This change tracks bandwidth for a bucket and object
- [x] Add Admin API
- [x] Add Peer API
- [x] Add BW throttling
- [x] Admin APIs to set replication limit
- [x] Admin APIs for fetch bandwidth
In almost all scenarios MinIO now is
mostly ready for all sub-systems
independently, safe-mode is not useful
anymore and do not serve its original
intended purpose.
allow server to be fully functional
even with config partially configured,
this is to cater for availability of actual
I/O v/s manually fixing the server.
In k8s like environments it will never make
sense to take pod into safe-mode state,
because there is no real access to perform
any remote operation on them.
- select lockers which are non-local and online to have
affinity towards remote servers for lock contention
- optimize lock retry interval to avoid sending too many
messages during lock contention, reduces average CPU
usage as well
- if bucket is not set, when deleteObject fails make sure
setPutObjHeaders() honors lifecycle only if bucket name
is set.
- fix top locks to list out always the oldest lockers always,
avoid getting bogged down into map's unordered nature.
This commit refactors the certificate management implementation
in the `certs` package such that multiple certificates can be
specified at the same time. Therefore, the following layout of
the `certs/` directory is expected:
```
certs/
│
├─ public.crt
├─ private.key
├─ CAs/ // CAs directory is ignored
│ │
│ ...
│
├─ example.com/
│ │
│ ├─ public.crt
│ └─ private.key
└─ foobar.org/
│
├─ public.crt
└─ private.key
...
```
However, directory names like `example.com` are just for human
readability/organization and don't have any meaning w.r.t whether
a particular certificate is served or not. This decision is made based
on the SNI sent by the client and the SAN of the certificate.
***
The `Manager` will pick a certificate based on the client trying
to establish a TLS connection. In particular, it looks at the client
hello (i.e. SNI) to determine which host the client tries to access.
If the manager can find a certificate that matches the SNI it
returns this certificate to the client.
However, the client may choose to not send an SNI or tries to access
a server directly via IP (`https://<ip>:<port>`). In this case, we
cannot use the SNI to determine which certificate to serve. However,
we also should not pick "the first" certificate that would be accepted
by the client (based on crypto. parameters - like a signature algorithm)
because it may be an internal certificate that contains internal hostnames.
We would disclose internal infrastructure details doing so.
Therefore, the `Manager` returns the "default" certificate when the
client does not specify an SNI. The default certificate the top-level
`public.crt` - i.e. `certs/public.crt`.
This approach has some consequences:
- It's the operator's responsibility to ensure that the top-level
`public.crt` does not disclose any information (i.e. hostnames)
that are not publicly visible. However, this was the case in the
past already.
- Any other `public.crt` - except for the top-level one - must not
contain any IP SAN. The reason for this restriction is that the
Manager cannot match a SNI to an IP b/c the SNI is the server host
name. The entire purpose of SNI is to indicate which host the client
tries to connect to when multiple hosts run on the same IP. So, a
client will not set the SNI to an IP.
If we would allow IP SANs in a lower-level `public.crt` a user would
expect that it is possible to connect to MinIO directly via IP address
and that the MinIO server would pick "the right" certificate. However,
the MinIO server cannot determine which certificate to serve, and
therefore always picks the "default" one. This may lead to all sorts
of confusing errors like:
"It works if I use `https:instance.minio.local` but not when I use
`https://10.0.2.1`.
These consequences/limitations should be pointed out / explained in our
docs in an appropriate way. However, the support for multiple
certificates should not have any impact on how deployment with a single
certificate function today.
Co-authored-by: Harshavardhana <harsha@minio.io>
newDynamicTimeout should be allocated once, in-case
of temporary locks in config and IAM we should
have allocated timeout once before the `for loop`
This PR doesn't fix any issue as such, but provides
enough dynamism for the timeout as per expectation.
It is possible in situations when server was deployed
in asymmetric configuration in the past such as
```
minio server ~/fs{1...4}/disk{1...5}
```
Results in setDriveCount of 10 in older releases
but with fairly recent releases we have moved to
having server affinity which means that a set drive
count ascertained from above config will be now '4'
While the object layer make sure that we honor
`format.json` the storageClass configuration however
was by mistake was using the global value obtained
by heuristics. Which leads to prematurely using
lower parity without being requested by the an
administrator.
This PR fixes this behavior.
Generalize replication target management so
that remote targets for a bucket can be
managed with ARNs. `mc admin bucket remote`
command will be used to manage targets.
with the merge of https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/pull/11823
etcd v3.5.0 will now have a properly imported versioned path
this fixes our pending migration to newer repo
When manual healing is triggered, one node in a cluster will
become the authority to heal. mc regularly sends new requests
to fetch the status of the ongoing healing process, but a load
balancer could land the healing request to a node that is not
doing the healing request.
This PR will redirect a request to the node based on the node
index found described as part of the client token. A similar
technique is also used to proxy ListObjectsV2 requests
by encoding this information in continuation-token
Looking into full disk errors on zoned setup. We don't take the
5% space requirement into account when selecting a zone.
The interesting part is that even considering this we don't
know the size of the object the user wants to upload when
they do multipart uploads.
It seems quite defensive to always upload multiparts to
the zone where there is the most space since all load will
be directed to a part of the cluster.
In these cases we make sure it can at least hold a 1GiB file
and we disadvantage fuller zones more by subtracting the
expected size before weighing.
- Implement a new xl.json 2.0.0 format to support,
this moves the entire marshaling logic to POSIX
layer, top layer always consumes a common FileInfo
construct which simplifies the metadata reads.
- Implement list object versions
- Migrate to siphash from crchash for new deployments
for object placements.
Fixes#2111
Bonus fixes in quota enforcement to use the
new datastructure and use timedValue to cache
a value/reload automatically avoids one less
global variable.
This PR adds a new configuration parameter which allows readiness
check to respond within 10secs, this can be reduced to a lower value
if necessary using
```
mc admin config set api ready_deadline=5s
```
or
```
export MINIO_API_READY_DEADLINE=5s
```
this is a major overhaul by migrating off all
bucket metadata related configs into a single
object '.metadata.bin' this allows us for faster
bootups across 1000's of buckets and as well
as keeps the code simple enough for future
work and additions.
Additionally also fixes#9396, #9394
This PR is to ensure that we call the relevant object
layer APIs for necessary S3 API level functionalities
allowing gateway implementations to return proper
errors as NotImplemented{}
This allows for all our tests in mint to behave
appropriately and can be handled appropriately as
well.
We should allow quorum errors to be send upwards
such that caller can retry while reading bucket
encryption/policy configs when server is starting
up, this allows distributed setups to load the
configuration properly.
Current code didn't facilitate this and would have
never loaded the actual configs during rolling,
server restarts.
This PR allows setting a "hard" or "fifo" quota
restriction at the bucket level. Buckets that
have reached the FIFO quota configured, will
automatically be cleaned up in FIFO manner until
bucket usage drops to configured quota.
If a bucket is configured with a "hard" quota
ceiling, all further writes are disallowed.
this commit avoids lots of tiny allocations, repeated
channel creates which are performed when filtering
the incoming events, unescaping a key just for matching.
also remove deprecated code which is not needed
anymore, avoids unexpected data structure transformations
from the map to slice.
global WORM mode is a complex piece for which
the time has passed, with the advent of S3 compatible
object locking and retention implementation global
WORM is sort of deprecated, this has been mentioned
in our documentation for some time, now the time
has come for this to go.
Add two new configuration entries, api.requests-max and
api.requests-deadline which have the same role of
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX and MINIO_API_REQUESTS_DEADLINE.
- pkg/bucket/encryption provides support for handling bucket
encryption configuration
- changes under cmd/ provide support for AES256 algorithm only
Co-Authored-By: Poorna <poornas@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Harshavardhana <harsha@minio.io>
This is to ensure that when we have multiple tenants
deployed all sharing the same etcd for global bucket
should avoid listing each others buckets, this leads
to information leak which should be avoided unless
etcd is not namespaced for IAM assets in which case
it can be assumed that its a federated setup.
Federated setup and namespaced IAM assets on etcd
is not supported since namespacing is only useful
when you wish to separate the tenants as isolated
instances of MinIO.
This PR allows a new type of behavior, primarily
driven by the usecase of m3(mkube) multi-tenant
deployments with global bucket support.
This ensures that we can update the
- .minio.sys is updated for accounting/data usage purposes
- .minio.sys is updated to indicate if backend is encrypted
or not.
Currently, we use the top-level prefix "config/"
for all our IAM assets, instead of to provide
tenant-level separation bring 'path_prefix'
to namespace the access properly.
Fixes#8567
level - this PR builds on #8120 which
added PutBucketObjectLockConfiguration and
GetBucketObjectLockConfiguration APIS
This PR implements PutObjectRetention,
GetObjectRetention API and enhances
PUT and GET API operations to display
governance metadata if permissions allow.
- Supports migrating only when the credential ENVs are set,
so any FS mode deployments which do not have ENVs set will
continue to remain as is.
- Credential ENVs can be rotated using MINIO_ACCESS_KEY_OLD
and MINIO_SECRET_KEY_OLD envs, in such scenarios it allowed
to rotate the encrypted content to a new admin key.
- This PR allows config KVS to be validated properly
without being affected by ENV overrides, rejects
invalid values during set operation
- Expands unit tests and refactors the error handling
for notification targets, returns error instead of
ignoring targets for invalid KVS
- Does all the prep-work for implementing safe-mode
style operation for MinIO server, introduces a new
global variable to toggle safe mode based operations
NOTE: this PR itself doesn't provide safe mode operations
