fix: allow parsing keys in both new and old format (#12144)

Bonus fix fallback to decrypt previously
encrypted content as well using older master
key ciphertext format.

Signed-off-by: Harshavardhana <harsha@minio.io>

cmd/common-main.go

@@ -341,28 +341,37 @@ func handleCommonEnvVars() {
 	case env.IsSet(config.EnvKMSMasterKey) && env.IsSet(config.EnvKESEndpoint):
 		logger.Fatal(errors.New("ambigious KMS configuration"), fmt.Sprintf("The environment contains %q as well as %q", config.EnvKMSMasterKey, config.EnvKESEndpoint))
 	}
-	if env.IsSet(config.EnvKMSSecretKey) {
-		KMS, err := kms.Parse(env.Get(config.EnvKMSSecretKey, ""))
-		if err != nil {
-			logger.Fatal(err, "Unable to parse the KMS secret key inherited from the shell environment")
-		}
-		GlobalKMS = KMS
-	} else if env.IsSet(config.EnvKMSMasterKey) {
-		logger.LogIf(GlobalContext, errors.New("legacy KMS configuration"), fmt.Sprintf("The environment variable %q is deprecated and will be removed in the future", config.EnvKMSMasterKey))
 
-		v := strings.SplitN(env.Get(config.EnvKMSMasterKey, ""), ":", 2)
+	parseMasterKey := func(key string) error {
-		if len(v) != 2 {
+		KMS, err := kms.Parse(env.Get(key, ""))
-			logger.Fatal(errors.New("invalid "+config.EnvKMSMasterKey), "Unable to parse the KMS secret key inherited from the shell environment")
-		}
-		secretKey, err := hex.DecodeString(v[1])
 		if err != nil {
-			logger.Fatal(err, "Unable to parse the KMS secret key inherited from the shell environment")
+			v := strings.SplitN(env.Get(key, ""), ":", 2)
-		}
+			if len(v) != 2 {
-		KMS, err := kms.New(v[0], secretKey)
+				return errors.New("invalid " + key)
-		if err != nil {
+			}
-			logger.Fatal(err, "Unable to parse the KMS secret key inherited from the shell environment")
+			secretKey, err := hex.DecodeString(v[1])
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			KMS, err = kms.New(v[0], secretKey)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
 		}
 		GlobalKMS = KMS
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if env.IsSet(config.EnvKMSSecretKey) {
+		if err = parseMasterKey(config.EnvKMSSecretKey); err != nil {
+			logger.Fatal(err, "Unable to parse the KMS secret key inherited from the shell environment")
+		}
+	} else if env.IsSet(config.EnvKMSMasterKey) {
+		logger.LogIf(GlobalContext, errors.New("legacy KMS configuration"),
+			fmt.Sprintf("The environment variable %q is deprecated and will be removed in the future", config.EnvKMSMasterKey))
+		if err = parseMasterKey(config.EnvKMSMasterKey); err != nil {
+			logger.Fatal(err, "Unable to parse the KMS secret key inherited from the shell environment")
+		}
 	}
 	if env.IsSet(config.EnvKESEndpoint) {
 		kesEndpoints, err := crypto.ParseKESEndpoints(env.Get(config.EnvKESEndpoint, ""))

docs/kms/IAM.md

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# KMS IAM/Config Encryption
+
+MinIO will soon release a change that re-works the encryption of IAM and
+configuration data. Currently, MinIO encrypts IAM data (user/temp. credentials,
+policies and other configuration data) with the cluster root credentials before
+storing it on the backend disks. After release `RELEASE.2021-04-22T15-44-28Z`
+onwards, MinIO will use the KMS provided keys to encrypt the IAM data instead
+of the cluster root credentials. If the KMS is not enabled, MinIO will store
+the IAM data as plain text in its backend.
+
+### FAQ
+
+> Why is this change needed? Was the previous encryption not secure (enough)?
+
+The previous mechanism of encryption using the cluster root credentials itself
+is secure. The purpose of this change is to improve the encryption key
+management by delegating it to the KMS. Once the cluster root credentials are no
+longer needed to decrypt persistent data at the backend, they can be rotated
+much more easily. By using a KMS to protect the IAM data a potential security or
+compliance team has much more control over how/when a MinIO cluster can be
+started.
+
+> Does this mean I need an enterprise KMS setup to run MinIO (securely)?
+
+No, MinIO does not depend on any third-party KMS provider. You have three options here:
+
+- Run MinIO without a KMS. In this case all IAM data will be stored in plain-text.
+
+- Run MinIO with a single secret key. MinIO supports a static cryptographic key
+  that can act as minimal KMS. With this method all IAM data will be stored
+  encrypted. The encryption key has to be passed as environment variable.
+
+- Run MinIO with KES (minio/kes) in combination with any supported KMS as
+  secure key store. For example, you can run MinIO + KES + Hashicorp Vault.
+
+> What about an exiting MinIO deployment? Can I just upgrade my cluster?
+
+Yes, MinIO will try to transparently migrate any existing IAM data and either stores
+it in plaintext (no KMS) or re-encrypts using the KMS.
+
+> Is this change backward compatible? Will it break my setup?
+
+This change is not backward compatible for all setups. In particular, the native
+Hashicorp Vault integration - which has been deprecated already - won't be
+supported anymore. KES is now mandatory if a third-party KMS should be used.
+
+Further, since the configuration data is encrypted with the KMS, the KMS
+configuration itself can no longer be stored in the MinIO config file and
+instead must be provided via environment variables. If you have set your KMS
+configuration using e.g. the `mc admin config` commands you will need to adjust
+your deployment.
+
+Even though this change is backward compatible we do not expect that it affects
+the vast majority of deployments in any negative way.
+
+> Will an upgrade of an existing MinIO cluster impact the SLA of the cluster or will it even cause downtime?
+
+No, an upgrade should not cause any downtime. However, on the first startup -
+since MinIO will attempt to migrate any existing IAM data - the boot process may
+take slightly longer, but may not be visibly noticeable. Once the migration has
+completed, any subsequent restart should be as fast as before or even faster.

pkg/kms/single-key.go

@@ -28,7 +28,9 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
+	"unicode/utf8"
 
+	"github.com/minio/sio"
 	"github.com/secure-io/sio-go/sioutil"
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20"
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
@@ -55,7 +57,7 @@ func Parse(s string) (KMS, error) {
 }
 
 // New returns a single-key KMS that derives new DEKs from the
-// given key. The given key must always be 32 bytes.
+// given key.
 func New(keyID string, key []byte) (KMS, error) {
 	if len(key) != 32 {
 		return nil, errors.New("kms: invalid key length " + strconv.Itoa(len(key)))
@@ -168,11 +170,39 @@ func (kms secretKey) GenerateKey(keyID string, context Context) (DEK, error) {
 	}, nil
 }
 
+func (kms secretKey) legacyDecryptKey(keyID string, sealedKey []byte, ctx Context) ([]byte, error) {
+	var derivedKey = kms.deriveKey(keyID, ctx)
+
+	var key [32]byte
+	out, err := sio.DecryptBuffer(key[:0], sealedKey, sio.Config{Key: derivedKey[:]})
+	if err != nil || len(out) != 32 {
+		return nil, err // TODO(aead): upgrade sio to use sio.Error
+	}
+	return key[:], nil
+}
+
+func (kms secretKey) deriveKey(keyID string, context Context) (key [32]byte) {
+	if context == nil {
+		context = Context{}
+	}
+	ctxBytes, _ := context.MarshalText()
+
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, kms.key[:])
+	mac.Write([]byte(keyID))
+	mac.Write(ctxBytes)
+	mac.Sum(key[:0])
+	return key
+}
+
 func (kms secretKey) DecryptKey(keyID string, ciphertext []byte, context Context) ([]byte, error) {
 	if keyID != kms.keyID {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("kms: key %q does not exist", keyID)
 	}
 
+	if !utf8.Valid(ciphertext) {
+		return kms.legacyDecryptKey(keyID, ciphertext, context)
+	}
+
 	var encryptedKey encryptedKey
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(ciphertext, &encryptedKey); err != nil {
 		return nil, err