This commit simplifies and optimizes the decryption of large (multipart)
objects. This PR does two things:
- Re-write the init logic for the decryption reader
- Reduce the number of OEK decryptions
Before, the init logic copied some SSE HTTP request headers to
parse them later. This is simplified to parsing them right away. This
removes some fields from the decryption reader struct.
Further, the decryption reader decrypted the OEK using the client-provided
key (SSE-C) or the KMS (SSE-S3 / SSE-KMS) for each part. This is redundant
since the OEK is the same for all parts. In particular, a KMS call might be a
network request. Now, the OEK is decrypted once for the entire multipart object.
This should improve latency when reading encrypted multipart objects
and reduce requests to the KMS.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <github@aead.dev>
* Multipart SSEC checksums were not transferred.
* Remove key mismatch logging. This key is user-controlled with SSEC.
* If the source is SSEC and the destination reports ErrSSEEncryptedObject,
assume replication is good.
This commit adds support for MinKMS. Now, there are three KMS
implementations in `internal/kms`: Builtin, MinIO KES and MinIO KMS.
Adding another KMS integration required some cleanup. In particular:
- Various KMS APIs that haven't been and are not used have been
removed. A lot of the code was broken anyway.
- Metrics are now monitored by the `kms.KMS` itself. For basic
metrics this is simpler than collecting metrics for external
servers. In particular, each KES server returns its own metrics
and no cluster-level view.
- The builtin KMS now uses the same en/decryption implemented by
MinKMS and KES. It still supports decryption of the previous
ciphertext format. It's backwards compatible.
- Data encryption keys now include a master key version since MinKMS
supports multiple versions (~4 billion in total and 10000 concurrent)
per key name.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <github@aead.dev>
Create new code paths for multiple subsystems in the code. This will
make maintaing this easier later.
Also introduce bugLogIf() for errors that should not happen in the first
place.
With this commit, MinIO generates root credentials automatically
and deterministically if:
- No root credentials have been set.
- A KMS (KES) is configured.
- API access for the root credentials is disabled (lockdown mode).
Before, MinIO defaults to `minioadmin` for both the access and
secret keys. Now, MinIO generates unique root credentials
automatically on startup using the KMS.
Therefore, it uses the KMS HMAC function to generate pseudo-random
values. These values never change as long as the KMS key remains
the same, and the KMS key must continue to exist since all IAM data
is encrypted with it.
Backward compatibility:
This commit should not cause existing deployments to break. It only
changes the root credentials of deployments that have a KMS configured
(KES, not a static key) but have not set any admin credentials. Such
implementations should be rare or not exist at all.
Even if the worst case would be updating root credentials in mc
or other clients used to administer the cluster. Root credentials
are anyway not intended for regular S3 operations.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <github@aead.dev>
GetActualSize() was heavily relying on o.Parts()
to be non-empty to figure out if the object is multipart or not,
However, we have many indicators of whether an object is multipart
or not.
Blindly assuming that o.Parts == nil is not a multipart, is an
incorrect expectation instead, multipart must be obtained via
- Stored metadata value indicating this is a multipart encrypted object.
- Rely on <meta>-actual-size metadata to get the object's actual size.
This value is preserved for additional reasons such as these.
- ETag != 32 length
- remove targetClient for passing around via replicationObjectInfo{}
- remove cloing to object info unnecessarily
- remove objectInfo from replicationObjectInfo{} (only require necessary fields)
This commit adds a `context.Context` to the
the KMS `{Stat, CreateKey, GenerateKey}` API
calls.
The context will be used to terminate external calls
as soon as the client requests gets canceled.
A follow-up PR will add a `context.Context` to
the remaining `DecryptKey` API call.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <hi@aead.dev>
It is observed in a local 8 drive system the CPU seems to be
bottlenecked at
```
(pprof) top
Showing nodes accounting for 1385.31s, 88.47% of 1565.88s total
Dropped 1304 nodes (cum <= 7.83s)
Showing top 10 nodes out of 159
flat flat% sum% cum cum%
724s 46.24% 46.24% 724s 46.24% crypto/sha256.block
219.04s 13.99% 60.22% 226.63s 14.47% syscall.Syscall
158.04s 10.09% 70.32% 158.04s 10.09% runtime.memmove
127.58s 8.15% 78.46% 127.58s 8.15% crypto/md5.block
58.67s 3.75% 82.21% 58.67s 3.75% github.com/minio/highwayhash.updateAVX2
40.07s 2.56% 84.77% 40.07s 2.56% runtime.epollwait
33.76s 2.16% 86.93% 33.76s 2.16% github.com/klauspost/reedsolomon._galMulAVX512Parallel84
8.88s 0.57% 87.49% 11.56s 0.74% runtime.step
7.84s 0.5% 87.99% 7.84s 0.5% runtime.memclrNoHeapPointers
7.43s 0.47% 88.47% 22.18s 1.42% runtime.pcvalue
```
Bonus changes:
- re-use transport for bucket replication clients, also site replication clients.
- use 32KiB buffer for all read and writes at transport layer seems to help
TLS read connections.
- Do not have 'MaxConnsPerHost' this is problematic to be used with net/http
connection pooling 'MaxIdleConnsPerHost' is enough.
This commit improves the listing of encrypted objects:
- Use `etag.Format` and `etag.Decrypt`
- Detect SSE-S3 single-part objects in a single iteration
- Fix batch size to `250`
- Pass request context to `DecryptAll` to not waste resources
when a client cancels the operation.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <hi@aead.dev>
This commit optimises the ETag decryption when
listing objects.
When MinIO lists objects, it has to decrypt the
ETags of single-part SSE-S3 objects.
It does not need to decrypt ETags of
- plaintext objects => Their ETag is not encrypted
- SSE-C objects => Their ETag is not the content MD5
- SSE-KMS objects => Their ETag is not the content MD5
- multipart objects => Their ETag is not encrypted
Hence, MinIO only needs to make a call to the KMS
when it needs to decrypt a single-part SSE-S3 object.
It can resolve the ETags off all other object types
locally.
This commit implements the above semantics by
processing an object listing in batches.
If the batch contains no single-part SSE-S3 object,
then no KMS calls will be made.
If the batch contains at least one single-part
SSE-S3 object we have to make at least one KMS call.
No we first filter all single-part SSE-S3 objects
such that we only request the decryption keys for
these objects.
Once we know which objects resp. ETags require a
decryption key, MinIO either uses the KES bulk
decryption API (if supported) or decrypts each
ETag serially.
This commit is a significant improvement compared
to the previous listing code. Before, a single
non-SSE-S3 object caused MinIO to fall-back to
a serial ETag decryption.
For example, if a batch consisted of 249 SSE-S3
objects and one single SSE-KMS object, MinIO would
send 249 requests to the KMS.
Now, MinIO will send a single request for exactly
those 249 objects and skip the one SSE-KMS object
since it can handle its ETag locally.
Further, MinIO would request decryption keys
for SSE-S3 multipart objects in the past - even
though multipart ETags are not encrypted.
So, if a bucket contained only multipart SSE-S3
objects, MinIO would make totally unnecessary
requests to the KMS.
Now, MinIO simply skips these multipart objects
since it can handle the ETags locally.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <hi@aead.dev>
In bulk ETag decryption, do not rely on the etag to check if it is
encrypted or not to decide if we should set the actual object size in
ObjectInfo. The reason is that multipart objects ETags are not
encrypted.
Always get the actual object size in that case.
This commit adds support for bulk ETag
decryption for SSE-S3 encrypted objects.
If KES supports a bulk decryption API, then
MinIO will check whether its policy grants
access to this API. If so, MinIO will use
a bulk API call instead of sending encrypted
ETags serially to KES.
Note that MinIO will not use the KES bulk API
if its client certificate is an admin identity.
MinIO will process object listings in batches.
A batch has a configurable size that can be set
via `MINIO_KMS_KES_BULK_API_BATCH_SIZE=N`.
It defaults to `500`.
This env. variable is experimental and may be
renamed / removed in the future.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <hi@aead.dev>
This commit fixes two bugs in the `PutObjectPartHandler`.
First, `PutObjectPart` should return SSE-KMS headers
when the object is encrypted using SSE-KMS.
Before, this was not the case.
Second, the ETag should always be a 16 byte hex string,
perhaps followed by a `-X` (where `X` is the number of parts).
However, `PutObjectPart` used to return the encrypted ETag
in case of SSE-KMS. This leaks MinIO internal etag details
through the S3 API.
The combination of both bugs causes clients that use SSE-KMS
to fail when trying to validate the ETag. Since `PutObjectPart`
did not send the SSE-KMS response headers, the response looked
like a plaintext `PutObjectPart` response. Hence, the client
tries to verify that the ETag is the content-md5 of the part.
This could never be the case, since MinIO used to return the
encrypted ETag.
Therefore, clients behaving as specified by the S3 protocol
tried to verify the ETag in a situation they should not.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <hi@aead.dev>
Replication was not working properly for encrypted
objects in single PUT object for preserving etag,
We need to make sure to preserve etag such that replication
works properly and not gets into infinite loops of copying
due to ETag mismatches.
This is to ensure that there are no projects
that try to import `minio/minio/pkg` into
their own repo. Any such common packages should
go to `https://github.com/minio/pkg`
Fixes `testSSES3EncryptedGetObjectReadSeekFunctional` mint test.
```
{
"args": {
"bucketName": "minio-go-test-w53hbpat649nhvws",
"objectName": "6mdswladz4vfpp2oit1pkn3qd11te5"
},
"duration": 7537,
"error": "We encountered an internal error, please try again.: cause(The requested range \"bytes 251717932 -> -116384170 of 135333762\" is not satisfiable.)",
"function": "GetObject(bucketName, objectName)",
"message": "CopyN failed",
"name": "minio-go: testSSES3EncryptedGetObjectReadSeekFunctional",
"status": "FAIL"
}
```
Compressed files always start at the beginning of a part so no additional offset should be added.
This commit replaces the custom KES client implementation
with the KES SDK from https://github.com/minio/kes
The SDK supports multi-server client load-balancing and
requests retry out of the box. Therefore, this change reduces
the overall complexity within the MinIO server and there
is no need to maintain two separate client implementations.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <aead@mail.de>
This commit fixes a bug in the single-part object decryption
that is triggered in case of SSE-KMS. Before, it was assumed
that the encryption is either SSE-C or SSE-S3. In case of SSE-KMS
the SSE-C branch was executed. This lead to an invalid SSE-C
algorithm error.
This commit fixes this by inverting the `if-else` logic.
Now, the SSE-C branch only gets executed when SSE-C headers
are present.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <aead@mail.de>
This commit adds basic SSE-KMS support.
Now, a client can specify the SSE-KMS headers
(algorithm, optional key-id, optional context)
such that the object gets encrypted using the
SSE-KMS method. Further, auto-encryption now
defaults to SSE-KMS.
This commit does not try to do any refactoring
and instead tries to implement SSE-KMS as a minimal
change to the code base. However, refactoring the entire
crypto-related code is planned - but needs a separate
effort.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <aead@mail.de>
This commit adds basic SSE-KMS support.
Now, a client can specify the SSE-KMS headers
(algorithm, optional key-id, optional context)
such that the object gets encrypted using the
SSE-KMS method. Further, auto-encryption now
defaults to SSE-KMS.
This commit does not try to do any refactoring
and instead tries to implement SSE-KMS as a minimal
change to the code base. However, refactoring the entire
crypto-related code is planned - but needs a separate
effort.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <aead@mail.de>
Co-authored-by: Klaus Post <klauspost@gmail.com>
This commit introduces a new package `pkg/kms`.
It contains basic types and functions to interact
with various KMS implementations.
This commit also moves KMS-related code from `cmd/crypto`
to `pkg/kms`. Now, it is possible to implement a KMS-based
config data encryption in the `pkg/config` package.
Harshavardhana
Andreas Auernhammer
shandongzhejiang
Poorna
Klaus Post
Anis Eleuch
Sveinn
ferhat elmas
Allan Roger Reid
Andreas Auernhammer
Andreas Auernhammer