No locks are ever left in memory, we also
have a periodic interval of clearing stale locks
anyways. The lock instrumentation was not complete
and was seldom used.
Deprecate this for now and bring it back later if
it is really needed. This also in-turn seems to improve
performance slightly.
Order for server:disk originally provided wouldn't stripe
wide and may lead to availability issues.
Also added Short-form examples using {1...n} and a
warning about {1..2} vs {1...3}
With CoreDNS now supporting etcdv3 as the DNS backend, we
can update our federation target to etcdv3. Users will now be
able to use etcdv3 server as the federation backbone.
Minio will update bucket data to etcdv3 and CoreDNS can pick
that data up and serve it as bucket style DNS path.
Certain SCSI drivers do not allow certain tuning parameters
like nr_requests, max_sectors_kb to be changed, ignore these
errors silently as this script is simply a best effort.
Fixes#6103
This PR adds CopyObject support for objects residing in buckets
in different Minio instances (where Minio instances are part of
a federated setup).
Also, added support for multiple Minio domain IPs. This is required
for distributed deployments, where one deployment may have multiple
nodes, each with a different public IP.
Buckets already present on a Minio server before it joins a
bucket federated deployment will now be added to etcd during
startup. In case of a bucket name collision, admin is informed
via Minio server console message.
Added configuration migration for configuration stored in etcd
backend.
Also, environment variables are updated and ListBucket path style
request is no longer forwarded.
Minio server supports healthcheck and prometheus related
unauthenticated endpoints. This document summarizes this
information in a single place and add links for more detailed
documentation if needed.
This change disables the non-constant-time implementations of P-384 and P-521.
As a consequence a client using just these curves cannot connect to the server.
This should be no real issues because (all) clients at least support P-256.
Further this change also rejects ECDSA private keys of P-384 and P-521.
While non-constant-time implementations for the ECDHE exchange don't expose an
obvious vulnerability, using P-384 or P-521 keys for the ECDSA signature may allow
pratical timing attacks.
Fixes#5844