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999bbd3a14
This commit changes how MinIO generates the object encryption key (OEK) when encrypting an object using server-side encryption. This change is fully backwards compatible. Now, MinIO generates the OEK as following: ``` Nonce = RANDOM(32) // generate 256 bit random value OEK = HMAC-SHA256(EK, Context || Nonce) ``` Before, the OEK was computed as following: ``` Nonce = RANDOM(32) // generate 256 bit random value OEK = SHA256(EK || Nonce) ``` The new scheme does not technically fix a security issue but uses a more familiar scheme. The only requirement for the OEK generation function is that it produces a (pseudo)random value for every pair (`EK`,`Nonce`) as long as no `EK`-`Nonce` combination is repeated. This prevents a faulty PRNG from repeating or generating a "bad" key. The previous scheme guarantees that the `OEK` is a (pseudo)random value given that no pair (`EK`,`Nonce`) repeats under the assumption that SHA256 is indistinguable from a random oracle. The new scheme guarantees that the `OEK` is a (pseudo)random value given that no pair (`EK`, `Nonce`) repeats under the assumption that SHA256's underlying compression function is a PRF/PRP. While the later is a weaker assumption, and therefore, less likely to be false, both are considered true. SHA256 is believed to be indistinguable from a random oracle AND its compression function is assumed to be a PRF/PRP. As far as the OEK generating is concerned, the OS random number generator is not required to be pseudo-random but just non-repeating. Apart from being more compatible to standard definitions and descriptions for how to generate crypto. keys, this change does not have any impact of the actual security of the OEK key generation. Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <github@aead.dev>
180 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
180 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2015-2021 MinIO, Inc.
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//
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// This file is part of MinIO Object Storage stack
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//
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// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
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// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
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// (at your option) any later version.
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//
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// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
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// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
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//
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// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
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// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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package crypto
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/binary"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"path"
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"github.com/minio/minio/internal/fips"
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"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash/sha256"
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"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
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"github.com/minio/sio"
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)
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// ObjectKey is a 256 bit secret key used to encrypt the object.
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// It must never be stored in plaintext.
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type ObjectKey [32]byte
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// GenerateKey generates a unique ObjectKey from a 256 bit external key
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// and a source of randomness. If random is nil the default PRNG of the
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// system (crypto/rand) is used.
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func GenerateKey(extKey []byte, random io.Reader) (key ObjectKey) {
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if random == nil {
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random = rand.Reader
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}
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if len(extKey) != 32 { // safety check
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logger.CriticalIf(context.Background(), errors.New("crypto: invalid key length"))
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}
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var nonce [32]byte
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(random, nonce[:]); err != nil {
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logger.CriticalIf(context.Background(), errOutOfEntropy)
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}
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const Context = "object-encryption-key generation"
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, extKey)
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mac.Write([]byte(Context))
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mac.Write(nonce[:])
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mac.Sum(key[:0])
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return key
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}
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// GenerateIV generates a new random 256 bit IV from the provided source
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// of randomness. If random is nil the default PRNG of the system
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// (crypto/rand) is used.
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func GenerateIV(random io.Reader) (iv [32]byte) {
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if random == nil {
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random = rand.Reader
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}
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(random, iv[:]); err != nil {
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logger.CriticalIf(context.Background(), errOutOfEntropy)
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}
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return iv
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}
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// SealedKey represents a sealed object key. It can be stored
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// at an untrusted location.
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type SealedKey struct {
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Key [64]byte // The encrypted and authenticated object-key.
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IV [32]byte // The random IV used to encrypt the object-key.
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Algorithm string // The sealing algorithm used to encrypt the object key.
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}
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// Seal encrypts the ObjectKey using the 256 bit external key and IV. The sealed
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// key is also cryptographically bound to the object's path (bucket/object) and the
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// domain (SSE-C or SSE-S3).
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func (key ObjectKey) Seal(extKey []byte, iv [32]byte, domain, bucket, object string) SealedKey {
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if len(extKey) != 32 {
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logger.CriticalIf(context.Background(), errors.New("crypto: invalid key length"))
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}
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var (
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sealingKey [32]byte
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encryptedKey bytes.Buffer
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)
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, extKey)
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mac.Write(iv[:])
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mac.Write([]byte(domain))
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mac.Write([]byte(SealAlgorithm))
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mac.Write([]byte(path.Join(bucket, object))) // use path.Join for canonical 'bucket/object'
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mac.Sum(sealingKey[:0])
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if n, err := sio.Encrypt(&encryptedKey, bytes.NewReader(key[:]), sio.Config{Key: sealingKey[:], CipherSuites: fips.DARECiphers()}); n != 64 || err != nil {
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logger.CriticalIf(context.Background(), errors.New("Unable to generate sealed key"))
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}
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sealedKey := SealedKey{
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IV: iv,
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Algorithm: SealAlgorithm,
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}
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copy(sealedKey.Key[:], encryptedKey.Bytes())
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return sealedKey
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}
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// Unseal decrypts a sealed key using the 256 bit external key. Since the sealed key
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// may be cryptographically bound to the object's path the same bucket/object as during sealing
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// must be provided. On success the ObjectKey contains the decrypted sealed key.
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func (key *ObjectKey) Unseal(extKey []byte, sealedKey SealedKey, domain, bucket, object string) error {
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var unsealConfig sio.Config
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switch sealedKey.Algorithm {
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default:
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return Errorf("The sealing algorithm '%s' is not supported", sealedKey.Algorithm)
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case SealAlgorithm:
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, extKey)
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mac.Write(sealedKey.IV[:])
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mac.Write([]byte(domain))
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mac.Write([]byte(SealAlgorithm))
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mac.Write([]byte(path.Join(bucket, object))) // use path.Join for canonical 'bucket/object'
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unsealConfig = sio.Config{MinVersion: sio.Version20, Key: mac.Sum(nil), CipherSuites: fips.DARECiphers()}
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case InsecureSealAlgorithm:
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sha := sha256.New()
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sha.Write(extKey)
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sha.Write(sealedKey.IV[:])
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unsealConfig = sio.Config{MinVersion: sio.Version10, Key: sha.Sum(nil), CipherSuites: fips.DARECiphers()}
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}
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if out, err := sio.DecryptBuffer(key[:0], sealedKey.Key[:], unsealConfig); len(out) != 32 || err != nil {
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return ErrSecretKeyMismatch
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}
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return nil
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}
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// DerivePartKey derives an unique 256 bit key from an ObjectKey and the part index.
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func (key ObjectKey) DerivePartKey(id uint32) (partKey [32]byte) {
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var bin [4]byte
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binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(bin[:], id)
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key[:])
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mac.Write(bin[:])
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mac.Sum(partKey[:0])
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return partKey
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}
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// SealETag seals the etag using the object key.
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// It does not encrypt empty ETags because such ETags indicate
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// that the S3 client hasn't sent an ETag = MD5(object) and
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// the backend can pick an ETag value.
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func (key ObjectKey) SealETag(etag []byte) []byte {
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if len(etag) == 0 { // don't encrypt empty ETag - only if client sent ETag = MD5(object)
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return etag
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}
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var buffer bytes.Buffer
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key[:])
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mac.Write([]byte("SSE-etag"))
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if _, err := sio.Encrypt(&buffer, bytes.NewReader(etag), sio.Config{Key: mac.Sum(nil), CipherSuites: fips.DARECiphers()}); err != nil {
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logger.CriticalIf(context.Background(), errors.New("Unable to encrypt ETag using object key"))
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}
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return buffer.Bytes()
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}
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// UnsealETag unseals the etag using the provided object key.
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// It does not try to decrypt the ETag if len(etag) == 16
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// because such ETags indicate that the S3 client hasn't sent
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// an ETag = MD5(object) and the backend has picked an ETag value.
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func (key ObjectKey) UnsealETag(etag []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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if !IsETagSealed(etag) {
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return etag, nil
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}
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key[:])
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mac.Write([]byte("SSE-etag"))
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return sio.DecryptBuffer(make([]byte, 0, len(etag)), etag, sio.Config{Key: mac.Sum(nil), CipherSuites: fips.DARECiphers()})
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}
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