mirror of
https://github.com/minio/minio.git
synced 2024-12-26 15:15:55 -05:00
613 lines
20 KiB
Go
613 lines
20 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2015-2021 MinIO, Inc.
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//
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// This file is part of MinIO Object Storage stack
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//
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// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
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// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
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// (at your option) any later version.
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//
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// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
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// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
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//
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// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
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// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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package cmd
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import (
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"path"
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"path/filepath"
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"runtime/debug"
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"strings"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
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"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/s3utils"
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"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/set"
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"github.com/minio/minio/internal/grid"
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xnet "github.com/minio/pkg/v2/net"
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"github.com/minio/minio/internal/amztime"
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"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/dns"
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"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
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xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
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"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
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"github.com/minio/minio/internal/mcontext"
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)
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const (
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// Maximum allowed form data field values. 64MiB is a guessed practical value
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// which is more than enough to accommodate any form data fields and headers.
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requestFormDataSize = 64 * humanize.MiByte
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// For any HTTP request, request body should be not more than 16GiB + requestFormDataSize
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// where, 16GiB is the maximum allowed object size for object upload.
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requestMaxBodySize = globalMaxObjectSize + requestFormDataSize
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// Maximum size for http headers - See: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/UsingMetadata.html
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maxHeaderSize = 8 * 1024
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// Maximum size for user-defined metadata - See: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/UsingMetadata.html
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maxUserDataSize = 2 * 1024
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// maxBuckets upto 500000 for any MinIO deployment.
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maxBuckets = 500 * 1000
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)
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// ReservedMetadataPrefix is the prefix of a metadata key which
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// is reserved and for internal use only.
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const (
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ReservedMetadataPrefix = "X-Minio-Internal-"
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ReservedMetadataPrefixLower = "x-minio-internal-"
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)
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// containsReservedMetadata returns true if the http.Header contains
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// keys which are treated as metadata but are reserved for internal use
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// and must not set by clients
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func containsReservedMetadata(header http.Header) bool {
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for key := range header {
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if stringsHasPrefixFold(key, ReservedMetadataPrefix) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// isHTTPHeaderSizeTooLarge returns true if the provided
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// header is larger than 8 KB or the user-defined metadata
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// is larger than 2 KB.
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func isHTTPHeaderSizeTooLarge(header http.Header) bool {
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var size, usersize int
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for key := range header {
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length := len(key) + len(header.Get(key))
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size += length
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for _, prefix := range userMetadataKeyPrefixes {
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if stringsHasPrefixFold(key, prefix) {
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usersize += length
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break
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}
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}
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if usersize > maxUserDataSize || size > maxHeaderSize {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// Limits body and header to specific allowed maximum limits as per S3/MinIO API requirements.
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func setRequestLimitMiddleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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tc, ok := r.Context().Value(mcontext.ContextTraceKey).(*mcontext.TraceCtxt)
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// Reject unsupported reserved metadata first before validation.
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if containsReservedMetadata(r.Header) {
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if ok {
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tc.FuncName = "handler.ValidRequest"
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tc.ResponseRecorder.LogErrBody = true
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}
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defer logger.AuditLog(r.Context(), w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
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writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrUnsupportedMetadata), r.URL)
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return
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}
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if isHTTPHeaderSizeTooLarge(r.Header) {
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if ok {
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tc.FuncName = "handler.ValidRequest"
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tc.ResponseRecorder.LogErrBody = true
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}
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defer logger.AuditLog(r.Context(), w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
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writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrMetadataTooLarge), r.URL)
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atomic.AddUint64(&globalHTTPStats.rejectedRequestsHeader, 1)
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return
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}
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// Restricting read data to a given maximum length
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, requestMaxBodySize)
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h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// Reserved bucket.
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const (
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minioReservedBucket = "minio"
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minioReservedBucketPath = SlashSeparator + minioReservedBucket
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loginPathPrefix = SlashSeparator + "login"
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)
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func guessIsBrowserReq(r *http.Request) bool {
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aType := getRequestAuthType(r)
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return strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("User-Agent"), "Mozilla") &&
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globalBrowserEnabled && aType == authTypeAnonymous
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}
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func setBrowserRedirectMiddleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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read := r.Method == http.MethodGet || r.Method == http.MethodHead
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// Re-direction is handled specifically for browser requests.
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if !guessIsHealthCheckReq(r) && guessIsBrowserReq(r) && read && globalBrowserRedirect {
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// Fetch the redirect location if any.
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if u := getRedirectLocation(r); u != nil {
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// Employ a temporary re-direct.
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http.Redirect(w, r, u.String(), http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
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return
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}
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}
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h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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var redirectPrefixes = map[string]struct{}{
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"favicon-16x16.png": {},
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"favicon-32x32.png": {},
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"favicon-96x96.png": {},
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"index.html": {},
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minioReservedBucket: {},
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}
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// Fetch redirect location if urlPath satisfies certain
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// criteria. Some special names are considered to be
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// redirectable, this is purely internal function and
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// serves only limited purpose on redirect-handler for
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// browser requests.
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func getRedirectLocation(r *http.Request) *xnet.URL {
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resource, err := getResource(r.URL.Path, r.Host, globalDomainNames)
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if err != nil {
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return nil
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}
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bucket, _ := path2BucketObject(resource)
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_, redirect := redirectPrefixes[path.Clean(bucket)]
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if redirect || resource == slashSeparator {
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if globalBrowserRedirectURL != nil {
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return globalBrowserRedirectURL
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}
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xhost, err := xnet.ParseHost(r.Host)
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if err != nil {
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return nil
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}
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return &xnet.URL{
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Host: net.JoinHostPort(xhost.Name, globalMinioConsolePort),
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Scheme: func() string {
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scheme := "http"
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if r.TLS != nil {
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scheme = "https"
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}
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return scheme
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}(),
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// guessIsHealthCheckReq - returns true if incoming request looks
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// like healthCheck request
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func guessIsHealthCheckReq(req *http.Request) bool {
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if req == nil {
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return false
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}
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aType := getRequestAuthType(req)
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return aType == authTypeAnonymous && (req.Method == http.MethodGet || req.Method == http.MethodHead) &&
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(req.URL.Path == healthCheckPathPrefix+healthCheckLivenessPath ||
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req.URL.Path == healthCheckPathPrefix+healthCheckReadinessPath ||
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req.URL.Path == healthCheckPathPrefix+healthCheckClusterPath ||
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req.URL.Path == healthCheckPathPrefix+healthCheckClusterReadPath)
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}
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// guessIsMetricsReq - returns true if incoming request looks
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// like metrics request
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func guessIsMetricsReq(req *http.Request) bool {
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if req == nil {
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return false
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}
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aType := getRequestAuthType(req)
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return (aType == authTypeAnonymous || aType == authTypeJWT) &&
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req.URL.Path == minioReservedBucketPath+prometheusMetricsPathLegacy ||
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req.URL.Path == minioReservedBucketPath+prometheusMetricsV2ClusterPath ||
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req.URL.Path == minioReservedBucketPath+prometheusMetricsV2NodePath ||
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req.URL.Path == minioReservedBucketPath+prometheusMetricsV2BucketPath ||
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req.URL.Path == minioReservedBucketPath+prometheusMetricsV2ResourcePath
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}
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// guessIsRPCReq - returns true if the request is for an RPC endpoint.
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func guessIsRPCReq(req *http.Request) bool {
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if req == nil {
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return false
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}
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if req.Method == http.MethodGet && req.URL != nil && req.URL.Path == grid.RoutePath {
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return true
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}
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return req.Method == http.MethodPost &&
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strings.HasPrefix(req.URL.Path, minioReservedBucketPath+SlashSeparator)
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}
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// Check to allow access to the reserved "bucket" `/minio` for Admin
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// API requests.
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func isAdminReq(r *http.Request) bool {
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return strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, adminPathPrefix)
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}
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// Check to allow access to the reserved "bucket" `/minio` for KMS
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// API requests.
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func isKMSReq(r *http.Request) bool {
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return strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, kmsPathPrefix)
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}
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// Supported Amz date headers.
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var amzDateHeaders = []string{
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// Do not change this order, x-amz-date value should be
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// validated first.
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"x-amz-date",
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"date",
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}
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// parseAmzDateHeader - parses supported amz date headers, in
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// supported amz date formats.
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func parseAmzDateHeader(req *http.Request) (time.Time, APIErrorCode) {
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for _, amzDateHeader := range amzDateHeaders {
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amzDateStr := req.Header.Get(amzDateHeader)
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if amzDateStr != "" {
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t, err := amztime.Parse(amzDateStr)
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if err != nil {
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return time.Time{}, ErrMalformedDate
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}
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return t, ErrNone
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}
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}
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// Date header missing.
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return time.Time{}, ErrMissingDateHeader
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}
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// Bad path components to be rejected by the path validity handler.
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const (
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dotdotComponent = ".."
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dotComponent = "."
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)
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func hasBadHost(host string) error {
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if globalIsCICD && strings.TrimSpace(host) == "" {
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// under CI/CD test setups ignore empty hosts as invalid hosts
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return nil
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}
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_, err := xnet.ParseHost(host)
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return err
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}
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// Check if the incoming path has bad path components,
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// such as ".." and "."
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func hasBadPathComponent(path string) bool {
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path = filepath.ToSlash(strings.TrimSpace(path)) // For windows '\' must be converted to '/'
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for _, p := range strings.Split(path, SlashSeparator) {
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switch strings.TrimSpace(p) {
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case dotdotComponent:
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return true
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case dotComponent:
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// Check if client is sending a malicious request.
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func hasMultipleAuth(r *http.Request) bool {
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authTypeCount := 0
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for _, hasValidAuth := range []func(*http.Request) bool{
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isRequestSignatureV2, isRequestPresignedSignatureV2,
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isRequestSignatureV4, isRequestPresignedSignatureV4,
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isRequestJWT, isRequestPostPolicySignatureV4,
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} {
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if hasValidAuth(r) {
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authTypeCount++
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}
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}
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return authTypeCount > 1
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}
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// requestValidityHandler validates all the incoming paths for
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// any malicious requests.
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func setRequestValidityMiddleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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tc, ok := r.Context().Value(mcontext.ContextTraceKey).(*mcontext.TraceCtxt)
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if err := hasBadHost(r.Host); err != nil {
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if ok {
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tc.FuncName = "handler.ValidRequest"
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tc.ResponseRecorder.LogErrBody = true
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}
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defer logger.AuditLog(r.Context(), w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
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invalidReq := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidRequest)
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invalidReq.Description = fmt.Sprintf("%s (%s)", invalidReq.Description, err)
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writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, invalidReq, r.URL)
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atomic.AddUint64(&globalHTTPStats.rejectedRequestsInvalid, 1)
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return
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}
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// Check for bad components in URL path.
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if hasBadPathComponent(r.URL.Path) {
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if ok {
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tc.FuncName = "handler.ValidRequest"
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tc.ResponseRecorder.LogErrBody = true
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}
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defer logger.AuditLog(r.Context(), w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
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writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidResourceName), r.URL)
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atomic.AddUint64(&globalHTTPStats.rejectedRequestsInvalid, 1)
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return
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}
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// Check for bad components in URL query values.
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for k, vv := range r.Form {
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if k == "delimiter" { // delimiters are allowed to have `.` or `..`
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continue
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}
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for _, v := range vv {
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if hasBadPathComponent(v) {
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if ok {
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tc.FuncName = "handler.ValidRequest"
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tc.ResponseRecorder.LogErrBody = true
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}
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defer logger.AuditLog(r.Context(), w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
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writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidResourceName), r.URL)
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atomic.AddUint64(&globalHTTPStats.rejectedRequestsInvalid, 1)
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return
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}
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}
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}
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if hasMultipleAuth(r) {
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if ok {
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tc.FuncName = "handler.Auth"
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tc.ResponseRecorder.LogErrBody = true
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}
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defer logger.AuditLog(r.Context(), w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
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invalidReq := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidRequest)
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invalidReq.Description = fmt.Sprintf("%s (request has multiple authentication types, please use one)", invalidReq.Description)
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writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, invalidReq, r.URL)
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atomic.AddUint64(&globalHTTPStats.rejectedRequestsInvalid, 1)
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return
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}
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// For all other requests reject access to reserved buckets
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bucketName, _ := request2BucketObjectName(r)
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if isMinioReservedBucket(bucketName) || isMinioMetaBucket(bucketName) {
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if !guessIsRPCReq(r) && !guessIsBrowserReq(r) && !guessIsHealthCheckReq(r) && !guessIsMetricsReq(r) && !isAdminReq(r) && !isKMSReq(r) {
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if ok {
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tc.FuncName = "handler.ValidRequest"
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tc.ResponseRecorder.LogErrBody = true
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}
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defer logger.AuditLog(r.Context(), w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
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writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAllAccessDisabled), r.URL)
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return
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}
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} else {
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// Validate bucket names if it is not empty
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if bucketName != "" && s3utils.CheckValidBucketNameStrict(bucketName) != nil {
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if ok {
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tc.FuncName = "handler.ValidRequest"
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tc.ResponseRecorder.LogErrBody = true
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}
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defer logger.AuditLog(r.Context(), w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
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writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidBucketName), r.URL)
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return
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}
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}
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// Deny SSE-C requests if not made over TLS
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if !globalIsTLS && (crypto.SSEC.IsRequested(r.Header) || crypto.SSECopy.IsRequested(r.Header)) {
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if r.Method == http.MethodHead {
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if ok {
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tc.FuncName = "handler.ValidRequest"
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tc.ResponseRecorder.LogErrBody = false
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}
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defer logger.AuditLog(r.Context(), w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
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writeErrorResponseHeadersOnly(w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInsecureSSECustomerRequest))
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} else {
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if ok {
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tc.FuncName = "handler.ValidRequest"
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tc.ResponseRecorder.LogErrBody = true
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}
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defer logger.AuditLog(r.Context(), w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
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writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInsecureSSECustomerRequest), r.URL)
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}
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return
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}
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h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// setBucketForwardingMiddleware middleware forwards the path style requests
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// on a bucket to the right bucket location, bucket to IP configuration
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// is obtained from centralized etcd configuration service.
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func setBucketForwardingMiddleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if origin := w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin"); origin == "null" {
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// This is a workaround change to ensure that "Origin: null"
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// incoming request to a response back as "*" instead of "null"
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
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}
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if globalDNSConfig == nil || !globalBucketFederation ||
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guessIsHealthCheckReq(r) || guessIsMetricsReq(r) ||
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guessIsRPCReq(r) || guessIsLoginSTSReq(r) || isAdminReq(r) {
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h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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bucket, object := request2BucketObjectName(r)
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// Requests in federated setups for STS type calls which are
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// performed at '/' resource should be routed by the muxer,
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// the assumption is simply such that requests without a bucket
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// in a federated setup cannot be proxied, so serve them at
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// current server.
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if bucket == "" {
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h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// MakeBucket requests should be handled at current endpoint
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if r.Method == http.MethodPut && bucket != "" && object == "" && r.URL.RawQuery == "" {
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h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// CopyObject requests should be handled at current endpoint as path style
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// requests have target bucket and object in URI and source details are in
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// header fields
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if r.Method == http.MethodPut && r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzCopySource) != "" {
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bucket, object = path2BucketObject(r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzCopySource))
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if bucket == "" || object == "" {
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
sr, err := globalDNSConfig.Get(bucket)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
defer logger.AuditLog(r.Context(), w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
|
|
if err == dns.ErrNoEntriesFound {
|
|
writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrNoSuchBucket), r.URL)
|
|
} else {
|
|
writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, toAPIError(r.Context(), err), r.URL)
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if globalDomainIPs.Intersection(set.CreateStringSet(getHostsSlice(sr)...)).IsEmpty() {
|
|
r.URL.Scheme = "http"
|
|
if globalIsTLS {
|
|
r.URL.Scheme = "https"
|
|
}
|
|
r.URL.Host = getHostFromSrv(sr)
|
|
// Make sure we remove any existing headers before
|
|
// proxying the request to another node.
|
|
for k := range w.Header() {
|
|
w.Header().Del(k)
|
|
}
|
|
globalForwarder.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// addCustomHeadersMiddleware adds various HTTP(S) response headers.
|
|
// Security Headers enable various security protections behaviors in the client's browser.
|
|
func addCustomHeadersMiddleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
header := w.Header()
|
|
header.Set("X-XSS-Protection", "1; mode=block") // Prevents against XSS attacks
|
|
header.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff") // Prevent mime-sniff
|
|
header.Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains") // HSTS mitigates variants of MITM attacks
|
|
|
|
// Previously, this value was set right before a response was sent to
|
|
// the client. So, logger and Error response XML were not using this
|
|
// value. This is set here so that this header can be logged as
|
|
// part of the log entry, Error response XML and auditing.
|
|
// Set custom headers such as x-amz-request-id for each request.
|
|
w.Header().Set(xhttp.AmzRequestID, mustGetRequestID(UTCNow()))
|
|
if globalLocalNodeName != "" {
|
|
w.Header().Set(xhttp.AmzRequestHostID, globalLocalNodeNameHex)
|
|
}
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// criticalErrorHandler handles panics and fatal errors by
|
|
// `panic(logger.ErrCritical)` as done by `logger.CriticalIf`.
|
|
//
|
|
// It should be always the first / highest HTTP handler.
|
|
func setCriticalErrorHandler(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if rec := recover(); rec == logger.ErrCritical { // handle
|
|
stack := debug.Stack()
|
|
logger.Error("critical: \"%s %s\": %v\n%s", r.Method, r.URL, rec, string(stack))
|
|
writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInternalError), r.URL)
|
|
return
|
|
} else if rec != nil {
|
|
stack := debug.Stack()
|
|
logger.Error("panic: \"%s %s\": %v\n%s", r.Method, r.URL, rec, string(stack))
|
|
// Try to write an error response, upstream may not have written header.
|
|
writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInternalError), r.URL)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// setUploadForwardingMiddleware middleware forwards multiparts requests
|
|
// in a site replication setup to peer that initiated the upload
|
|
func setUploadForwardingMiddleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if !globalSiteReplicationSys.isEnabled() ||
|
|
guessIsHealthCheckReq(r) || guessIsMetricsReq(r) ||
|
|
guessIsRPCReq(r) || guessIsLoginSTSReq(r) || isAdminReq(r) {
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bucket, object := request2BucketObjectName(r)
|
|
uploadID := r.Form.Get(xhttp.UploadID)
|
|
|
|
if bucket != "" && object != "" && uploadID != "" {
|
|
deplID, err := getDeplIDFromUpload(uploadID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
remote, self := globalSiteReplicationSys.getPeerForUpload(deplID)
|
|
if self {
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// forward request to peer handling this upload
|
|
if globalBucketTargetSys.isOffline(remote.EndpointURL) {
|
|
defer logger.AuditLog(r.Context(), w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
|
|
writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrReplicationRemoteConnectionError), r.URL)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r.URL.Scheme = remote.EndpointURL.Scheme
|
|
r.URL.Host = remote.EndpointURL.Host
|
|
// Make sure we remove any existing headers before
|
|
// proxying the request to another node.
|
|
for k := range w.Header() {
|
|
w.Header().Del(k)
|
|
}
|
|
ctx := newContext(r, w, "SiteReplicationUploadForwarding")
|
|
defer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, mustGetClaimsFromToken(r))
|
|
globalForwarder.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|