Configure http2 with higher maxconcurrent streams (#7363)

This value is needed for Minio's internode communication,
read the meaning of this value as per the HTTP 2.0 spec

https://http2.github.io/http2-spec/#rfc.section.5.1.2

cmd/http/server.go

@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	humanize "github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
+	"golang.org/x/net/http2"
+
 	"github.com/minio/minio-go/pkg/set"
 	"github.com/minio/minio/pkg/certs"
 )
@@ -46,6 +48,9 @@ const (
 
 	// DefaultMaxHeaderBytes - default maximum HTTP header size in bytes.
 	DefaultMaxHeaderBytes = 1 * humanize.MiByte
+
+	// DefaultHTTP2MaxConcurrentStreams - default value for HTTP 2.0 maximum concurrent streams allowed.
+	DefaultHTTP2MaxConcurrentStreams = 1024
 )
 
 // Server - extended http.Server supports multiple addresses to serve and enhanced connection handling.
@@ -56,7 +61,7 @@ type Server struct {
 	TCPKeepAliveTimeout    time.Duration // timeout used for underneath TCP connection.
 	UpdateBytesReadFunc    func(int)     // function to be called to update bytes read in bufConn.
 	UpdateBytesWrittenFunc func(int)     // function to be called to update bytes written in bufConn.
-	listenerMutex          *sync.Mutex   // to guard 'listener' field.
+	listenerMutex          sync.Mutex    // to guard 'listener' field.
 	listener               *httpListener // HTTP listener for all 'Addrs' field.
 	inShutdown             uint32        // indicates whether the server is in shutdown or not
 	requestCount           int32         // counter holds no. of request in progress.
@@ -120,6 +125,11 @@ func (srv *Server) Start() (err error) {
 
 	// Start servicing with listener.
 	if tlsConfig != nil {
+		if err = http2.ConfigureServer(&srv.Server, &http2.Server{
+			MaxConcurrentStreams: DefaultHTTP2MaxConcurrentStreams,
+		}); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 		return srv.Server.Serve(tls.NewListener(listener, tlsConfig))
 	}
 	return srv.Server.Serve(listener)
@@ -202,7 +212,6 @@ func NewServer(addrs []string, handler http.Handler, getCert certs.GetCertificat
 		Addrs:               addrs,
 		ShutdownTimeout:     DefaultShutdownTimeout,
 		TCPKeepAliveTimeout: DefaultTCPKeepAliveTimeout,
-		listenerMutex:       &sync.Mutex{},
 	}
 	httpServer.Handler = handler
 	httpServer.TLSConfig = tlsConfig

cmd/http/server_test.go

@@ -77,10 +77,6 @@ func TestNewServer(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Fatalf("Case %v: server.TCPKeepAliveTimeout: expected: %v, got: %v", (i + 1), DefaultTCPKeepAliveTimeout, server.TCPKeepAliveTimeout)
 		}
 
-		if server.listenerMutex == nil {
-			t.Fatalf("Case %v: server.listenerMutex: expected: <non-nil>, got: <nil>", (i + 1))
-		}
-
 		if server.ReadTimeout != DefaultReadTimeout {
 			t.Fatalf("Case %v: server.ReadTimeout: expected: %v, got: %v", (i + 1), DefaultReadTimeout, server.ReadTimeout)
 		}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/ciphers.go

@@ -0,0 +1,641 @@
+// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package http2
+
+// A list of the possible cipher suite ids. Taken from
+// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.txt
+
+const (
+	cipher_TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL               uint16 = 0x0000
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5                 uint16 = 0x0001
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                 uint16 = 0x0002
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5        uint16 = 0x0003
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5              uint16 = 0x0004
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              uint16 = 0x0005
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5    uint16 = 0x0006
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA             uint16 = 0x0007
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA     uint16 = 0x0008
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA              uint16 = 0x0009
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA         uint16 = 0x000A
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA  uint16 = 0x000B
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA           uint16 = 0x000C
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA      uint16 = 0x000D
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA  uint16 = 0x000E
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA           uint16 = 0x000F
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA      uint16 = 0x0010
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0011
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0x0012
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     uint16 = 0x0013
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0014
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0x0015
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     uint16 = 0x0016
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5    uint16 = 0x0017
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5          uint16 = 0x0018
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0019
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0x001A
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     uint16 = 0x001B
+	// Reserved uint16 =  0x001C-1D
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA             uint16 = 0x001E
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        uint16 = 0x001F
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA             uint16 = 0x0020
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0x0021
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5             uint16 = 0x0022
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5        uint16 = 0x0023
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5             uint16 = 0x0024
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5            uint16 = 0x0025
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA   uint16 = 0x0026
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA   uint16 = 0x0027
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA       uint16 = 0x0028
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5   uint16 = 0x0029
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5   uint16 = 0x002A
+	cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5       uint16 = 0x002B
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                 uint16 = 0x002C
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA             uint16 = 0x002D
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA             uint16 = 0x002E
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0x002F
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA       uint16 = 0x0030
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA       uint16 = 0x0031
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA      uint16 = 0x0032
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA      uint16 = 0x0033
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA      uint16 = 0x0034
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0x0035
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA       uint16 = 0x0036
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA       uint16 = 0x0037
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA      uint16 = 0x0038
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA      uint16 = 0x0039
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA      uint16 = 0x003A
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256              uint16 = 0x003B
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256       uint16 = 0x003C
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256       uint16 = 0x003D
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256    uint16 = 0x003E
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256    uint16 = 0x003F
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256   uint16 = 0x0040
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     uint16 = 0x0041
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA  uint16 = 0x0042
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA  uint16 = 0x0043
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0044
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0045
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0046
+	// Reserved uint16 =  0x0047-4F
+	// Reserved uint16 =  0x0050-58
+	// Reserved uint16 =  0x0059-5C
+	// Unassigned uint16 =  0x005D-5F
+	// Reserved uint16 =  0x0060-66
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x0067
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256  uint16 = 0x0068
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256  uint16 = 0x0069
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x006A
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x006B
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x006C
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x006D
+	// Unassigned uint16 =  0x006E-83
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA        uint16 = 0x0084
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     uint16 = 0x0085
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     uint16 = 0x0086
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA    uint16 = 0x0087
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA    uint16 = 0x0088
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA    uint16 = 0x0089
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                 uint16 = 0x008A
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0x008B
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA             uint16 = 0x008C
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA             uint16 = 0x008D
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA             uint16 = 0x008E
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        uint16 = 0x008F
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         uint16 = 0x0090
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         uint16 = 0x0091
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA             uint16 = 0x0092
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        uint16 = 0x0093
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         uint16 = 0x0094
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         uint16 = 0x0095
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA                uint16 = 0x0096
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA             uint16 = 0x0097
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA             uint16 = 0x0098
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0x0099
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0x009A
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0x009B
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256          uint16 = 0x009C
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384          uint16 = 0x009D
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      uint16 = 0x009E
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      uint16 = 0x009F
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       uint16 = 0x00A0
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       uint16 = 0x00A1
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      uint16 = 0x00A2
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      uint16 = 0x00A3
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       uint16 = 0x00A4
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       uint16 = 0x00A5
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      uint16 = 0x00A6
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      uint16 = 0x00A7
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256          uint16 = 0x00A8
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384          uint16 = 0x00A9
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      uint16 = 0x00AA
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      uint16 = 0x00AB
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      uint16 = 0x00AC
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      uint16 = 0x00AD
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256          uint16 = 0x00AE
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384          uint16 = 0x00AF
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                 uint16 = 0x00B0
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                 uint16 = 0x00B1
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256      uint16 = 0x00B2
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384      uint16 = 0x00B3
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256             uint16 = 0x00B4
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384             uint16 = 0x00B5
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256      uint16 = 0x00B6
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384      uint16 = 0x00B7
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256             uint16 = 0x00B8
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384             uint16 = 0x00B9
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     uint16 = 0x00BA
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  uint16 = 0x00BB
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  uint16 = 0x00BC
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BD
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BE
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BF
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256     uint16 = 0x00C0
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256  uint16 = 0x00C1
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256  uint16 = 0x00C2
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C3
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C4
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C5
+	// Unassigned uint16 =  0x00C6-FE
+	cipher_TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV uint16 = 0x00FF
+	// Unassigned uint16 =  0x01-55,*
+	cipher_TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600
+	// Unassigned                                   uint16 = 0x5601 - 0xC000
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                 uint16 = 0xC001
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              uint16 = 0xC002
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA         uint16 = 0xC003
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0xC004
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0xC005
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                uint16 = 0xC006
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA             uint16 = 0xC007
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        uint16 = 0xC008
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         uint16 = 0xC009
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         uint16 = 0xC00A
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                   uint16 = 0xC00B
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                uint16 = 0xC00C
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           uint16 = 0xC00D
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0xC00E
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0xC00F
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                  uint16 = 0xC010
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               uint16 = 0xC011
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0xC012
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA           uint16 = 0xC013
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA           uint16 = 0xC014
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA                  uint16 = 0xC015
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               uint16 = 0xC016
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0xC017
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA           uint16 = 0xC018
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA           uint16 = 0xC019
+	cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0xC01A
+	cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        uint16 = 0xC01B
+	cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        uint16 = 0xC01C
+	cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA             uint16 = 0xC01D
+	cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         uint16 = 0xC01E
+	cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         uint16 = 0xC01F
+	cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA             uint16 = 0xC020
+	cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         uint16 = 0xC021
+	cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         uint16 = 0xC022
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256      uint16 = 0xC023
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384      uint16 = 0xC024
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256       uint16 = 0xC025
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384       uint16 = 0xC026
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256        uint16 = 0xC027
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384        uint16 = 0xC028
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC029
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC02A
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      uint16 = 0xC02B
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      uint16 = 0xC02C
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       uint16 = 0xC02D
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       uint16 = 0xC02E
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        uint16 = 0xC02F
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        uint16 = 0xC030
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC031
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC032
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               uint16 = 0xC033
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0xC034
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA           uint16 = 0xC035
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA           uint16 = 0xC036
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256        uint16 = 0xC037
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384        uint16 = 0xC038
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                  uint16 = 0xC039
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256               uint16 = 0xC03A
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384               uint16 = 0xC03B
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256             uint16 = 0xC03C
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384             uint16 = 0xC03D
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256          uint16 = 0xC03E
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384          uint16 = 0xC03F
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256          uint16 = 0xC040
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384          uint16 = 0xC041
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC042
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC043
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC044
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC045
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC046
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC047
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256     uint16 = 0xC048
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384     uint16 = 0xC049
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256      uint16 = 0xC04A
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384      uint16 = 0xC04B
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256       uint16 = 0xC04C
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384       uint16 = 0xC04D
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256        uint16 = 0xC04E
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384        uint16 = 0xC04F
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256             uint16 = 0xC050
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384             uint16 = 0xC051
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC052
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC053
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256          uint16 = 0xC054
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384          uint16 = 0xC055
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC056
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC057
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256          uint16 = 0xC058
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384          uint16 = 0xC059
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC05A
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC05B
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256     uint16 = 0xC05C
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384     uint16 = 0xC05D
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256      uint16 = 0xC05E
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384      uint16 = 0xC05F
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256       uint16 = 0xC060
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384       uint16 = 0xC061
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256        uint16 = 0xC062
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384        uint16 = 0xC063
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256             uint16 = 0xC064
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384             uint16 = 0xC065
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC066
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC067
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC068
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC069
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256             uint16 = 0xC06A
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384             uint16 = 0xC06B
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC06C
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC06D
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC06E
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC06F
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256       uint16 = 0xC070
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384       uint16 = 0xC071
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC072
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC073
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  uint16 = 0xC074
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  uint16 = 0xC075
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   uint16 = 0xC076
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   uint16 = 0xC077
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    uint16 = 0xC078
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    uint16 = 0xC079
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC07A
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC07B
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     uint16 = 0xC07C
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     uint16 = 0xC07D
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      uint16 = 0xC07E
+	cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      uint16 = 0xC07F
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     uint16 = 0xC080
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     uint16 = 0xC081
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      uint16 = 0xC082
+	cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      uint16 = 0xC083
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     uint16 = 0xC084
+	cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     uint16 = 0xC085
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC086
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC087
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256  uint16 = 0xC088
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384  uint16 = 0xC089
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256   uint16 = 0xC08A
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384   uint16 = 0xC08B
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    uint16 = 0xC08C
+	cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    uint16 = 0xC08D
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC08E
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC08F
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     uint16 = 0xC090
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     uint16 = 0xC091
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     uint16 = 0xC092
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     uint16 = 0xC093
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256         uint16 = 0xC094
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384         uint16 = 0xC095
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     uint16 = 0xC096
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384     uint16 = 0xC097
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     uint16 = 0xC098
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384     uint16 = 0xC099
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   uint16 = 0xC09A
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   uint16 = 0xC09B
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM                     uint16 = 0xC09C
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM                     uint16 = 0xC09D
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM                 uint16 = 0xC09E
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM                 uint16 = 0xC09F
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8                   uint16 = 0xC0A0
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8                   uint16 = 0xC0A1
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8               uint16 = 0xC0A2
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8               uint16 = 0xC0A3
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM                     uint16 = 0xC0A4
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM                     uint16 = 0xC0A5
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM                 uint16 = 0xC0A6
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM                 uint16 = 0xC0A7
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8                   uint16 = 0xC0A8
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8                   uint16 = 0xC0A9
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8               uint16 = 0xC0AA
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8               uint16 = 0xC0AB
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM             uint16 = 0xC0AC
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM             uint16 = 0xC0AD
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8           uint16 = 0xC0AE
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8           uint16 = 0xC0AF
+	// Unassigned uint16 =  0xC0B0-FF
+	// Unassigned uint16 =  0xC1-CB,*
+	// Unassigned uint16 =  0xCC00-A7
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256   uint16 = 0xCCA8
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCA9
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256     uint16 = 0xCCAA
+	cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256         uint16 = 0xCCAB
+	cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256   uint16 = 0xCCAC
+	cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256     uint16 = 0xCCAD
+	cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256     uint16 = 0xCCAE
+)
+
+// isBadCipher reports whether the cipher is blacklisted by the HTTP/2 spec.
+// References:
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#appendix-A
+// Reject cipher suites from Appendix A.
+// "This list includes those cipher suites that do not
+// offer an ephemeral key exchange and those that are
+// based on the TLS null, stream or block cipher type"
+func isBadCipher(cipher uint16) bool {
+	switch cipher {
+	case cipher_TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+		cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+		cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+		cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8:
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/client_conn_pool.go

@@ -52,9 +52,31 @@ const (
 	noDialOnMiss = false
 )
 
+// shouldTraceGetConn reports whether getClientConn should call any
+// ClientTrace.GetConn hook associated with the http.Request.
+//
+// This complexity is needed to avoid double calls of the GetConn hook
+// during the back-and-forth between net/http and x/net/http2 (when the
+// net/http.Transport is upgraded to also speak http2), as well as support
+// the case where x/net/http2 is being used directly.
+func (p *clientConnPool) shouldTraceGetConn(st clientConnIdleState) bool {
+	// If our Transport wasn't made via ConfigureTransport, always
+	// trace the GetConn hook if provided, because that means the
+	// http2 package is being used directly and it's the one
+	// dialing, as opposed to net/http.
+	if _, ok := p.t.ConnPool.(noDialClientConnPool); !ok {
+		return true
+	}
+	// Otherwise, only use the GetConn hook if this connection has
+	// been used previously for other requests. For fresh
+	// connections, the net/http package does the dialing.
+	return !st.freshConn
+}
+
 func (p *clientConnPool) getClientConn(req *http.Request, addr string, dialOnMiss bool) (*ClientConn, error) {
 	if isConnectionCloseRequest(req) && dialOnMiss {
 		// It gets its own connection.
+		traceGetConn(req, addr)
 		const singleUse = true
 		cc, err := p.t.dialClientConn(addr, singleUse)
 		if err != nil {
@@ -64,7 +86,10 @@ func (p *clientConnPool) getClientConn(req *http.Request, addr string, dialOnMis
 	}
 	p.mu.Lock()
 	for _, cc := range p.conns[addr] {
-		if cc.CanTakeNewRequest() {
+		if st := cc.idleState(); st.canTakeNewRequest {
+			if p.shouldTraceGetConn(st) {
+				traceGetConn(req, addr)
+			}
 			p.mu.Unlock()
 			return cc, nil
 		}
@@ -73,6 +98,7 @@ func (p *clientConnPool) getClientConn(req *http.Request, addr string, dialOnMis
 		p.mu.Unlock()
 		return nil, ErrNoCachedConn
 	}
+	traceGetConn(req, addr)
 	call := p.getStartDialLocked(addr)
 	p.mu.Unlock()
 	<-call.done

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/configure_transport.go

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// +build go1.6
-
-package http2
-
-import (
-	"crypto/tls"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/http"
-)
-
-func configureTransport(t1 *http.Transport) (*Transport, error) {
-	connPool := new(clientConnPool)
-	t2 := &Transport{
-		ConnPool: noDialClientConnPool{connPool},
-		t1:       t1,
-	}
-	connPool.t = t2
-	if err := registerHTTPSProtocol(t1, noDialH2RoundTripper{t2}); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if t1.TLSClientConfig == nil {
-		t1.TLSClientConfig = new(tls.Config)
-	}
-	if !strSliceContains(t1.TLSClientConfig.NextProtos, "h2") {
-		t1.TLSClientConfig.NextProtos = append([]string{"h2"}, t1.TLSClientConfig.NextProtos...)
-	}
-	if !strSliceContains(t1.TLSClientConfig.NextProtos, "http/1.1") {
-		t1.TLSClientConfig.NextProtos = append(t1.TLSClientConfig.NextProtos, "http/1.1")
-	}
-	upgradeFn := func(authority string, c *tls.Conn) http.RoundTripper {
-		addr := authorityAddr("https", authority)
-		if used, err := connPool.addConnIfNeeded(addr, t2, c); err != nil {
-			go c.Close()
-			return erringRoundTripper{err}
-		} else if !used {
-			// Turns out we don't need this c.
-			// For example, two goroutines made requests to the same host
-			// at the same time, both kicking off TCP dials. (since protocol
-			// was unknown)
-			go c.Close()
-		}
-		return t2
-	}
-	if m := t1.TLSNextProto; len(m) == 0 {
-		t1.TLSNextProto = map[string]func(string, *tls.Conn) http.RoundTripper{
-			"h2": upgradeFn,
-		}
-	} else {
-		m["h2"] = upgradeFn
-	}
-	return t2, nil
-}
-
-// registerHTTPSProtocol calls Transport.RegisterProtocol but
-// convering panics into errors.
-func registerHTTPSProtocol(t *http.Transport, rt http.RoundTripper) (err error) {
-	defer func() {
-		if e := recover(); e != nil {
-			err = fmt.Errorf("%v", e)
-		}
-	}()
-	t.RegisterProtocol("https", rt)
-	return nil
-}
-
-// noDialH2RoundTripper is a RoundTripper which only tries to complete the request
-// if there's already has a cached connection to the host.
-type noDialH2RoundTripper struct{ t *Transport }
-
-func (rt noDialH2RoundTripper) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-	res, err := rt.t.RoundTrip(req)
-	if err == ErrNoCachedConn {
-		return nil, http.ErrSkipAltProtocol
-	}
-	return res, err
-}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/errors.go

@@ -87,13 +87,16 @@ type goAwayFlowError struct{}
 
 func (goAwayFlowError) Error() string { return "connection exceeded flow control window size" }
 
-// connErrorReason wraps a ConnectionError with an informative error about why it occurs.
+// connError represents an HTTP/2 ConnectionError error code, along
-
+// with a string (for debugging) explaining why.
+//
 // Errors of this type are only returned by the frame parser functions
-// and converted into ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol).
+// and converted into ConnectionError(Code), after stashing away
+// the Reason into the Framer's errDetail field, accessible via
+// the (*Framer).ErrorDetail method.
 type connError struct {
-	Code   ErrCode
+	Code   ErrCode // the ConnectionError error code
-	Reason string
+	Reason string  // additional reason
 }
 
 func (e connError) Error() string {

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/flow.go

@@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ func (f *flow) take(n int32) {
 // add adds n bytes (positive or negative) to the flow control window.
 // It returns false if the sum would exceed 2^31-1.
 func (f *flow) add(n int32) bool {
-	remain := (1<<31 - 1) - f.n
+	sum := f.n + n
-	if n > remain {
+	if (sum > n) == (f.n > 0) {
-		return false
+		f.n = sum
+		return true
 	}
-	f.n += n
+	return false
-	return true
 }

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/frame.go

@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 
+	"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
 	"golang.org/x/net/http2/hpack"
-	"golang.org/x/net/lex/httplex"
 )
 
 const frameHeaderLen = 9
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ func (f *Framer) WriteData(streamID uint32, endStream bool, data []byte) error {
 	return f.WriteDataPadded(streamID, endStream, data, nil)
 }
 
-// WriteData writes a DATA frame with optional padding.
+// WriteDataPadded writes a DATA frame with optional padding.
 //
 // If pad is nil, the padding bit is not sent.
 // The length of pad must not exceed 255 bytes.
@@ -733,32 +733,67 @@ func (f *SettingsFrame) IsAck() bool {
 	return f.FrameHeader.Flags.Has(FlagSettingsAck)
 }
 
-func (f *SettingsFrame) Value(s SettingID) (v uint32, ok bool) {
+func (f *SettingsFrame) Value(id SettingID) (v uint32, ok bool) {
 	f.checkValid()
-	buf := f.p
+	for i := 0; i < f.NumSettings(); i++ {
-	for len(buf) > 0 {
+		if s := f.Setting(i); s.ID == id {
-		settingID := SettingID(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[:2]))
+			return s.Val, true
-		if settingID == s {
-			return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[2:6]), true
 		}
-		buf = buf[6:]
 	}
 	return 0, false
 }
 
+// Setting returns the setting from the frame at the given 0-based index.
+// The index must be >= 0 and less than f.NumSettings().
+func (f *SettingsFrame) Setting(i int) Setting {
+	buf := f.p
+	return Setting{
+		ID:  SettingID(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[i*6 : i*6+2])),
+		Val: binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[i*6+2 : i*6+6]),
+	}
+}
+
+func (f *SettingsFrame) NumSettings() int { return len(f.p) / 6 }
+
+// HasDuplicates reports whether f contains any duplicate setting IDs.
+func (f *SettingsFrame) HasDuplicates() bool {
+	num := f.NumSettings()
+	if num == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	// If it's small enough (the common case), just do the n^2
+	// thing and avoid a map allocation.
+	if num < 10 {
+		for i := 0; i < num; i++ {
+			idi := f.Setting(i).ID
+			for j := i + 1; j < num; j++ {
+				idj := f.Setting(j).ID
+				if idi == idj {
+					return true
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		return false
+	}
+	seen := map[SettingID]bool{}
+	for i := 0; i < num; i++ {
+		id := f.Setting(i).ID
+		if seen[id] {
+			return true
+		}
+		seen[id] = true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // ForeachSetting runs fn for each setting.
 // It stops and returns the first error.
 func (f *SettingsFrame) ForeachSetting(fn func(Setting) error) error {
 	f.checkValid()
-	buf := f.p
+	for i := 0; i < f.NumSettings(); i++ {
-	for len(buf) > 0 {
+		if err := fn(f.Setting(i)); err != nil {
-		if err := fn(Setting{
-			SettingID(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[:2])),
-			binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[2:6]),
-		}); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-		buf = buf[6:]
 	}
 	return nil
 }
@@ -1442,7 +1477,7 @@ func (fr *Framer) maxHeaderStringLen() int {
 }
 
 // readMetaFrame returns 0 or more CONTINUATION frames from fr and
-// merge them into into the provided hf and returns a MetaHeadersFrame
+// merge them into the provided hf and returns a MetaHeadersFrame
 // with the decoded hpack values.
 func (fr *Framer) readMetaFrame(hf *HeadersFrame) (*MetaHeadersFrame, error) {
 	if fr.AllowIllegalReads {
@@ -1462,7 +1497,7 @@ func (fr *Framer) readMetaFrame(hf *HeadersFrame) (*MetaHeadersFrame, error) {
 		if VerboseLogs && fr.logReads {
 			fr.debugReadLoggerf("http2: decoded hpack field %+v", hf)
 		}
-		if !httplex.ValidHeaderFieldValue(hf.Value) {
+		if !httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue(hf.Value) {
 			invalid = headerFieldValueError(hf.Value)
 		}
 		isPseudo := strings.HasPrefix(hf.Name, ":")

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go111.go

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// +build go1.11
+
+package http2
+
+import (
+	"net/http/httptrace"
+	"net/textproto"
+)
+
+func traceHasWroteHeaderField(trace *httptrace.ClientTrace) bool {
+	return trace != nil && trace.WroteHeaderField != nil
+}
+
+func traceWroteHeaderField(trace *httptrace.ClientTrace, k, v string) {
+	if trace != nil && trace.WroteHeaderField != nil {
+		trace.WroteHeaderField(k, []string{v})
+	}
+}
+
+func traceGot1xxResponseFunc(trace *httptrace.ClientTrace) func(int, textproto.MIMEHeader) error {
+	if trace != nil {
+		return trace.Got1xxResponse
+	}
+	return nil
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go16.go

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// +build go1.6
-
-package http2
-
-import (
-	"crypto/tls"
-	"net/http"
-	"time"
-)
-
-func transportExpectContinueTimeout(t1 *http.Transport) time.Duration {
-	return t1.ExpectContinueTimeout
-}
-
-// isBadCipher reports whether the cipher is blacklisted by the HTTP/2 spec.
-func isBadCipher(cipher uint16) bool {
-	switch cipher {
-	case tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-		tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
-		// Reject cipher suites from Appendix A.
-		// "This list includes those cipher suites that do not
-		// offer an ephemeral key exchange and those that are
-		// based on the TLS null, stream or block cipher type"
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go17.go

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// +build go1.7
-
-package http2
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptrace"
-	"time"
-)
-
-type contextContext interface {
-	context.Context
-}
-
-func serverConnBaseContext(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) (ctx contextContext, cancel func()) {
-	ctx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, http.LocalAddrContextKey, c.LocalAddr())
-	if hs := opts.baseConfig(); hs != nil {
-		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, http.ServerContextKey, hs)
-	}
-	return
-}
-
-func contextWithCancel(ctx contextContext) (_ contextContext, cancel func()) {
-	return context.WithCancel(ctx)
-}
-
-func requestWithContext(req *http.Request, ctx contextContext) *http.Request {
-	return req.WithContext(ctx)
-}
-
-type clientTrace httptrace.ClientTrace
-
-func reqContext(r *http.Request) context.Context { return r.Context() }
-
-func (t *Transport) idleConnTimeout() time.Duration {
-	if t.t1 != nil {
-		return t.t1.IdleConnTimeout
-	}
-	return 0
-}
-
-func setResponseUncompressed(res *http.Response) { res.Uncompressed = true }
-
-func traceGotConn(req *http.Request, cc *ClientConn) {
-	trace := httptrace.ContextClientTrace(req.Context())
-	if trace == nil || trace.GotConn == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	ci := httptrace.GotConnInfo{Conn: cc.tconn}
-	cc.mu.Lock()
-	ci.Reused = cc.nextStreamID > 1
-	ci.WasIdle = len(cc.streams) == 0 && ci.Reused
-	if ci.WasIdle && !cc.lastActive.IsZero() {
-		ci.IdleTime = time.Now().Sub(cc.lastActive)
-	}
-	cc.mu.Unlock()
-
-	trace.GotConn(ci)
-}
-
-func traceWroteHeaders(trace *clientTrace) {
-	if trace != nil && trace.WroteHeaders != nil {
-		trace.WroteHeaders()
-	}
-}
-
-func traceGot100Continue(trace *clientTrace) {
-	if trace != nil && trace.Got100Continue != nil {
-		trace.Got100Continue()
-	}
-}
-
-func traceWait100Continue(trace *clientTrace) {
-	if trace != nil && trace.Wait100Continue != nil {
-		trace.Wait100Continue()
-	}
-}
-
-func traceWroteRequest(trace *clientTrace, err error) {
-	if trace != nil && trace.WroteRequest != nil {
-		trace.WroteRequest(httptrace.WroteRequestInfo{Err: err})
-	}
-}
-
-func traceFirstResponseByte(trace *clientTrace) {
-	if trace != nil && trace.GotFirstResponseByte != nil {
-		trace.GotFirstResponseByte()
-	}
-}
-
-func requestTrace(req *http.Request) *clientTrace {
-	trace := httptrace.ContextClientTrace(req.Context())
-	return (*clientTrace)(trace)
-}
-
-// Ping sends a PING frame to the server and waits for the ack.
-func (cc *ClientConn) Ping(ctx context.Context) error {
-	return cc.ping(ctx)
-}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go17_not18.go

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// +build go1.7,!go1.8
-
-package http2
-
-import "crypto/tls"
-
-// temporary copy of Go 1.7's private tls.Config.clone:
-func cloneTLSConfig(c *tls.Config) *tls.Config {
-	return &tls.Config{
-		Rand:                        c.Rand,
-		Time:                        c.Time,
-		Certificates:                c.Certificates,
-		NameToCertificate:           c.NameToCertificate,
-		GetCertificate:              c.GetCertificate,
-		RootCAs:                     c.RootCAs,
-		NextProtos:                  c.NextProtos,
-		ServerName:                  c.ServerName,
-		ClientAuth:                  c.ClientAuth,
-		ClientCAs:                   c.ClientCAs,
-		InsecureSkipVerify:          c.InsecureSkipVerify,
-		CipherSuites:                c.CipherSuites,
-		PreferServerCipherSuites:    c.PreferServerCipherSuites,
-		SessionTicketsDisabled:      c.SessionTicketsDisabled,
-		SessionTicketKey:            c.SessionTicketKey,
-		ClientSessionCache:          c.ClientSessionCache,
-		MinVersion:                  c.MinVersion,
-		MaxVersion:                  c.MaxVersion,
-		CurvePreferences:            c.CurvePreferences,
-		DynamicRecordSizingDisabled: c.DynamicRecordSizingDisabled,
-		Renegotiation:               c.Renegotiation,
-	}
-}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go18.go

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// +build go1.8
-
-package http2
-
-import (
-	"crypto/tls"
-	"io"
-	"net/http"
-)
-
-func cloneTLSConfig(c *tls.Config) *tls.Config {
-	c2 := c.Clone()
-	c2.GetClientCertificate = c.GetClientCertificate // golang.org/issue/19264
-	return c2
-}
-
-var _ http.Pusher = (*responseWriter)(nil)
-
-// Push implements http.Pusher.
-func (w *responseWriter) Push(target string, opts *http.PushOptions) error {
-	internalOpts := pushOptions{}
-	if opts != nil {
-		internalOpts.Method = opts.Method
-		internalOpts.Header = opts.Header
-	}
-	return w.push(target, internalOpts)
-}
-
-func configureServer18(h1 *http.Server, h2 *Server) error {
-	if h2.IdleTimeout == 0 {
-		if h1.IdleTimeout != 0 {
-			h2.IdleTimeout = h1.IdleTimeout
-		} else {
-			h2.IdleTimeout = h1.ReadTimeout
-		}
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func shouldLogPanic(panicValue interface{}) bool {
-	return panicValue != nil && panicValue != http.ErrAbortHandler
-}
-
-func reqGetBody(req *http.Request) func() (io.ReadCloser, error) {
-	return req.GetBody
-}
-
-func reqBodyIsNoBody(body io.ReadCloser) bool {
-	return body == http.NoBody
-}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/headermap.go

@@ -7,15 +7,21 @@ package http2
 import (
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
 )
 
 var (
-	commonLowerHeader = map[string]string{} // Go-Canonical-Case -> lower-case
+	commonBuildOnce   sync.Once
-	commonCanonHeader = map[string]string{} // lower-case -> Go-Canonical-Case
+	commonLowerHeader map[string]string // Go-Canonical-Case -> lower-case
+	commonCanonHeader map[string]string // lower-case -> Go-Canonical-Case
 )
 
-func init() {
+func buildCommonHeaderMapsOnce() {
-	for _, v := range []string{
+	commonBuildOnce.Do(buildCommonHeaderMaps)
+}
+
+func buildCommonHeaderMaps() {
+	common := []string{
 		"accept",
 		"accept-charset",
 		"accept-encoding",
@@ -63,7 +69,10 @@ func init() {
 		"vary",
 		"via",
 		"www-authenticate",
-	} {
+	}
+	commonLowerHeader = make(map[string]string, len(common))
+	commonCanonHeader = make(map[string]string, len(common))
+	for _, v := range common {
 		chk := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(v)
 		commonLowerHeader[chk] = v
 		commonCanonHeader[v] = chk
@@ -71,6 +80,7 @@ func init() {
 }
 
 func lowerHeader(v string) string {
+	buildCommonHeaderMapsOnce()
 	if s, ok := commonLowerHeader[v]; ok {
 		return s
 	}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/http2.go

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 
-	"golang.org/x/net/lex/httplex"
+	"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
 )
 
 var (
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ var (
 )
 
 // validWireHeaderFieldName reports whether v is a valid header field
-// name (key). See httplex.ValidHeaderName for the base rules.
+// name (key). See httpguts.ValidHeaderName for the base rules.
 //
 // Further, http2 says:
 //   "Just as in HTTP/1.x, header field names are strings of ASCII
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ func validWireHeaderFieldName(v string) bool {
 		return false
 	}
 	for _, r := range v {
-		if !httplex.IsTokenRune(r) {
+		if !httpguts.IsTokenRune(r) {
 			return false
 		}
 		if 'A' <= r && r <= 'Z' {
@@ -201,19 +201,12 @@ func validWireHeaderFieldName(v string) bool {
 	return true
 }
 
-var httpCodeStringCommon = map[int]string{} // n -> strconv.Itoa(n)
-
-func init() {
-	for i := 100; i <= 999; i++ {
-		if v := http.StatusText(i); v != "" {
-			httpCodeStringCommon[i] = strconv.Itoa(i)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func httpCodeString(code int) string {
-	if s, ok := httpCodeStringCommon[code]; ok {
+	switch code {
-		return s
+	case 200:
+		return "200"
+	case 404:
+		return "404"
 	}
 	return strconv.Itoa(code)
 }
@@ -312,7 +305,7 @@ func mustUint31(v int32) uint32 {
 }
 
 // bodyAllowedForStatus reports whether a given response status code
-// permits a body. See RFC 2616, section 4.4.
+// permits a body. See RFC 7230, section 3.3.
 func bodyAllowedForStatus(status int) bool {
 	switch {
 	case status >= 100 && status <= 199:
@@ -376,12 +369,16 @@ func (s *sorter) SortStrings(ss []string) {
 // validPseudoPath reports whether v is a valid :path pseudo-header
 // value. It must be either:
 //
-//     *) a non-empty string starting with '/', but not with with "//",
+//     *) a non-empty string starting with '/'
 //     *) the string '*', for OPTIONS requests.
 //
 // For now this is only used a quick check for deciding when to clean
 // up Opaque URLs before sending requests from the Transport.
 // See golang.org/issue/16847
+//
+// We used to enforce that the path also didn't start with "//", but
+// Google's GFE accepts such paths and Chrome sends them, so ignore
+// that part of the spec. See golang.org/issue/19103.
 func validPseudoPath(v string) bool {
-	return (len(v) > 0 && v[0] == '/' && (len(v) == 1 || v[1] != '/')) || v == "*"
+	return (len(v) > 0 && v[0] == '/') || v == "*"
 }

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/not_go111.go

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// +build !go1.11
+
+package http2
+
+import (
+	"net/http/httptrace"
+	"net/textproto"
+)
+
+func traceHasWroteHeaderField(trace *httptrace.ClientTrace) bool { return false }
+
+func traceWroteHeaderField(trace *httptrace.ClientTrace, k, v string) {}
+
+func traceGot1xxResponseFunc(trace *httptrace.ClientTrace) func(int, textproto.MIMEHeader) error {
+	return nil
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/not_go16.go

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// +build !go1.6
-
-package http2
-
-import (
-	"crypto/tls"
-	"net/http"
-	"time"
-)
-
-func configureTransport(t1 *http.Transport) (*Transport, error) {
-	return nil, errTransportVersion
-}
-
-func transportExpectContinueTimeout(t1 *http.Transport) time.Duration {
-	return 0
-
-}
-
-// isBadCipher reports whether the cipher is blacklisted by the HTTP/2 spec.
-func isBadCipher(cipher uint16) bool {
-	switch cipher {
-	case tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-		tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
-		// Reject cipher suites from Appendix A.
-		// "This list includes those cipher suites that do not
-		// offer an ephemeral key exchange and those that are
-		// based on the TLS null, stream or block cipher type"
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/not_go17.go

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// +build !go1.7
-
-package http2
-
-import (
-	"crypto/tls"
-	"net"
-	"net/http"
-	"time"
-)
-
-type contextContext interface {
-	Done() <-chan struct{}
-	Err() error
-}
-
-type fakeContext struct{}
-
-func (fakeContext) Done() <-chan struct{} { return nil }
-func (fakeContext) Err() error            { panic("should not be called") }
-
-func reqContext(r *http.Request) fakeContext {
-	return fakeContext{}
-}
-
-func setResponseUncompressed(res *http.Response) {
-	// Nothing.
-}
-
-type clientTrace struct{}
-
-func requestTrace(*http.Request) *clientTrace { return nil }
-func traceGotConn(*http.Request, *ClientConn) {}
-func traceFirstResponseByte(*clientTrace)     {}
-func traceWroteHeaders(*clientTrace)          {}
-func traceWroteRequest(*clientTrace, error)   {}
-func traceGot100Continue(trace *clientTrace)  {}
-func traceWait100Continue(trace *clientTrace) {}
-
-func nop() {}
-
-func serverConnBaseContext(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) (ctx contextContext, cancel func()) {
-	return nil, nop
-}
-
-func contextWithCancel(ctx contextContext) (_ contextContext, cancel func()) {
-	return ctx, nop
-}
-
-func requestWithContext(req *http.Request, ctx contextContext) *http.Request {
-	return req
-}
-
-// temporary copy of Go 1.6's private tls.Config.clone:
-func cloneTLSConfig(c *tls.Config) *tls.Config {
-	return &tls.Config{
-		Rand:                     c.Rand,
-		Time:                     c.Time,
-		Certificates:             c.Certificates,
-		NameToCertificate:        c.NameToCertificate,
-		GetCertificate:           c.GetCertificate,
-		RootCAs:                  c.RootCAs,
-		NextProtos:               c.NextProtos,
-		ServerName:               c.ServerName,
-		ClientAuth:               c.ClientAuth,
-		ClientCAs:                c.ClientCAs,
-		InsecureSkipVerify:       c.InsecureSkipVerify,
-		CipherSuites:             c.CipherSuites,
-		PreferServerCipherSuites: c.PreferServerCipherSuites,
-		SessionTicketsDisabled:   c.SessionTicketsDisabled,
-		SessionTicketKey:         c.SessionTicketKey,
-		ClientSessionCache:       c.ClientSessionCache,
-		MinVersion:               c.MinVersion,
-		MaxVersion:               c.MaxVersion,
-		CurvePreferences:         c.CurvePreferences,
-	}
-}
-
-func (cc *ClientConn) Ping(ctx contextContext) error {
-	return cc.ping(ctx)
-}
-
-func (t *Transport) idleConnTimeout() time.Duration { return 0 }

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/not_go18.go

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// +build !go1.8
-
-package http2
-
-import (
-	"io"
-	"net/http"
-)
-
-func configureServer18(h1 *http.Server, h2 *Server) error {
-	// No IdleTimeout to sync prior to Go 1.8.
-	return nil
-}
-
-func shouldLogPanic(panicValue interface{}) bool {
-	return panicValue != nil
-}
-
-func reqGetBody(req *http.Request) func() (io.ReadCloser, error) {
-	return nil
-}
-
-func reqBodyIsNoBody(io.ReadCloser) bool { return false }

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/pipe.go

@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ import (
 // underlying buffer is an interface. (io.Pipe is always unbuffered)
 type pipe struct {
 	mu       sync.Mutex
-	c        sync.Cond // c.L lazily initialized to &p.mu
+	c        sync.Cond     // c.L lazily initialized to &p.mu
-	b        pipeBuffer
+	b        pipeBuffer    // nil when done reading
 	err      error         // read error once empty. non-nil means closed.
 	breakErr error         // immediate read error (caller doesn't see rest of b)
 	donec    chan struct{} // closed on error
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ type pipeBuffer interface {
 func (p *pipe) Len() int {
 	p.mu.Lock()
 	defer p.mu.Unlock()
+	if p.b == nil {
+		return 0
+	}
 	return p.b.Len()
 }
 
@@ -47,7 +50,7 @@ func (p *pipe) Read(d []byte) (n int, err error) {
 		if p.breakErr != nil {
 			return 0, p.breakErr
 		}
-		if p.b.Len() > 0 {
+		if p.b != nil && p.b.Len() > 0 {
 			return p.b.Read(d)
 		}
 		if p.err != nil {
@@ -55,6 +58,7 @@ func (p *pipe) Read(d []byte) (n int, err error) {
 				p.readFn()     // e.g. copy trailers
 				p.readFn = nil // not sticky like p.err
 			}
+			p.b = nil
 			return 0, p.err
 		}
 		p.c.Wait()
@@ -75,6 +79,9 @@ func (p *pipe) Write(d []byte) (n int, err error) {
 	if p.err != nil {
 		return 0, errClosedPipeWrite
 	}
+	if p.breakErr != nil {
+		return len(d), nil // discard when there is no reader
+	}
 	return p.b.Write(d)
 }
 
@@ -109,6 +116,9 @@ func (p *pipe) closeWithError(dst *error, err error, fn func()) {
 		return
 	}
 	p.readFn = fn
+	if dst == &p.breakErr {
+		p.b = nil
+	}
 	*dst = err
 	p.closeDoneLocked()
 }

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/server.go

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ package http2
 import (
 	"bufio"
 	"bytes"
+	"context"
 	"crypto/tls"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
@@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ import (
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
+	"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
 	"golang.org/x/net/http2/hpack"
 )
 
@@ -126,6 +128,11 @@ type Server struct {
 	// NewWriteScheduler constructs a write scheduler for a connection.
 	// If nil, a default scheduler is chosen.
 	NewWriteScheduler func() WriteScheduler
+
+	// Internal state. This is a pointer (rather than embedded directly)
+	// so that we don't embed a Mutex in this struct, which will make the
+	// struct non-copyable, which might break some callers.
+	state *serverInternalState
 }
 
 func (s *Server) initialConnRecvWindowSize() int32 {
@@ -156,6 +163,40 @@ func (s *Server) maxConcurrentStreams() uint32 {
 	return defaultMaxStreams
 }
 
+type serverInternalState struct {
+	mu          sync.Mutex
+	activeConns map[*serverConn]struct{}
+}
+
+func (s *serverInternalState) registerConn(sc *serverConn) {
+	if s == nil {
+		return // if the Server was used without calling ConfigureServer
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	s.activeConns[sc] = struct{}{}
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (s *serverInternalState) unregisterConn(sc *serverConn) {
+	if s == nil {
+		return // if the Server was used without calling ConfigureServer
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	delete(s.activeConns, sc)
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (s *serverInternalState) startGracefulShutdown() {
+	if s == nil {
+		return // if the Server was used without calling ConfigureServer
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	for sc := range s.activeConns {
+		sc.startGracefulShutdown()
+	}
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
 // ConfigureServer adds HTTP/2 support to a net/http Server.
 //
 // The configuration conf may be nil.
@@ -168,21 +209,30 @@ func ConfigureServer(s *http.Server, conf *Server) error {
 	if conf == nil {
 		conf = new(Server)
 	}
-	if err := configureServer18(s, conf); err != nil {
+	conf.state = &serverInternalState{activeConns: make(map[*serverConn]struct{})}
-		return err
+	if h1, h2 := s, conf; h2.IdleTimeout == 0 {
+		if h1.IdleTimeout != 0 {
+			h2.IdleTimeout = h1.IdleTimeout
+		} else {
+			h2.IdleTimeout = h1.ReadTimeout
+		}
 	}
+	s.RegisterOnShutdown(conf.state.startGracefulShutdown)
 
 	if s.TLSConfig == nil {
 		s.TLSConfig = new(tls.Config)
 	} else if s.TLSConfig.CipherSuites != nil {
 		// If they already provided a CipherSuite list, return
 		// an error if it has a bad order or is missing
-		// ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
+		// ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 or ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
-		const requiredCipher = tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 		haveRequired := false
 		sawBad := false
 		for i, cs := range s.TLSConfig.CipherSuites {
-			if cs == requiredCipher {
+			switch cs {
+			case tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+				// Alternative MTI cipher to not discourage ECDSA-only servers.
+				// See http://golang.org/cl/30721 for further information.
+				tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
 				haveRequired = true
 			}
 			if isBadCipher(cs) {
@@ -192,7 +242,7 @@ func ConfigureServer(s *http.Server, conf *Server) error {
 			}
 		}
 		if !haveRequired {
-			return fmt.Errorf("http2: TLSConfig.CipherSuites is missing HTTP/2-required TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256")
+			return fmt.Errorf("http2: TLSConfig.CipherSuites is missing an HTTP/2-required AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher.")
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -292,7 +342,7 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
 		streams:                     make(map[uint32]*stream),
 		readFrameCh:                 make(chan readFrameResult),
 		wantWriteFrameCh:            make(chan FrameWriteRequest, 8),
-		wantStartPushCh:             make(chan startPushRequest, 8),
+		serveMsgCh:                  make(chan interface{}, 8),
 		wroteFrameCh:                make(chan frameWriteResult, 1), // buffered; one send in writeFrameAsync
 		bodyReadCh:                  make(chan bodyReadMsg),         // buffering doesn't matter either way
 		doneServing:                 make(chan struct{}),
@@ -305,6 +355,9 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
 		pushEnabled:                 true,
 	}
 
+	s.state.registerConn(sc)
+	defer s.state.unregisterConn(sc)
+
 	// The net/http package sets the write deadline from the
 	// http.Server.WriteTimeout during the TLS handshake, but then
 	// passes the connection off to us with the deadline already set.
@@ -357,7 +410,7 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
 			// addresses during development.
 			//
 			// TODO: optionally enforce? Or enforce at the time we receive
-			// a new request, and verify the the ServerName matches the :authority?
+			// a new request, and verify the ServerName matches the :authority?
 			// But that precludes proxy situations, perhaps.
 			//
 			// So for now, do nothing here again.
@@ -385,6 +438,15 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
 	sc.serve()
 }
 
+func serverConnBaseContext(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) (ctx context.Context, cancel func()) {
+	ctx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, http.LocalAddrContextKey, c.LocalAddr())
+	if hs := opts.baseConfig(); hs != nil {
+		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, http.ServerContextKey, hs)
+	}
+	return
+}
+
 func (sc *serverConn) rejectConn(err ErrCode, debug string) {
 	sc.vlogf("http2: server rejecting conn: %v, %s", err, debug)
 	// ignoring errors. hanging up anyway.
@@ -400,15 +462,14 @@ type serverConn struct {
 	conn             net.Conn
 	bw               *bufferedWriter // writing to conn
 	handler          http.Handler
-	baseCtx          contextContext
+	baseCtx          context.Context
 	framer           *Framer
 	doneServing      chan struct{}          // closed when serverConn.serve ends
 	readFrameCh      chan readFrameResult   // written by serverConn.readFrames
 	wantWriteFrameCh chan FrameWriteRequest // from handlers -> serve
-	wantStartPushCh  chan startPushRequest  // from handlers -> serve
 	wroteFrameCh     chan frameWriteResult  // from writeFrameAsync -> serve, tickles more frame writes
 	bodyReadCh       chan bodyReadMsg       // from handlers -> serve
-	testHookCh       chan func(int)         // code to run on the serve loop
+	serveMsgCh       chan interface{}       // misc messages & code to send to / run on the serve loop
 	flow             flow                   // conn-wide (not stream-specific) outbound flow control
 	inflow           flow                   // conn-wide inbound flow control
 	tlsState         *tls.ConnectionState   // shared by all handlers, like net/http
@@ -440,14 +501,15 @@ type serverConn struct {
 	inFrameScheduleLoop         bool              // whether we're in the scheduleFrameWrite loop
 	needToSendGoAway            bool              // we need to schedule a GOAWAY frame write
 	goAwayCode                  ErrCode
-	shutdownTimerCh             <-chan time.Time // nil until used
+	shutdownTimer               *time.Timer // nil until used
-	shutdownTimer               *time.Timer      // nil until used
+	idleTimer                   *time.Timer // nil if unused
-	idleTimer                   *time.Timer      // nil if unused
-	idleTimerCh                 <-chan time.Time // nil if unused
 
 	// Owned by the writeFrameAsync goroutine:
 	headerWriteBuf bytes.Buffer
 	hpackEncoder   *hpack.Encoder
+
+	// Used by startGracefulShutdown.
+	shutdownOnce sync.Once
 }
 
 func (sc *serverConn) maxHeaderListSize() uint32 {
@@ -480,7 +542,7 @@ type stream struct {
 	id        uint32
 	body      *pipe       // non-nil if expecting DATA frames
 	cw        closeWaiter // closed wait stream transitions to closed state
-	ctx       contextContext
+	ctx       context.Context
 	cancelCtx func()
 
 	// owned by serverConn's serve loop:
@@ -603,7 +665,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) condlogf(err error, format string, args ...interface{}) {
 	if err == nil {
 		return
 	}
-	if err == io.EOF || err == io.ErrUnexpectedEOF || isClosedConnError(err) {
+	if err == io.EOF || err == io.ErrUnexpectedEOF || isClosedConnError(err) || err == errPrefaceTimeout {
 		// Boring, expected errors.
 		sc.vlogf(format, args...)
 	} else {
@@ -613,6 +675,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) condlogf(err error, format string, args ...interface{}) {
 
 func (sc *serverConn) canonicalHeader(v string) string {
 	sc.serveG.check()
+	buildCommonHeaderMapsOnce()
 	cv, ok := commonCanonHeader[v]
 	if ok {
 		return cv
@@ -748,19 +811,15 @@ func (sc *serverConn) serve() {
 	sc.setConnState(http.StateIdle)
 
 	if sc.srv.IdleTimeout != 0 {
-		sc.idleTimer = time.NewTimer(sc.srv.IdleTimeout)
+		sc.idleTimer = time.AfterFunc(sc.srv.IdleTimeout, sc.onIdleTimer)
 		defer sc.idleTimer.Stop()
-		sc.idleTimerCh = sc.idleTimer.C
-	}
-
-	var gracefulShutdownCh <-chan struct{}
-	if sc.hs != nil {
-		gracefulShutdownCh = h1ServerShutdownChan(sc.hs)
 	}
 
 	go sc.readFrames() // closed by defer sc.conn.Close above
 
-	settingsTimer := time.NewTimer(firstSettingsTimeout)
+	settingsTimer := time.AfterFunc(firstSettingsTimeout, sc.onSettingsTimer)
+	defer settingsTimer.Stop()
+
 	loopNum := 0
 	for {
 		loopNum++
@@ -771,8 +830,6 @@ func (sc *serverConn) serve() {
 				break
 			}
 			sc.writeFrame(wr)
-		case spr := <-sc.wantStartPushCh:
-			sc.startPush(spr)
 		case res := <-sc.wroteFrameCh:
 			sc.wroteFrame(res)
 		case res := <-sc.readFrameCh:
@@ -780,36 +837,85 @@ func (sc *serverConn) serve() {
 				return
 			}
 			res.readMore()
-			if settingsTimer.C != nil {
+			if settingsTimer != nil {
 				settingsTimer.Stop()
-				settingsTimer.C = nil
+				settingsTimer = nil
 			}
 		case m := <-sc.bodyReadCh:
 			sc.noteBodyRead(m.st, m.n)
-		case <-settingsTimer.C:
+		case msg := <-sc.serveMsgCh:
-			sc.logf("timeout waiting for SETTINGS frames from %v", sc.conn.RemoteAddr())
+			switch v := msg.(type) {
-			return
+			case func(int):
-		case <-gracefulShutdownCh:
+				v(loopNum) // for testing
-			gracefulShutdownCh = nil
+			case *serverMessage:
-			sc.startGracefulShutdown()
+				switch v {
-		case <-sc.shutdownTimerCh:
+				case settingsTimerMsg:
-			sc.vlogf("GOAWAY close timer fired; closing conn from %v", sc.conn.RemoteAddr())
+					sc.logf("timeout waiting for SETTINGS frames from %v", sc.conn.RemoteAddr())
-			return
+					return
-		case <-sc.idleTimerCh:
+				case idleTimerMsg:
-			sc.vlogf("connection is idle")
+					sc.vlogf("connection is idle")
-			sc.goAway(ErrCodeNo)
+					sc.goAway(ErrCodeNo)
-		case fn := <-sc.testHookCh:
+				case shutdownTimerMsg:
-			fn(loopNum)
+					sc.vlogf("GOAWAY close timer fired; closing conn from %v", sc.conn.RemoteAddr())
+					return
+				case gracefulShutdownMsg:
+					sc.startGracefulShutdownInternal()
+				default:
+					panic("unknown timer")
+				}
+			case *startPushRequest:
+				sc.startPush(v)
+			default:
+				panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected type %T", v))
+			}
 		}
 
-		if sc.inGoAway && sc.curOpenStreams() == 0 && !sc.needToSendGoAway && !sc.writingFrame {
+		// Start the shutdown timer after sending a GOAWAY. When sending GOAWAY
-			return
+		// with no error code (graceful shutdown), don't start the timer until
+		// all open streams have been completed.
+		sentGoAway := sc.inGoAway && !sc.needToSendGoAway && !sc.writingFrame
+		gracefulShutdownComplete := sc.goAwayCode == ErrCodeNo && sc.curOpenStreams() == 0
+		if sentGoAway && sc.shutdownTimer == nil && (sc.goAwayCode != ErrCodeNo || gracefulShutdownComplete) {
+			sc.shutDownIn(goAwayTimeout)
 		}
 	}
 }
 
-// readPreface reads the ClientPreface greeting from the peer
+func (sc *serverConn) awaitGracefulShutdown(sharedCh <-chan struct{}, privateCh chan struct{}) {
-// or returns an error on timeout or an invalid greeting.
+	select {
+	case <-sc.doneServing:
+	case <-sharedCh:
+		close(privateCh)
+	}
+}
+
+type serverMessage int
+
+// Message values sent to serveMsgCh.
+var (
+	settingsTimerMsg    = new(serverMessage)
+	idleTimerMsg        = new(serverMessage)
+	shutdownTimerMsg    = new(serverMessage)
+	gracefulShutdownMsg = new(serverMessage)
+)
+
+func (sc *serverConn) onSettingsTimer() { sc.sendServeMsg(settingsTimerMsg) }
+func (sc *serverConn) onIdleTimer()     { sc.sendServeMsg(idleTimerMsg) }
+func (sc *serverConn) onShutdownTimer() { sc.sendServeMsg(shutdownTimerMsg) }
+
+func (sc *serverConn) sendServeMsg(msg interface{}) {
+	sc.serveG.checkNotOn() // NOT
+	select {
+	case sc.serveMsgCh <- msg:
+	case <-sc.doneServing:
+	}
+}
+
+var errPrefaceTimeout = errors.New("timeout waiting for client preface")
+
+// readPreface reads the ClientPreface greeting from the peer or
+// returns errPrefaceTimeout on timeout, or an error if the greeting
+// is invalid.
 func (sc *serverConn) readPreface() error {
 	errc := make(chan error, 1)
 	go func() {
@@ -827,7 +933,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) readPreface() error {
 	defer timer.Stop()
 	select {
 	case <-timer.C:
-		return errors.New("timeout waiting for client preface")
+		return errPrefaceTimeout
 	case err := <-errc:
 		if err == nil {
 			if VerboseLogs {
@@ -1016,7 +1122,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) startFrameWrite(wr FrameWriteRequest) {
 
 // errHandlerPanicked is the error given to any callers blocked in a read from
 // Request.Body when the main goroutine panics. Since most handlers read in the
-// the main ServeHTTP goroutine, this will show up rarely.
+// main ServeHTTP goroutine, this will show up rarely.
 var errHandlerPanicked = errors.New("http2: handler panicked")
 
 // wroteFrame is called on the serve goroutine with the result of
@@ -1125,33 +1231,43 @@ func (sc *serverConn) scheduleFrameWrite() {
 	sc.inFrameScheduleLoop = false
 }
 
-// startGracefulShutdown sends a GOAWAY with ErrCodeNo to tell the
+// startGracefulShutdown gracefully shuts down a connection. This
-// client we're gracefully shutting down. The connection isn't closed
+// sends GOAWAY with ErrCodeNo to tell the client we're gracefully
-// until all current streams are done.
+// shutting down. The connection isn't closed until all current
+// streams are done.
+//
+// startGracefulShutdown returns immediately; it does not wait until
+// the connection has shut down.
 func (sc *serverConn) startGracefulShutdown() {
-	sc.goAwayIn(ErrCodeNo, 0)
+	sc.serveG.checkNotOn() // NOT
+	sc.shutdownOnce.Do(func() { sc.sendServeMsg(gracefulShutdownMsg) })
+}
+
+// After sending GOAWAY, the connection will close after goAwayTimeout.
+// If we close the connection immediately after sending GOAWAY, there may
+// be unsent data in our kernel receive buffer, which will cause the kernel
+// to send a TCP RST on close() instead of a FIN. This RST will abort the
+// connection immediately, whether or not the client had received the GOAWAY.
+//
+// Ideally we should delay for at least 1 RTT + epsilon so the client has
+// a chance to read the GOAWAY and stop sending messages. Measuring RTT
+// is hard, so we approximate with 1 second. See golang.org/issue/18701.
+//
+// This is a var so it can be shorter in tests, where all requests uses the
+// loopback interface making the expected RTT very small.
+//
+// TODO: configurable?
+var goAwayTimeout = 1 * time.Second
+
+func (sc *serverConn) startGracefulShutdownInternal() {
+	sc.goAway(ErrCodeNo)
 }
 
 func (sc *serverConn) goAway(code ErrCode) {
-	sc.serveG.check()
-	var forceCloseIn time.Duration
-	if code != ErrCodeNo {
-		forceCloseIn = 250 * time.Millisecond
-	} else {
-		// TODO: configurable
-		forceCloseIn = 1 * time.Second
-	}
-	sc.goAwayIn(code, forceCloseIn)
-}
-
-func (sc *serverConn) goAwayIn(code ErrCode, forceCloseIn time.Duration) {
 	sc.serveG.check()
 	if sc.inGoAway {
 		return
 	}
-	if forceCloseIn != 0 {
-		sc.shutDownIn(forceCloseIn)
-	}
 	sc.inGoAway = true
 	sc.needToSendGoAway = true
 	sc.goAwayCode = code
@@ -1160,8 +1276,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) goAwayIn(code ErrCode, forceCloseIn time.Duration) {
 
 func (sc *serverConn) shutDownIn(d time.Duration) {
 	sc.serveG.check()
-	sc.shutdownTimer = time.NewTimer(d)
+	sc.shutdownTimer = time.AfterFunc(d, sc.onShutdownTimer)
-	sc.shutdownTimerCh = sc.shutdownTimer.C
 }
 
 func (sc *serverConn) resetStream(se StreamError) {
@@ -1359,7 +1474,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) closeStream(st *stream, err error) {
 			sc.idleTimer.Reset(sc.srv.IdleTimeout)
 		}
 		if h1ServerKeepAlivesDisabled(sc.hs) {
-			sc.startGracefulShutdown()
+			sc.startGracefulShutdownInternal()
 		}
 	}
 	if p := st.body; p != nil {
@@ -1385,6 +1500,12 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processSettings(f *SettingsFrame) error {
 		}
 		return nil
 	}
+	if f.NumSettings() > 100 || f.HasDuplicates() {
+		// This isn't actually in the spec, but hang up on
+		// suspiciously large settings frames or those with
+		// duplicate entries.
+		return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
+	}
 	if err := f.ForeachSetting(sc.processSetting); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -1506,7 +1627,10 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processData(f *DataFrame) error {
 	// Sender sending more than they'd declared?
 	if st.declBodyBytes != -1 && st.bodyBytes+int64(len(data)) > st.declBodyBytes {
 		st.body.CloseWithError(fmt.Errorf("sender tried to send more than declared Content-Length of %d bytes", st.declBodyBytes))
-		return streamError(id, ErrCodeStreamClosed)
+		// RFC 7540, sec 8.1.2.6: A request or response is also malformed if the
+		// value of a content-length header field does not equal the sum of the
+		// DATA frame payload lengths that form the body.
+		return streamError(id, ErrCodeProtocol)
 	}
 	if f.Length > 0 {
 		// Check whether the client has flow control quota.
@@ -1546,7 +1670,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processGoAway(f *GoAwayFrame) error {
 	} else {
 		sc.vlogf("http2: received GOAWAY %+v, starting graceful shutdown", f)
 	}
-	sc.startGracefulShutdown()
+	sc.startGracefulShutdownInternal()
 	// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-6.8
 	// We should not create any new streams, which means we should disable push.
 	sc.pushEnabled = false
@@ -1616,6 +1740,13 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
 			// processing this frame.
 			return nil
 		}
+		// RFC 7540, sec 5.1: If an endpoint receives additional frames, other than
+		// WINDOW_UPDATE, PRIORITY, or RST_STREAM, for a stream that is in
+		// this state, it MUST respond with a stream error (Section 5.4.2) of
+		// type STREAM_CLOSED.
+		if st.state == stateHalfClosedRemote {
+			return streamError(id, ErrCodeStreamClosed)
+		}
 		return st.processTrailerHeaders(f)
 	}
 
@@ -1716,7 +1847,7 @@ func (st *stream) processTrailerHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
 	if st.trailer != nil {
 		for _, hf := range f.RegularFields() {
 			key := sc.canonicalHeader(hf.Name)
-			if !ValidTrailerHeader(key) {
+			if !httpguts.ValidTrailerHeader(key) {
 				// TODO: send more details to the peer somehow. But http2 has
 				// no way to send debug data at a stream level. Discuss with
 				// HTTP folk.
@@ -1757,7 +1888,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) newStream(id, pusherID uint32, state streamState) *stream
 		panic("internal error: cannot create stream with id 0")
 	}
 
-	ctx, cancelCtx := contextWithCancel(sc.baseCtx)
+	ctx, cancelCtx := context.WithCancel(sc.baseCtx)
 	st := &stream{
 		sc:        sc,
 		id:        id,
@@ -1923,7 +2054,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) newWriterAndRequestNoBody(st *stream, rp requestParam) (*r
 		Body:       body,
 		Trailer:    trailer,
 	}
-	req = requestWithContext(req, st.ctx)
+	req = req.WithContext(st.ctx)
 
 	rws := responseWriterStatePool.Get().(*responseWriterState)
 	bwSave := rws.bw
@@ -1951,7 +2082,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) runHandler(rw *responseWriter, req *http.Request, handler
 				stream: rw.rws.stream,
 			})
 			// Same as net/http:
-			if shouldLogPanic(e) {
+			if e != nil && e != http.ErrAbortHandler {
 				const size = 64 << 10
 				buf := make([]byte, size)
 				buf = buf[:runtime.Stack(buf, false)]
@@ -2163,6 +2294,7 @@ type responseWriterState struct {
 	wroteHeader   bool        // WriteHeader called (explicitly or implicitly). Not necessarily sent to user yet.
 	sentHeader    bool        // have we sent the header frame?
 	handlerDone   bool        // handler has finished
+	dirty         bool        // a Write failed; don't reuse this responseWriterState
 
 	sentContentLen int64 // non-zero if handler set a Content-Length header
 	wroteBytes     int64
@@ -2182,8 +2314,8 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) hasTrailers() bool { return len(rws.trailers) !=
 // written in the trailers at the end of the response.
 func (rws *responseWriterState) declareTrailer(k string) {
 	k = http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)
-	if !ValidTrailerHeader(k) {
+	if !httpguts.ValidTrailerHeader(k) {
-		// Forbidden by RFC 2616 14.40.
+		// Forbidden by RFC 7230, section 4.1.2.
 		rws.conn.logf("ignoring invalid trailer %q", k)
 		return
 	}
@@ -2220,7 +2352,7 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
 			clen = strconv.Itoa(len(p))
 		}
 		_, hasContentType := rws.snapHeader["Content-Type"]
-		if !hasContentType && bodyAllowedForStatus(rws.status) {
+		if !hasContentType && bodyAllowedForStatus(rws.status) && len(p) > 0 {
 			ctype = http.DetectContentType(p)
 		}
 		var date string
@@ -2233,6 +2365,19 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
 			foreachHeaderElement(v, rws.declareTrailer)
 		}
 
+		// "Connection" headers aren't allowed in HTTP/2 (RFC 7540, 8.1.2.2),
+		// but respect "Connection" == "close" to mean sending a GOAWAY and tearing
+		// down the TCP connection when idle, like we do for HTTP/1.
+		// TODO: remove more Connection-specific header fields here, in addition
+		// to "Connection".
+		if _, ok := rws.snapHeader["Connection"]; ok {
+			v := rws.snapHeader.Get("Connection")
+			delete(rws.snapHeader, "Connection")
+			if v == "close" {
+				rws.conn.startGracefulShutdown()
+			}
+		}
+
 		endStream := (rws.handlerDone && !rws.hasTrailers() && len(p) == 0) || isHeadResp
 		err = rws.conn.writeHeaders(rws.stream, &writeResHeaders{
 			streamID:      rws.stream.id,
@@ -2244,6 +2389,7 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
 			date:          date,
 		})
 		if err != nil {
+			rws.dirty = true
 			return 0, err
 		}
 		if endStream {
@@ -2265,6 +2411,7 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
 	if len(p) > 0 || endStream {
 		// only send a 0 byte DATA frame if we're ending the stream.
 		if err := rws.conn.writeDataFromHandler(rws.stream, p, endStream); err != nil {
+			rws.dirty = true
 			return 0, err
 		}
 	}
@@ -2276,6 +2423,9 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
 			trailers:  rws.trailers,
 			endStream: true,
 		})
+		if err != nil {
+			rws.dirty = true
+		}
 		return len(p), err
 	}
 	return len(p), nil
@@ -2299,7 +2449,7 @@ const TrailerPrefix = "Trailer:"
 // after the header has already been flushed. Because the Go
 // ResponseWriter interface has no way to set Trailers (only the
 // Header), and because we didn't want to expand the ResponseWriter
-// interface, and because nobody used trailers, and because RFC 2616
+// interface, and because nobody used trailers, and because RFC 7230
 // says you SHOULD (but not must) predeclare any trailers in the
 // header, the official ResponseWriter rules said trailers in Go must
 // be predeclared, and then we reuse the same ResponseWriter.Header()
@@ -2383,6 +2533,24 @@ func (w *responseWriter) Header() http.Header {
 	return rws.handlerHeader
 }
 
+// checkWriteHeaderCode is a copy of net/http's checkWriteHeaderCode.
+func checkWriteHeaderCode(code int) {
+	// Issue 22880: require valid WriteHeader status codes.
+	// For now we only enforce that it's three digits.
+	// In the future we might block things over 599 (600 and above aren't defined
+	// at http://httpwg.org/specs/rfc7231.html#status.codes)
+	// and we might block under 200 (once we have more mature 1xx support).
+	// But for now any three digits.
+	//
+	// We used to send "HTTP/1.1 000 0" on the wire in responses but there's
+	// no equivalent bogus thing we can realistically send in HTTP/2,
+	// so we'll consistently panic instead and help people find their bugs
+	// early. (We can't return an error from WriteHeader even if we wanted to.)
+	if code < 100 || code > 999 {
+		panic(fmt.Sprintf("invalid WriteHeader code %v", code))
+	}
+}
+
 func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
 	rws := w.rws
 	if rws == nil {
@@ -2393,6 +2561,7 @@ func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
 
 func (rws *responseWriterState) writeHeader(code int) {
 	if !rws.wroteHeader {
+		checkWriteHeaderCode(code)
 		rws.wroteHeader = true
 		rws.status = code
 		if len(rws.handlerHeader) > 0 {
@@ -2415,7 +2584,7 @@ func cloneHeader(h http.Header) http.Header {
 //
 // * Handler calls w.Write or w.WriteString ->
 // * -> rws.bw (*bufio.Writer) ->
-// * (Handler migth call Flush)
+// * (Handler might call Flush)
 // * -> chunkWriter{rws}
 // * -> responseWriterState.writeChunk(p []byte)
 // * -> responseWriterState.writeChunk (most of the magic; see comment there)
@@ -2454,10 +2623,19 @@ func (w *responseWriter) write(lenData int, dataB []byte, dataS string) (n int,
 
 func (w *responseWriter) handlerDone() {
 	rws := w.rws
+	dirty := rws.dirty
 	rws.handlerDone = true
 	w.Flush()
 	w.rws = nil
-	responseWriterStatePool.Put(rws)
+	if !dirty {
+		// Only recycle the pool if all prior Write calls to
+		// the serverConn goroutine completed successfully. If
+		// they returned earlier due to resets from the peer
+		// there might still be write goroutines outstanding
+		// from the serverConn referencing the rws memory. See
+		// issue 20704.
+		responseWriterStatePool.Put(rws)
+	}
 }
 
 // Push errors.
@@ -2466,14 +2644,9 @@ var (
 	ErrPushLimitReached = errors.New("http2: push would exceed peer's SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS")
 )
 
-// pushOptions is the internal version of http.PushOptions, which we
+var _ http.Pusher = (*responseWriter)(nil)
-// cannot include here because it's only defined in Go 1.8 and later.
-type pushOptions struct {
-	Method string
-	Header http.Header
-}
 
-func (w *responseWriter) push(target string, opts pushOptions) error {
+func (w *responseWriter) Push(target string, opts *http.PushOptions) error {
 	st := w.rws.stream
 	sc := st.sc
 	sc.serveG.checkNotOn()
@@ -2484,6 +2657,10 @@ func (w *responseWriter) push(target string, opts pushOptions) error {
 		return ErrRecursivePush
 	}
 
+	if opts == nil {
+		opts = new(http.PushOptions)
+	}
+
 	// Default options.
 	if opts.Method == "" {
 		opts.Method = "GET"
@@ -2539,7 +2716,7 @@ func (w *responseWriter) push(target string, opts pushOptions) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("method %q must be GET or HEAD", opts.Method)
 	}
 
-	msg := startPushRequest{
+	msg := &startPushRequest{
 		parent: st,
 		method: opts.Method,
 		url:    u,
@@ -2552,7 +2729,7 @@ func (w *responseWriter) push(target string, opts pushOptions) error {
 		return errClientDisconnected
 	case <-st.cw:
 		return errStreamClosed
-	case sc.wantStartPushCh <- msg:
+	case sc.serveMsgCh <- msg:
 	}
 
 	select {
@@ -2574,7 +2751,7 @@ type startPushRequest struct {
 	done   chan error
 }
 
-func (sc *serverConn) startPush(msg startPushRequest) {
+func (sc *serverConn) startPush(msg *startPushRequest) {
 	sc.serveG.check()
 
 	// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-6.6.
@@ -2613,7 +2790,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) startPush(msg startPushRequest) {
 		// A server that is unable to establish a new stream identifier can send a GOAWAY
 		// frame so that the client is forced to open a new connection for new streams.
 		if sc.maxPushPromiseID+2 >= 1<<31 {
-			sc.startGracefulShutdown()
+			sc.startGracefulShutdownInternal()
 			return 0, ErrPushLimitReached
 		}
 		sc.maxPushPromiseID += 2
@@ -2655,7 +2832,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) startPush(msg startPushRequest) {
 }
 
 // foreachHeaderElement splits v according to the "#rule" construction
-// in RFC 2616 section 2.1 and calls fn for each non-empty element.
+// in RFC 7230 section 7 and calls fn for each non-empty element.
 func foreachHeaderElement(v string, fn func(string)) {
 	v = textproto.TrimString(v)
 	if v == "" {
@@ -2703,66 +2880,6 @@ func new400Handler(err error) http.HandlerFunc {
 	}
 }
 
-// ValidTrailerHeader reports whether name is a valid header field name to appear
-// in trailers.
-// See: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-4.1.2
-func ValidTrailerHeader(name string) bool {
-	name = http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name)
-	if strings.HasPrefix(name, "If-") || badTrailer[name] {
-		return false
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-var badTrailer = map[string]bool{
-	"Authorization":       true,
-	"Cache-Control":       true,
-	"Connection":          true,
-	"Content-Encoding":    true,
-	"Content-Length":      true,
-	"Content-Range":       true,
-	"Content-Type":        true,
-	"Expect":              true,
-	"Host":                true,
-	"Keep-Alive":          true,
-	"Max-Forwards":        true,
-	"Pragma":              true,
-	"Proxy-Authenticate":  true,
-	"Proxy-Authorization": true,
-	"Proxy-Connection":    true,
-	"Range":               true,
-	"Realm":               true,
-	"Te":                  true,
-	"Trailer":             true,
-	"Transfer-Encoding":   true,
-	"Www-Authenticate":    true,
-}
-
-// h1ServerShutdownChan returns a channel that will be closed when the
-// provided *http.Server wants to shut down.
-//
-// This is a somewhat hacky way to get at http1 innards. It works
-// when the http2 code is bundled into the net/http package in the
-// standard library. The alternatives ended up making the cmd/go tool
-// depend on http Servers. This is the lightest option for now.
-// This is tested via the TestServeShutdown* tests in net/http.
-func h1ServerShutdownChan(hs *http.Server) <-chan struct{} {
-	if fn := testh1ServerShutdownChan; fn != nil {
-		return fn(hs)
-	}
-	var x interface{} = hs
-	type I interface {
-		getDoneChan() <-chan struct{}
-	}
-	if hs, ok := x.(I); ok {
-		return hs.getDoneChan()
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// optional test hook for h1ServerShutdownChan.
-var testh1ServerShutdownChan func(hs *http.Server) <-chan struct{}
-
 // h1ServerKeepAlivesDisabled reports whether hs has its keep-alives
 // disabled. See comments on h1ServerShutdownChan above for why
 // the code is written this way.

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/write.go

@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ import (
 	"log"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/url"
-	"time"
 
+	"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
 	"golang.org/x/net/http2/hpack"
-	"golang.org/x/net/lex/httplex"
 )
 
 // writeFramer is implemented by any type that is used to write frames.
@@ -90,11 +89,7 @@ type writeGoAway struct {
 
 func (p *writeGoAway) writeFrame(ctx writeContext) error {
 	err := ctx.Framer().WriteGoAway(p.maxStreamID, p.code, nil)
-	if p.code != 0 {
+	ctx.Flush() // ignore error: we're hanging up on them anyway
-		ctx.Flush() // ignore error: we're hanging up on them anyway
-		time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
-		ctx.CloseConn()
-	}
 	return err
 }
 
@@ -204,7 +199,7 @@ func (w *writeResHeaders) staysWithinBuffer(max int) bool {
 	// TODO: this is a common one. It'd be nice to return true
 	// here and get into the fast path if we could be clever and
 	// calculate the size fast enough, or at least a conservative
-	// uppper bound that usually fires. (Maybe if w.h and
+	// upper bound that usually fires. (Maybe if w.h and
 	// w.trailers are nil, so we don't need to enumerate it.)
 	// Otherwise I'm afraid that just calculating the length to
 	// answer this question would be slower than the ~2µs benefit.
@@ -334,7 +329,7 @@ func (wu writeWindowUpdate) writeFrame(ctx writeContext) error {
 }
 
 // encodeHeaders encodes an http.Header. If keys is not nil, then (k, h[k])
-// is encoded only only if k is in keys.
+// is encoded only if k is in keys.
 func encodeHeaders(enc *hpack.Encoder, h http.Header, keys []string) {
 	if keys == nil {
 		sorter := sorterPool.Get().(*sorter)
@@ -355,7 +350,7 @@ func encodeHeaders(enc *hpack.Encoder, h http.Header, keys []string) {
 		}
 		isTE := k == "transfer-encoding"
 		for _, v := range vv {
-			if !httplex.ValidHeaderFieldValue(v) {
+			if !httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue(v) {
 				// TODO: return an error? golang.org/issue/14048
 				// For now just omit it.
 				continue

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/writesched_priority.go

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ type PriorityWriteSchedulerConfig struct {
 }
 
 // NewPriorityWriteScheduler constructs a WriteScheduler that schedules
-// frames by following HTTP/2 priorities as described in RFC 7340 Section 5.3.
+// frames by following HTTP/2 priorities as described in RFC 7540 Section 5.3.
 // If cfg is nil, default options are used.
 func NewPriorityWriteScheduler(cfg *PriorityWriteSchedulerConfig) WriteScheduler {
 	if cfg == nil {

vendor/golang.org/x/net/lex/httplex/httplex.go

@@ -1,351 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// Package httplex contains rules around lexical matters of various
-// HTTP-related specifications.
-//
-// This package is shared by the standard library (which vendors it)
-// and x/net/http2. It comes with no API stability promise.
-package httplex
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"strings"
-	"unicode/utf8"
-
-	"golang.org/x/net/idna"
-)
-
-var isTokenTable = [127]bool{
-	'!':  true,
-	'#':  true,
-	'$':  true,
-	'%':  true,
-	'&':  true,
-	'\'': true,
-	'*':  true,
-	'+':  true,
-	'-':  true,
-	'.':  true,
-	'0':  true,
-	'1':  true,
-	'2':  true,
-	'3':  true,
-	'4':  true,
-	'5':  true,
-	'6':  true,
-	'7':  true,
-	'8':  true,
-	'9':  true,
-	'A':  true,
-	'B':  true,
-	'C':  true,
-	'D':  true,
-	'E':  true,
-	'F':  true,
-	'G':  true,
-	'H':  true,
-	'I':  true,
-	'J':  true,
-	'K':  true,
-	'L':  true,
-	'M':  true,
-	'N':  true,
-	'O':  true,
-	'P':  true,
-	'Q':  true,
-	'R':  true,
-	'S':  true,
-	'T':  true,
-	'U':  true,
-	'W':  true,
-	'V':  true,
-	'X':  true,
-	'Y':  true,
-	'Z':  true,
-	'^':  true,
-	'_':  true,
-	'`':  true,
-	'a':  true,
-	'b':  true,
-	'c':  true,
-	'd':  true,
-	'e':  true,
-	'f':  true,
-	'g':  true,
-	'h':  true,
-	'i':  true,
-	'j':  true,
-	'k':  true,
-	'l':  true,
-	'm':  true,
-	'n':  true,
-	'o':  true,
-	'p':  true,
-	'q':  true,
-	'r':  true,
-	's':  true,
-	't':  true,
-	'u':  true,
-	'v':  true,
-	'w':  true,
-	'x':  true,
-	'y':  true,
-	'z':  true,
-	'|':  true,
-	'~':  true,
-}
-
-func IsTokenRune(r rune) bool {
-	i := int(r)
-	return i < len(isTokenTable) && isTokenTable[i]
-}
-
-func isNotToken(r rune) bool {
-	return !IsTokenRune(r)
-}
-
-// HeaderValuesContainsToken reports whether any string in values
-// contains the provided token, ASCII case-insensitively.
-func HeaderValuesContainsToken(values []string, token string) bool {
-	for _, v := range values {
-		if headerValueContainsToken(v, token) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-// isOWS reports whether b is an optional whitespace byte, as defined
-// by RFC 7230 section 3.2.3.
-func isOWS(b byte) bool { return b == ' ' || b == '\t' }
-
-// trimOWS returns x with all optional whitespace removes from the
-// beginning and end.
-func trimOWS(x string) string {
-	// TODO: consider using strings.Trim(x, " \t") instead,
-	// if and when it's fast enough. See issue 10292.
-	// But this ASCII-only code will probably always beat UTF-8
-	// aware code.
-	for len(x) > 0 && isOWS(x[0]) {
-		x = x[1:]
-	}
-	for len(x) > 0 && isOWS(x[len(x)-1]) {
-		x = x[:len(x)-1]
-	}
-	return x
-}
-
-// headerValueContainsToken reports whether v (assumed to be a
-// 0#element, in the ABNF extension described in RFC 7230 section 7)
-// contains token amongst its comma-separated tokens, ASCII
-// case-insensitively.
-func headerValueContainsToken(v string, token string) bool {
-	v = trimOWS(v)
-	if comma := strings.IndexByte(v, ','); comma != -1 {
-		return tokenEqual(trimOWS(v[:comma]), token) || headerValueContainsToken(v[comma+1:], token)
-	}
-	return tokenEqual(v, token)
-}
-
-// lowerASCII returns the ASCII lowercase version of b.
-func lowerASCII(b byte) byte {
-	if 'A' <= b && b <= 'Z' {
-		return b + ('a' - 'A')
-	}
-	return b
-}
-
-// tokenEqual reports whether t1 and t2 are equal, ASCII case-insensitively.
-func tokenEqual(t1, t2 string) bool {
-	if len(t1) != len(t2) {
-		return false
-	}
-	for i, b := range t1 {
-		if b >= utf8.RuneSelf {
-			// No UTF-8 or non-ASCII allowed in tokens.
-			return false
-		}
-		if lowerASCII(byte(b)) != lowerASCII(t2[i]) {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-// isLWS reports whether b is linear white space, according
-// to http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.2
-//      LWS            = [CRLF] 1*( SP | HT )
-func isLWS(b byte) bool { return b == ' ' || b == '\t' }
-
-// isCTL reports whether b is a control byte, according
-// to http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.2
-//      CTL            = <any US-ASCII control character
-//                       (octets 0 - 31) and DEL (127)>
-func isCTL(b byte) bool {
-	const del = 0x7f // a CTL
-	return b < ' ' || b == del
-}
-
-// ValidHeaderFieldName reports whether v is a valid HTTP/1.x header name.
-// HTTP/2 imposes the additional restriction that uppercase ASCII
-// letters are not allowed.
-//
-//  RFC 7230 says:
-//   header-field   = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
-//   field-name     = token
-//   token          = 1*tchar
-//   tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*" / "+" / "-" / "." /
-//           "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~" / DIGIT / ALPHA
-func ValidHeaderFieldName(v string) bool {
-	if len(v) == 0 {
-		return false
-	}
-	for _, r := range v {
-		if !IsTokenRune(r) {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-// ValidHostHeader reports whether h is a valid host header.
-func ValidHostHeader(h string) bool {
-	// The latest spec is actually this:
-	//
-	// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-5.4
-	//     Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]
-	//
-	// Where uri-host is:
-	//     http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2
-	//
-	// But we're going to be much more lenient for now and just
-	// search for any byte that's not a valid byte in any of those
-	// expressions.
-	for i := 0; i < len(h); i++ {
-		if !validHostByte[h[i]] {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-// See the validHostHeader comment.
-var validHostByte = [256]bool{
-	'0': true, '1': true, '2': true, '3': true, '4': true, '5': true, '6': true, '7': true,
-	'8': true, '9': true,
-
-	'a': true, 'b': true, 'c': true, 'd': true, 'e': true, 'f': true, 'g': true, 'h': true,
-	'i': true, 'j': true, 'k': true, 'l': true, 'm': true, 'n': true, 'o': true, 'p': true,
-	'q': true, 'r': true, 's': true, 't': true, 'u': true, 'v': true, 'w': true, 'x': true,
-	'y': true, 'z': true,
-
-	'A': true, 'B': true, 'C': true, 'D': true, 'E': true, 'F': true, 'G': true, 'H': true,
-	'I': true, 'J': true, 'K': true, 'L': true, 'M': true, 'N': true, 'O': true, 'P': true,
-	'Q': true, 'R': true, 'S': true, 'T': true, 'U': true, 'V': true, 'W': true, 'X': true,
-	'Y': true, 'Z': true,
-
-	'!':  true, // sub-delims
-	'$':  true, // sub-delims
-	'%':  true, // pct-encoded (and used in IPv6 zones)
-	'&':  true, // sub-delims
-	'(':  true, // sub-delims
-	')':  true, // sub-delims
-	'*':  true, // sub-delims
-	'+':  true, // sub-delims
-	',':  true, // sub-delims
-	'-':  true, // unreserved
-	'.':  true, // unreserved
-	':':  true, // IPv6address + Host expression's optional port
-	';':  true, // sub-delims
-	'=':  true, // sub-delims
-	'[':  true,
-	'\'': true, // sub-delims
-	']':  true,
-	'_':  true, // unreserved
-	'~':  true, // unreserved
-}
-
-// ValidHeaderFieldValue reports whether v is a valid "field-value" according to
-// http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec4.html#sec4.2 :
-//
-//        message-header = field-name ":" [ field-value ]
-//        field-value    = *( field-content | LWS )
-//        field-content  = <the OCTETs making up the field-value
-//                         and consisting of either *TEXT or combinations
-//                         of token, separators, and quoted-string>
-//
-// http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.2 :
-//
-//        TEXT           = <any OCTET except CTLs,
-//                          but including LWS>
-//        LWS            = [CRLF] 1*( SP | HT )
-//        CTL            = <any US-ASCII control character
-//                         (octets 0 - 31) and DEL (127)>
-//
-// RFC 7230 says:
-//  field-value    = *( field-content / obs-fold )
-//  obj-fold       =  N/A to http2, and deprecated
-//  field-content  = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]
-//  field-vchar    = VCHAR / obs-text
-//  obs-text       = %x80-FF
-//  VCHAR          = "any visible [USASCII] character"
-//
-// http2 further says: "Similarly, HTTP/2 allows header field values
-// that are not valid. While most of the values that can be encoded
-// will not alter header field parsing, carriage return (CR, ASCII
-// 0xd), line feed (LF, ASCII 0xa), and the zero character (NUL, ASCII
-// 0x0) might be exploited by an attacker if they are translated
-// verbatim. Any request or response that contains a character not
-// permitted in a header field value MUST be treated as malformed
-// (Section 8.1.2.6). Valid characters are defined by the
-// field-content ABNF rule in Section 3.2 of [RFC7230]."
-//
-// This function does not (yet?) properly handle the rejection of
-// strings that begin or end with SP or HTAB.
-func ValidHeaderFieldValue(v string) bool {
-	for i := 0; i < len(v); i++ {
-		b := v[i]
-		if isCTL(b) && !isLWS(b) {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func isASCII(s string) bool {
-	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
-		if s[i] >= utf8.RuneSelf {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-// PunycodeHostPort returns the IDNA Punycode version
-// of the provided "host" or "host:port" string.
-func PunycodeHostPort(v string) (string, error) {
-	if isASCII(v) {
-		return v, nil
-	}
-
-	host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(v)
-	if err != nil {
-		// The input 'v' argument was just a "host" argument,
-		// without a port. This error should not be returned
-		// to the caller.
-		host = v
-		port = ""
-	}
-	host, err = idna.ToASCII(host)
-	if err != nil {
-		// Non-UTF-8? Not representable in Punycode, in any
-		// case.
-		return "", err
-	}
-	if port == "" {
-		return host, nil
-	}
-	return net.JoinHostPort(host, port), nil
-}

vendor/vendor.json

@@ -1083,10 +1083,10 @@
 			"revisionTime": "2018-05-30T06:29:46Z"
 		},
 		{
-			"checksumSHA1": "Zh++JEDfXo0DKQtoKVfScwVdvww=",
+			"checksumSHA1": "pMsrfJZ8JwoPT2pBa1loXKhGODQ=",
 			"path": "golang.org/x/net/http2",
-			"revision": "da118f7b8e5954f39d0d2130ab35d4bf0e3cb344",
+			"revision": "9f648a60d9775ef5c977e7669d1673a7a67bef33",
-			"revisionTime": "2017-04-23T14:02:46Z"
+			"revisionTime": "2019-03-13T06:50:29Z"
 		},
 		{
 			"checksumSHA1": "CBoO1DFToP49Ezph60yZ4J4PBBs=",
@@ -1112,12 +1112,6 @@
 			"revision": "da118f7b8e5954f39d0d2130ab35d4bf0e3cb344",
 			"revisionTime": "2017-04-23T14:02:46Z"
 		},
-		{
-			"checksumSHA1": "3xyuaSNmClqG4YWC7g0isQIbUTc=",
-			"path": "golang.org/x/net/lex/httplex",
-			"revision": "da118f7b8e5954f39d0d2130ab35d4bf0e3cb344",
-			"revisionTime": "2017-04-23T14:02:46Z"
-		},
 		{
 			"checksumSHA1": "mCMW3hvbWFW1k5il9yyO7ELOdws=",
 			"path": "golang.org/x/net/proxy",