_len, plaintext1, plaintext1_len);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error CTR encrypting plaintext 1";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_encrypt(hd, ciphertext, ciphertext_len, plaintext2, plaintext2_len);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Error CTR encrypting plaintext 2";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gcry_cipher_close(hd);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
gcry_cipher_close(hd);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ---------------------------------- API ---------------------------------- */
|
|
|
|
struct verification_setup_context *
|
|
verification_setup_new(const char *pin)
|
|
{
|
|
struct verification_setup_context *sctx;
|
|
|
|
if (sodium_init() == -1)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
sctx = calloc(1, sizeof(struct verification_setup_context));
|
|
if (!sctx)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(sctx->pin, pin, sizeof(sctx->pin));
|
|
|
|
return sctx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
verification_setup_free(struct verification_setup_context *sctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sctx)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
srp_user_delete(sctx->user);
|
|
|
|
free(sctx->pkB);
|
|
free(sctx->M2);
|
|
free(sctx->salt);
|
|
free(sctx->epk);
|
|
free(sctx->authtag);
|
|
|
|
free(sctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *
|
|
verification_setup_errmsg(struct verification_setup_context *sctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return sctx->errmsg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *
|
|
verification_setup_request1(uint32_t *len, struct verification_setup_context *sctx)
|
|
{
|
|
plist_t dict;
|
|
plist_t method;
|
|
plist_t user;
|
|
char *data = NULL; // Necessary to initialize because plist_to_bin() uses value
|
|
|
|
sctx->user = srp_user_new(HASH_SHA1, SRP_NG_2048, USERNAME, (unsigned char *)sctx->pin, sizeof(sctx->pin), 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
dict = plist_new_dict();
|
|
|
|
method = plist_new_string("pin");
|
|
user = plist_new_string(USERNAME);
|
|
|
|
plist_dict_set_item(dict, "method", method);
|
|
plist_dict_set_item(dict, "user", user);
|
|
plist_to_bin(dict, &data, len);
|
|
plist_free(dict);
|
|
|
|
return (uint8_t *)data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *
|
|
verification_setup_request2(uint32_t *len, struct verification_setup_context *sctx)
|
|
{
|
|
plist_t dict;
|
|
plist_t pk;
|
|
plist_t proof;
|
|
const char *auth_username = NULL;
|
|
char *data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
// Calculate A
|
|
srp_user_start_authentication(sctx->user, &auth_username, &sctx->pkA, &sctx->pkA_len);
|
|
|
|
// Calculate M1 (client proof)
|
|
srp_user_process_challenge(sctx->user, (const unsigned char *)sctx->salt, sctx->salt_len, (const unsigned char *)sctx->pkB, sctx->pkB_len, &sctx->M1, &sctx->M1_len);
|
|
|
|
pk = plist_new_data((char *)sctx->pkA, sctx->pkA_len);
|
|
proof = plist_new_data((char *)sctx->M1, sctx->M1_len);
|
|
|
|
dict = plist_new_dict();
|
|
plist_dict_set_item(dict, "pk", pk);
|
|
plist_dict_set_item(dict, "proof", proof);
|
|
plist_to_bin(dict, &data, len);
|
|
plist_free(dict);
|
|
|
|
return (uint8_t *)data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *
|
|
verification_setup_request3(uint32_t *len, struct verification_setup_context *sctx)
|
|
{
|
|
plist_t dict;
|
|
plist_t epk;
|
|
plist_t authtag;
|
|
char *data = NULL;
|
|
const unsigned char *session_key;
|
|
int session_key_len;
|
|
unsigned char key[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char iv[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char encrypted[128]; // Alloc a bit extra - should only need 2*16
|
|
unsigned char tag[16];
|
|
const char *errmsg;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
session_key = srp_user_get_session_key(sctx->user, &session_key_len);
|
|
if (!session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
sctx->errmsg = "Setup request 3: No valid session key";
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hash_ab(HASH_SHA512, key, (unsigned char *)AES_SETUP_KEY, strlen(AES_SETUP_KEY), session_key, session_key_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
sctx->errmsg = "Setup request 3: Hashing of key string and shared secret failed";
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hash_ab(HASH_SHA512, iv, (unsigned char *)AES_SETUP_IV, strlen(AES_SETUP_IV), session_key, session_key_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
sctx->errmsg = "Setup request 3: Hashing of iv string and shared secret failed";
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
iv[15]++; // Magic
|
|
/*
|
|
if (iv[15] == 0x00 || iv[15] == 0xff)
|
|
printf("- note that value of last byte is %d!\n", iv[15]);
|
|
*/
|
|
crypto_sign_keypair(sctx->public_key, sctx->private_key);
|
|
|
|
ret = encrypt_gcm(encrypted, sizeof(encrypted), tag, sctx->public_key, sizeof(sctx->public_key), key, iv, &errmsg);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
sctx->errmsg = errmsg;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
epk = plist_new_data((char *)encrypted, EPK_LENGTH);
|
|
authtag = plist_new_data((char *)tag, AUTHTAG_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
dict = plist_new_dict();
|
|
plist_dict_set_item(dict, "epk", epk);
|
|
plist_dict_set_item(dict, "authTag", authtag);
|
|
plist_to_bin(dict, &data, len);
|
|
plist_free(dict);
|
|
|
|
return (uint8_t *)data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
verification_setup_response1(struct verification_setup_context *sctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
plist_t dict;
|
|
plist_t pk;
|
|
plist_t salt;
|
|
|
|
plist_from_bin((const char *)data, data_len, &dict);
|
|
|
|
pk = plist_dict_get_item(dict, "pk");
|
|
salt = plist_dict_get_item(dict, "salt");
|
|
if (!pk || !salt)
|
|
{
|
|
sctx->errmsg = "Setup response 1: Missing pk or salt";
|
|
plist_free(dict);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
plist_get_data_val(pk, (char **)&sctx->pkB, &sctx->pkB_len); // B
|
|
plist_get_data_val(salt, (char **)&sctx->salt, &sctx->salt_len);
|
|
|
|
plist_free(dict);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
verification_setup_response2(struct verification_setup_context *sctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
plist_t dict;
|
|
plist_t proof;
|
|
|
|
plist_from_bin((const char *)data, data_len, &dict);
|
|
|
|
proof = plist_dict_get_item(dict, "proof");
|
|
if (!proof)
|
|
{
|
|
sctx->errmsg = "Setup response 2: Missing proof";
|
|
plist_free(dict);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
plist_get_data_val(proof, (char **)&sctx->M2, &sctx->M2_len); // M2
|
|
|
|
plist_free(dict);
|
|
|
|
// Check M2
|
|
srp_user_verify_session(sctx->user, (const unsigned char *)sctx->M2);
|
|
if (!srp_user_is_authenticated(sctx->user))
|
|
{
|
|
sctx->errmsg = "Setup response 2: Server authentication failed";
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
verification_setup_response3(struct verification_setup_context *sctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
plist_t dict;
|
|
plist_t epk;
|
|
plist_t authtag;
|
|
|
|
plist_from_bin((const char *)data, data_len, &dict);
|
|
|
|
epk = plist_dict_get_item(dict, "epk");
|
|
if (!epk)
|
|
{
|
|
sctx->errmsg = "Setup response 3: Missing epk";
|
|
plist_free(dict);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
plist_get_data_val(epk, (char **)&sctx->epk, &sctx->epk_len);
|
|
|
|
authtag = plist_dict_get_item(dict, "authTag");
|
|
if (!authtag)
|
|
{
|
|
sctx->errmsg = "Setup response 3: Missing authTag";
|
|
plist_free(dict);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
plist_get_data_val(authtag, (char **)&sctx->authtag, &sctx->authtag_len);
|
|
|
|
plist_free(dict);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
verification_setup_result(const char **authorisation_key, struct verification_setup_context *sctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct verification_verify_context *vctx;
|
|
char *ptr;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (sizeof(vctx->client_public_key) != sizeof(sctx->public_key) || sizeof(vctx->client_private_key) != sizeof(sctx->private_key))
|
|
{
|
|
sctx->errmsg = "Setup result: Bug!";
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fills out the auth_key with public + private in hex. It seems that the private
|
|
// key actually includes the public key (last 32 bytes), so we could in
|
|
// principle just export the private key
|
|
ptr = sctx->auth_key;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(sctx->public_key); i++)
|
|
ptr += sprintf(ptr, "%02x", sctx->public_key[i]);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(sctx->private_key); i++)
|
|
ptr += sprintf(ptr, "%02x", sctx->private_key[i]);
|
|
*ptr = '\0';
|
|
|
|
*authorisation_key = sctx->auth_key;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct verification_verify_context *
|
|
verification_verify_new(const char *authorisation_key)
|
|
{
|
|
struct verification_verify_context *vctx;
|
|
char hex[] = { 0, 0, 0 };
|
|
const char *ptr;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (sodium_init() == -1)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!authorisation_key)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (strlen(authorisation_key) != 2 * (sizeof(vctx->client_public_key) + sizeof(vctx->client_private_key)))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
vctx = calloc(1, sizeof(struct verification_verify_context));
|
|
if (!vctx)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
ptr = authorisation_key;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(vctx->client_public_key); i++, ptr+=2)
|
|
{
|
|
hex[0] = ptr[0];
|
|
hex[1] = ptr[1];
|
|
vctx->client_public_key[i] = strtol(hex, NULL, 16);
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(vctx->client_private_key); i++, ptr+=2)
|
|
{
|
|
hex[0] = ptr[0];
|
|
hex[1] = ptr[1];
|
|
vctx->client_private_key[i] = strtol(hex, NULL, 16);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return vctx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
verification_verify_free(struct verification_verify_context *vctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!vctx)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
free(vctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *
|
|
verification_verify_errmsg(struct verification_verify_context *vctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return vctx->errmsg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *
|
|
verification_verify_request1(uint32_t *len, struct verification_verify_context *vctx)
|
|
{
|
|
const uint8_t basepoint[32] = {9};
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = crypto_scalarmult(vctx->client_eph_public_key, vctx->client_eph_private_key, basepoint);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
vctx->errmsg = "Verify request 1: Curve 25519 returned an error";
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = 4 + sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key) + sizeof(vctx->client_public_key);
|
|
data = calloc(1, *len);
|
|
if (!data)
|
|
{
|
|
vctx->errmsg = "Verify request 1: Out of memory";
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data[0] = 1; // Magic
|
|
memcpy(data + 4, vctx->client_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key));
|
|
memcpy(data + 4 + sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key), vctx->client_public_key, sizeof(vctx->client_public_key));
|
|
|
|
return data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *
|
|
verification_verify_request2(uint32_t *len, struct verification_verify_context *vctx)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t shared_secret[crypto_scalarmult_BYTES];
|
|
uint8_t key[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t iv[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t encrypted[128]; // Alloc a bit extra, should only really need size of public key len
|
|
uint8_t signature[crypto_sign_BYTES];
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
const char *errmsg;
|
|
|
|
*len = sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key) + sizeof(vctx->server_eph_public_key);
|
|
data = calloc(1, *len);
|
|
if (!data)
|
|
{
|
|
vctx->errmsg = "Verify request 2: Out of memory";
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data, vctx->client_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key));
|
|
memcpy(data + sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key), vctx->server_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->server_eph_public_key));
|
|
|
|
crypto_sign_detached(signature, NULL, data, *len, vctx->client_private_key);
|
|
|
|
free(data);
|
|
|
|
ret = crypto_scalarmult(shared_secret, vctx->client_eph_private_key, vctx->server_eph_public_key);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
vctx->errmsg = "Verify request 2: Curve 25519 returned an error";
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hash_ab(HASH_SHA512, key, (unsigned char *)AES_VERIFY_KEY, strlen(AES_VERIFY_KEY), shared_secret, sizeof(shared_secret));
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
vctx->errmsg = "Verify request 2: Hashing of key string and shared secret failed";
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hash_ab(HASH_SHA512, iv, (unsigned char *)AES_VERIFY_IV, strlen(AES_VERIFY_IV), shared_secret, sizeof(shared_secret));
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
vctx->errmsg = "Verify request 2: Hashing of iv string and shared secret failed";
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = encrypt_ctr(encrypted, sizeof(encrypted), vctx->server_public_key, sizeof(vctx->server_public_key), signature, sizeof(signature), key, iv, &errmsg);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
vctx->errmsg = errmsg;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = 4 + sizeof(vctx->server_public_key);
|
|
data = calloc(1, *len);
|
|
if (!data)
|
|
{
|
|
vctx->errmsg = "Verify request 2: Out of memory";
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data + 4, encrypted, sizeof(vctx->server_public_key));
|
|
|
|
return data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
verification_verify_response1(struct verification_verify_context *vctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t wanted;
|
|
|
|
wanted = sizeof(vctx->server_eph_public_key) + sizeof(vctx->server_public_key);
|
|
if (data_len < wanted)
|
|
{
|
|
vctx->errmsg = "Verify response 2: Unexpected response (too short)";
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(vctx->server_eph_public_key, data, sizeof(vctx->server_eph_public_key));
|
|
memcpy(vctx->server_public_key, data + sizeof(vctx->server_eph_public_key), sizeof(vctx->server_public_key));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|