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disable elliptic curves P-384 and P-521 for TLS. (#5845)
This change disables the non-constant-time implementations of P-384 and P-521. As a consequence a client using just these curves cannot connect to the server. This should be no real issues because (all) clients at least support P-256. Further this change also rejects ECDSA private keys of P-384 and P-521. While non-constant-time implementations for the ECDHE exchange don't expose an obvious vulnerability, using P-384 or P-521 keys for the ECDSA signature may allow pratical timing attacks. Fixes #5844
This commit is contained in:
committed by
kannappanr
parent
c733fe87ce
commit
21a3c0f482
12
cmd/certs.go
12
cmd/certs.go
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
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package cmd
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import (
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/tls"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/pem"
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@@ -142,6 +144,16 @@ func getSSLConfig() (x509Certs []*x509.Certificate, rootCAs *x509.CertPool, tlsC
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if cert, err = loadX509KeyPair(getPublicCertFile(), getPrivateKeyFile()); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, nil, false, err
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}
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// Ensure that the private key is not a P-384 or P-521 EC key.
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// The Go TLS stack does not provide constant-time implementations of P-384 and P-521.
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if priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok {
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if pub, ok := priv.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey); ok {
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if name := pub.Params().Name; name == "P-384" || name == "P-521" { // unfortunately there is no cleaner way to check
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return nil, nil, nil, false, fmt.Errorf("TLS: the ECDSA curve '%s' is not supported", name)
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}
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}
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}
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tlsCert = &cert
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