This commit replaces the usage of
github.com/minio/sha256-simd with crypto/sha256
of the standard library in all non-performance
critical paths.
This is necessary for FIPS 140-2 compliance which
requires that all crypto. primitives are implemented
by a FIPS-validated module.
Go can use the Google FIPS module. The boringcrypto
branch of the Go standard library uses the BoringSSL
FIPS module to implement crypto. primitives like AES
or SHA256.
We only keep github.com/minio/sha256-simd when computing
the content-SHA256 of an object. Therefore, this commit
relies on a build tag `fips`.
When MinIO is compiled without the `fips` flag it will
use github.com/minio/sha256-simd. When MinIO is compiled
with the fips flag (go build --tags "fips") then MinIO
uses crypto/sha256 to compute the content-SHA256.
This commit adds a new package `etag` for dealing
with S3 ETags.
Even though ETag is often viewed as MD5 checksum of
an object, handling S3 ETags correctly is a surprisingly
complex task. While it is true that the ETag corresponds
to the MD5 for the most basic S3 API operations, there are
many exceptions in case of multipart uploads or encryption.
In worse, some S3 clients expect very specific behavior when
it comes to ETags. For example, some clients expect that the
ETag is a double-quoted string and fail otherwise.
Non-AWS compliant ETag handling has been a source of many bugs
in the past.
Therefore, this commit adds a dedicated `etag` package that provides
functionality for parsing, generating and converting S3 ETags.
Further, this commit removes the ETag computation from the `hash`
package. Instead, the `hash` package (i.e. `hash.Reader`) should
focus only on computing and verifying the content-sha256.
One core feature of this commit is to provide a mechanism to
communicate a computed ETag from a low-level `io.Reader` to
a high-level `io.Reader`.
This problem occurs when an S3 server receives a request and
has to compute the ETag of the content. However, the server
may also wrap the initial body with several other `io.Reader`,
e.g. when encrypting or compressing the content:
```
reader := Encrypt(Compress(ETag(content)))
```
In such a case, the ETag should be accessible by the high-level
`io.Reader`.
The `etag` provides a mechanism to wrap `io.Reader` implementations
such that the `ETag` can be accessed by a type-check.
This technique is applied to the PUT, COPY and Upload handlers.
The `ioutil.NopCloser(reader)` was hiding nested hash readers.
We make it an `io.Closer` so it can be attached without wrapping
and allows for nesting, by merging the requests.
This commit fixes a DoS vulnerability for certain APIs using
signature V4 by verifying the content-md5 and/or content-sha56 of
the request body in a streaming mode.
The issue was caused by reading the entire body of the request into
memory to verify the content-md5 or content-sha56 checksum if present.
The vulnerability could be exploited by either replaying a V4 request
(in the 15 min time frame) or sending a V4 presigned request with a
large body.
This change replaces all imports of "crypto/sha256" with
"github.com/minio/sha256-simd". The sha256-simd package
is faster on ARM64 (NEON instructions) and can take advantage
of AVX-512 in certain scenarios.
Fixes#5374
- Use it to send the Content-MD5 header correctly encoded to S3
Gateway
- Fixes a bug in PutObject (including anonymous PutObject) and
PutObjectPart with S3 Gateway found when testing with Mint.
Verify() was being called by caller after the data
has been successfully read after io.EOF. This disconnection
opens a race under concurrent access to such an object.
Verification is not necessary outside of Read() call,
we can simply just do checksum verification right inside
Read() call at io.EOF.
This approach simplifies the usage.