fix: authenticate LDAP via actual DN instead of normalized DN
Normalized DN is only for internal representation, not for
external communication, any communication to LDAP must be
based on actual user DN. LDAP servers do not understand
normalized DN.
fixes#19757
This change uses the updated ldap library in minio/pkg (bumped
up to v3). A new config parameter is added for LDAP configuration to
specify extra user attributes to load from the LDAP server and to store
them as additional claims for the user.
A test is added in sts_handlers.go that shows how to access the LDAP
attributes as a claim.
This is in preparation for adding SSH pubkey authentication to MinIO's SFTP
integration.
```
==================
WARNING: DATA RACE
Read at 0x0000082be990 by goroutine 205:
github.com/minio/minio/cmd.setCommonHeaders()
Previous write at 0x0000082be990 by main goroutine:
github.com/minio/minio/cmd.lookupConfigs()
```
The `Token` parameter is a sensitive value that should not be output in the Audit log for STS AssumeRoleWithCustomToken API.
Bonus: Add a simple tool that echoes audit logs to the console.
This fixes a regression from #19358 which prevents policy mappings
created in the latest release from being displayed in policy entity
listing APIs.
This is due to the possibility that the base DNs in the LDAP config are
not in a normalized form and #19358 introduced normalized of mapping
keys (user DNs and group DNs). When listing, we check if the policy
mappings are on entities that parse as valid DNs that are descendants of
the base DNs in the config.
Test added that demonstrates a failure without this fix.
Create new code paths for multiple subsystems in the code. This will
make maintaing this easier later.
Also introduce bugLogIf() for errors that should not happen in the first
place.
This change is to decouple need for root credentials to match between
site replication deployments.
Also ensuring site replication config initialization is re-tried until
it succeeds, this deoendency is critical to STS flow in site replication
scenario.
To force limit the duration of STS accounts, the user can create a new
policy, like the following:
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"],
"Condition": {"NumericLessThanEquals": {"sts:DurationSeconds": "300"}}
}]
}
And force binding the policy to all OpenID users, whether using a claim name or role
ARN.
Main motivation is move towards a common backend format
for all different types of modes in MinIO, allowing for
a simpler code and predictable behavior across all features.
This PR also brings features such as versioning, replication,
transitioning to single drive setups.
It would seem like the PR #11623 had chewed more
than it wanted to, non-fips build shouldn't really
be forced to use slower crypto/sha256 even for
presumed "non-performance" codepaths. In MinIO
there are really no "non-performance" codepaths.
This assumption seems to have had an adverse
effect in certain areas of CPU usage.
This PR ensures that we stick to sha256-simd
on all non-FIPS builds, our most common build
to ensure we get the best out of the CPU at
any given point in time.
- Adds an STS API `AssumeRoleWithCustomToken` that can be used to
authenticate via the Id. Mgmt. Plugin.
- Adds a sample identity manager plugin implementation
- Add doc for plugin and STS API
- Add an example program using go SDK for AssumeRoleWithCustomToken
- This change renames the OPA integration as Access Management Plugin - there is
nothing specific to OPA in the integration, it is just a webhook.
- OPA configuration is automatically migrated to Access Management Plugin and
OPA specific configuration is marked as deprecated.
- OPA doc is updated and moved.
- When using multiple providers, claim-based providers are not allowed. All
providers must use role policies.
- Update markdown config to allow `details` HTML element
- This allows site-replication to be configured when using OpenID or the
internal IDentity Provider.
- Internal IDP IAM users and groups will now be replicated to all members of the
set of replicated sites.
- When using OpenID as the external identity provider, STS and service accounts
are replicated.
- Currently this change dis-allows root service accounts from being
replicated (TODO: discuss security implications).
When STS credentials are created for a user, a unique (hopefully stable) parent
user value exists for the credential, which corresponds to the user for whom the
credentials are created. The access policy is mapped to this parent-user and is
persisted. This helps ensure that all STS credentials of a user have the same
policy assignment at all times.
Before this change, for an OIDC STS credential, when the policy claim changes in
the provider (when not using RoleARNs), the change would not take effect on
existing credentials, but only on new ones.
To support existing STS credentials without parent-user policy mappings, we
lookup the policy in the policy claim value. This behavior should be deprecated
when such support is no longer required, as it can still lead to stale
policy mappings.
Additionally this change also simplifies the implementation for all non-RoleARN
STS credentials. Specifically, for AssumeRole (internal IDP) STS credentials,
policies are picked up from the parent user's policies; for
AssumeRoleWithCertificate STS credentials, policies are picked up from the
parent user mapping created when the STS credential is generated.
AssumeRoleWithLDAP already picks up policies mapped to the virtual parent user.
- Allows setting a role policy parameter when configuring OIDC provider
- When role policy is set, the server prints a role ARN usable in STS API requests
- The given role policy is applied to STS API requests when the roleARN parameter is provided.
- Service accounts for role policy are also possible and work as expected.
- New sub-system has "region" and "name" fields.
- `region` subsystem is marked as deprecated, however still works, unless the
new region parameter under `site` is set - in this case, the region subsystem is
ignored. `region` subsystem is hidden from top-level help (i.e. from `mc admin
config set myminio`), but appears when specifically requested (i.e. with `mc
admin config set myminio region`).
- MINIO_REGION, MINIO_REGION_NAME are supported as legacy environment variables for server region.
- Adds MINIO_SITE_REGION as the current environment variable to configure the
server region and MINIO_SITE_NAME for the site name.
This commit makes the MinIO server behavior more consistent
w.r.t. key usage verification.
When MinIO verifies the client certificates it also checks
that the client certificate is valid of client authentication
(or any (i.e. wildcard) usage).
However, the MinIO server used to not verify the client key usage
when client certificate verification was disabled.
Now, the MinIO server verifies the client key usage even when
client certificate verification has been disabled. This makes
the MinIO behavior more consistent from a client's perspective.
Now, a client certificate has to be valid for client authentication
in all cases.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <hi@aead.dev>
As we use etcd's watch interface, we do not need the
network notifications as they are no-ops anyway.
Bonus: Remove globalEtcdClient global usage in IAM
* fix: disallow invalid x-amz-security-token for root credentials
fixes#13335
This was a regression added in #12947 when this part of the
code was refactored to avoid privilege issues with service
accounts with session policy.
Bonus:
- fix: AssumeRoleWithCertificate policy mapping and reload
AssumeRoleWithCertificate was not mapping to correct
policies even after successfully generating keys, since
the claims associated with this API were never looked up
properly. Ensure that policies are set appropriately.
- GetUser() API was not loading policies correctly based
on AccessKey based mapping which is true with OpenID
and AssumeRoleWithCertificate API.
