Optimize DeleteObject API to avoid extra
GetObjectInfo call on the replicating side.
For receiving side, it is just a regular
DeleteObject call.
Bonus: Fix a corner case where version purged is
absent on target (either due to replication not yet
complete or target version already deleted in a
one-way replication or when replication was disabled).
In such cases, mark version purge complete.
- lifecycle must return InvalidArgument for rule errors
- do not return `null` versionId in HTTP header
- reject mixed SSE uploads with correct error message
- getObjectTagging to be allowed for anonymous policies
- return correct errors for invalid retention period
- return sorted list of tags for an object
- putObjectTagging must return 200 OK not 204 OK
- return 409 ErrObjectLockConfigurationNotAllowed for existing buckets
remote error is not required to be passed back to the
client - this is mostly because we have healing that should
eventually, catch up on this and heal the bucket.
500k is a reasonable limit for any single MinIO
cluster deployment, in future we may increase this
value.
However for now we are going to keep this limit.
Currently, the code doesn't check if the user creating a bucket with
locking feature has bucket locking and versioning permissions enabled,
adding it in accordance with S3 spec.
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_CreateBucket.html
Object Lock - If ObjectLockEnabledForBucket is set to true in your CreateBucket request,
s3:PutBucketObjectLockConfiguration and s3:PutBucketVersioning permissions are required.
This PR changes the handling of bucket deletes for site
replicated setups to hold on to deleted bucket state until
it syncs to all the clusters participating in site replication.
This commit adds a `context.Context` to the
the KMS `{Stat, CreateKey, GenerateKey}` API
calls.
The context will be used to terminate external calls
as soon as the client requests gets canceled.
A follow-up PR will add a `context.Context` to
the remaining `DecryptKey` API call.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <hi@aead.dev>
Add up to 256 bytes of padding for compressed+encrypted files.
This will obscure the obvious cases of extremely compressible content
and leave a similar output size for a very wide variety of inputs.
This does *not* mean the compression ratio doesn't leak information
about the content, but the outcome space is much smaller,
so often *less* information is leaked.
